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Translations and Abbreviations  
It has been my aim to write the thesis in British English. As a rule, all translations to 
English are mine. Official translations have been used when it was possible. I regarded a 
translation as official if it came from the source itself, had been commonly translated like 
this or appeared in a dictionary. Since the majority of the empirical material was in 
Danish, I experienced an amount of instances where no official English translation was 
available. All titles and names are presented in the original language with the English 
translation in a footnote at the bottom of the same page. I have remarked whenever the 
translation is not mine, i.e. when I regard it as official. If no translation appears, the title 
was originally in English. 
 One considerable exception is quotations from the group of newspaper articles, 
presented in 4.4.2, which are not translated by me. The articles, which originally 
appeared in Danish and Greenlandic daily and weekly newspapers, were translated to 
English by professional translators. Therefore, the quotations will appear as I read them, 
in English.    
It has been my intention to avoid abbreviations when possible. The few cases 
where I used one, it was because the abbreviation was commonly used in a way that I 
considered to replace the full name. Another exception is abbreviations in references. 
Though the abbreviations are also explained when they occur the first time, they are 
shown here: 
UKG: Udvalget vedrørende tilladelser og koncessioner i henhold til lov om mineralske 
råstoffer i Grønland1  
KHG: Kommission om hjemmestyre i Grønland2 
PC & AGTL: Petro-Canada (PC) & The Alberta Gas Trunk Line Company Limited  
 
Some terms deserve a few explaining words.  
The term “exploit” has two seemingly opposing meanings in Danish (and 
Norwegian). It means “udnytte”, to make use of something, and “udbytte”, to overuse 
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 The Committee of Licences and Concessions regarding the Greenlandic Raw Materials Act 
2
 The Commission on Home Rule in Greenland (official translation) 
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something. I have used it in the first sense. So when I write “to exploit hydrocarbons”, it 
means something similar to “produce”.   
The terms “produce”, “create” and “construct” are all used to describe a processes 
of change, implying approximately the same. I have tried to use “exploit” instead of 
“produce” when describing the industrial activity related to hydrocarbon extraction.  
The expression “Denmark-Greenland” is taken from Sørensen (2006) and is used 
to connote the total of Denmark and Greenland, when I do not find it necessary to 
distinguish the details of their relation. 
 1 
1.0 Introduction and Research Question 
This chapter introduces the topic of the thesis and my personal entrance to it. It describes 
the central processes that will be analysed and introduces the approach taken to do this. 
Then the topic is specified and ends as the research question, which to be answered by 
this thesis. Lastly, the structure of the thesis is presented in a rough sketch. 
 
1.1 It’s the Oil, Stupid! 
Climate change, peak oil, race for the North Pole, the melting of permanent ice caps, ice-
free North East Passage; the headline-making Arctic events are many and visible. 
Greenland is in the midst of this – geographically, geophysically, legally, economically 
and politically speaking – and is of many reasons an interesting place to ask questions 
that might illuminate how these processes can and will proceed. During Greenland’s 
short history of political autonomy many of the forces that shape such events have been 
played out in the construction of this Arctic nation. Hydrocarbons − a term that captures 
both crude oil and natural gas − are a crucial component to the course of these events. 
Hydrocarbons are fossil fuel, a valuable resource, specialised knowledge and a way of 
life. 
In the initial phase of selecting a topic for this thesis, I was fascinated by 
Greenland as a place where some of the global ecological problems could be observed at 
close range. It seemed an intriguing paradox that one could promote hydrocarbon 
extraction and debate harmful consequences of climate change simultaneously. I termed 
it “the Arctic Paradox” and this was the original title of the thesis. Later I discovered that 
this double, or parallel, strategy was not as controversial as I first thought. 
Compellingly, politically autonomic times in Greenland coincide with 
hydrocarbon-times. The first influential Greenlandic political formulations concerning 
autonomy were written at almost exactly the same time as the administrative framework 
for Greenlandic hydrocarbons was being drafted. The time span of the hydrocarbons 
exploration activity is roughly captured by the two most fundamental documents in the 
political history of autonomous Greenland: Hjemmestyreloven3 from 1978 and 
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Selvstyreloven4 from 2009, and the closely related commissioned reports representing 
years of work leading up to the law proposals.  
According to the political visions, the promising geological assessments and the 
world’s projected hydrocarbons demand, we stand on the brink of a new era in 
Greenlandic history. Again, one could say. Surely, there have been small leaks, 
promising seismic surveys and favourable geological structures, but during 40 years of 
exploration history it is an intriguing fact that no commercial exploitable discovery has 
been made. Hydrocarbons have never been extracted commercially in Greenland. The 
expected and desired oil adventure has not taken place so far. 
Knowledge of hydrocarbons in Greenland precedes Greenlandic autonomy. 
Reservoirs of oil had been assessed by the geological expeditions from the 1920s and 
since the legal framework was introduced in 1935 there had also been explorations and 
surveys on an irregular basis. While this had happened without too much debate, the 
Home Rule Commission of 1975 was at the centre of heated discussions about the 
subsurface resources and rights. Gradually it turned out to be the single most important 
issue, or hindrance, in the Home Rule negotiations (Dahl 1986:64). In fact, hydrocarbons 
were to become a key issue in the way Greenlandic natural resources were understood 
and framed.  
When exploration wells were drilled in the 1970s, oil spills and blowouts 
contributed to the idea of hydrocarbons as a dangerous activity, and a threat to the 
indigenous population and the environment in which they lived. Simultaneously, 
optimism was spreading and an oil adventure was something that could happen in the 
north. American companies had discovered profitable hydrocarbon reserves in Prudhoe 
Bay, Alaska, and Canadian companies conducted promising explorations in the Beaufort 
Sea. After the Danish, British and Norwegian discoveries in the North Sea in the late 
1960s, the oil adventure had come close. Was Greenland next? 
Posing this question led me to two large events regarding hydrocarbons in 
Greenland: The Arctic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land Concession (see p.73 and 82). 
While the Arctic Pilot Project was a Canadian proposal of Arctic shipping of liquid 
natural gas and perhaps crude oil, the Jameson Land Concession was autonomous 
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Greenland’s first real chance to be part of an oil adventure. Who wanted Greenland to be 
next, was it feasible and what were the hindrances standing in the way?   
 
1.2 The Challenge that Disappeared 
From the late 1960s, ethnic or national-minded Greenlandic right claims began to surface. 
When Greenland’s autonomy was negotiated in the 1970s, the management of 
Greenland’s hydrocarbon resources had turned into a Greenlandic political project, which 
represented a challenge to the Danish administration. It was the vast distances, ice, 
mountains and fjords of Greenland against small, flat and brown Denmark. There was 
still something to argue about, still something to be traded. Regardless if the motivation 
for Danish interests was private economic profit or public savings on subsidies to 
Greenland, there was a Danish desire in developing the hydrocarbon-fields. Seen from 
the other side, hydrocarbons were for many people in Greenland the symbol of a 
threatening, industrial culture. Hydrocarbons could be seen to represent a Danish (partly 
colonial) modernisation project. If the Greenlanders were given the right to their land and 
had the autonomy to decide, it was an openly stated outcome that no more hydrocarbon 
explorations would take place. To many people in early 1970s Denmark-Greenland, it 
was not a question of how, how much, how fast, when and where, but a simple and clear 
‘no’ to exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons. 
As such the struggling positions of indigenous rights claims versus frontier 
colonialism seemed to be the discourses that initially structured confrontation over 
Greenlandic hydrocarbons. This central line of confrontation in the Denmark-Greenland 
relationship was to be transformed in the period of 1975-1985. In the late 1970s, a third 
discursive position − partly a synthesis of the foregoing indigenous and colonial 
discourses − was to become the favoured way of understanding the hydrocarbon-issue. 
Later I will refer to this as ecological modernisation: the “politico-administrative” 
response to “global ecological threats” as for instance global warming or ozone depletion 
(Hajer 1995, 1996, see p.14). This is seen as part of a larger shift in modernised, western 
countries, where ecological problems are integrated in institutional arrangements in stead 
of posing a challenge to industrial development. In our case, one of the most visible 
consequences of this shift in definitional power was the sudden ability to explain and 
 4 
justify renewed hydrocarbon exploration in Greenland in the early 1980s.  With this, the 
struggle between contradictory visions of future resource development in Greenland 
moved towards an end. My analysis shows that at the brink of the 1980s, contours of a 
new situation appeared, only to become clearer as time passed.  
The latest culmination of this change is visible in the Self Rule Agreement 
between Greenland and Denmark, introduced in June 2009. From a Greenlandic 
perspective, hydrocarbons extraction was and is tied to ambitions of, eventually, 
economic and political independence. Thus, as will be explained below, a co-production 
(Jasanoff 2004, 2005) of knowledge about hydrocarbons and nation-building was part of 
the process. In a decade, the harsh disagreements about hydrocarbons seemed to have 
been resolved. The challenge disappeared – how did it happen? 
 
1.3 Research Question 
40 years of commercial non-existence has not stopped hydrocarbons from playing a lead 
role in the Danish-Greenlandic post-colonial relationship. Hydrocarbons exist without 
being accessible. Nevertheless key political aspects of Greenland’s development have 
been influenced by hydrocarbons – as a physical existence and as an idea. The common 
narratives by which Greenland is imagined and understood depends on hydrocarbons as a 
scientific fact, an economic prospect and technologies to facilitate their use. On the other 
hand hydrocarbons have been constructed and framed to serve such narratives. From 
being a brownish, smelly substance, mere organic waste, deposited below the subsurface, 
hydrocarbons have become a catalyst of desire and visions. The point is to inquire about 
what society has done with hydrocarbons and what hydrocarbons have done with society. 
The question of how the issue of hydrocarbons in Greenland changed over time? 
will be the general approach that defines this thesis. By the issue of hydrocarbons I mean 
the relations in which hydrocarbons have been integrated, both as a part of nature and 
politics. What have been the challenges of such integration and what have been the 
responses and solutions?  
Of course the question demands further specification and as it was, such 
specification was shaped by the events and processes I investigated. Around the time 
where Greenlandic Home Rule was on the political sketch pad, many hydrocarbon-
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related events happened closely in time, all strongly affecting how Denmark-Greenland 
would proceed. The time-frame can therefore be limited to roughly ten years, from the 
formation of the Danish-Greenlandic Home Rule Commission in 1975 to the finalisation 
of the first hydrocarbons concession under the autonomous Greenlandic administration, 
the Jameson Land Concession, in 1984/5.  
During a decade, maybe less, I hypothesise that some of the patterns still guiding 
the management and framing of the Greenlandic natural resources fell into place and 
became visible as a discourse or a discourse-coalition (see p.21). Furthermore, I 
hypothesise this change in discourses to have taken place in the early 1980s, in the first 
years of autonomous Greenland. The aim of this thesis is therefore to analyse the 
discursive structures of such a change, with a special focus on hydrocarbons: 
 
Q1: How did the issue of hydrocarbons relate to the framing and management of 
Greenland’s natural resources and nature between approximately 1975 and 1985? 
 
Regarding the time-frame, the 10 years in question seemed an obvious choice based on 
the events referred to in the empirical material. Of course, many structures were visible 
further back, for instance the first scientific-geological commission regarding Greenland 
was established as early as 1878 (see p.38). Key legal and political material referred to, 
such as the Mining Act of 1965 (see p.44), was also introduced earlier. All of section 5.1 
and parts of 5.2 will be investigating what led to the situation in 1975. The main 
analytical emphasis, however, will be on the period in question.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two (2.0 Academic Context) is meant to contextualise the findings of this thesis 
among the existing academic literature. Chapter three (3.0 Theoretical Considerations) is 
a review of the theoretical perspectives employed. The chapter outlines the two main 
analytical perspectives of the thesis: ecological modernisation and co-production. Chapter 
four (4.0 Method) is concerned with the methodological approach to answering the 
research question. The definitions of discourse and discourse analysis, the conceptual 
tools, the collection of data, the process of inter
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sources are part of this chapter. Chapter five (5.0 Analysis) contains the analysis and 
composes approximately two thirds of the total length. The analysis is structured 
chronologically. It begins with a short historical introduction, which emphasises the 
importance of geology in the framing of Greenland. This qualifies the perspective of co-
production. The next section describes the process before and during the creation of 
autonomous Greenland – the Home Rule process. After this, attention is turned towards 
two hydrocarbon-related events which are seen as emblematic to the hypothesised 
discursive change of ecological modernisation. Finally, the chapter tries to analyse how 
this new discourse can be seen as co-producing science (mainly geology) and the politics 
of hydrocarbons. Chapter six (6.0 Summary of Results) summarises the findings 
discussed by each section into a coherent whole and includes a table which present the 
findings chronologically. Chapter seven (7.0 Conclusion) explains how the findings 
answer the research question and in which way the hypothesised change is confirmed by 
the analysis. Chapter eight (8.0 References) include the list of literature and appendixes 
containing relevant lists regarding the empirical sources.  
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2.0 Academic Context 
In order to situate this thesis among existing research, I will describe the most important 
works used and referred to and provide an overview of the academic works in related 
fields. The search for relevant literature took place in the databases of Bibsys, which is 
the public internet portal of institutional libraries in Norway, and Google Scholar, the 
academic internet search engine of Google. Jack Hick’s Selected bibliography on 
Greenland (2006), which contains an impressive and comprehensive collection of 
academic works on Greenland, has also been a valuable source.  
 
2.1 Three Bulks of Research 
The relevant literature can be divided into three bulks.  
The first bulk consists of the works that share the topic of this thesis: 
hydrocarbons in Greenland. The research report Offentlig styring af olie og gas i 
Grønland5 (1984) by Jerome Davies, Finn Breinholt Larsen and Anne Marie Pagh 
Nielsen, along with related articles (Larsen 1984, Larsen & Nielsen 1984,1985) based on 
the report, is an analysis of the Danish-Greenlandic handling of hydrocarbon projects; 
specifically the Jameson Land Concession negotiations 1980-1985 (see p.85). It was 
argued that the Danish-Greenlandic collaboration rested on an “unstable balance” and 
that the related administrative and institutional frameworks were downplaying 
disagreements. This gave the political decisions regarding hydrocarbons a “ritual” 
character (Larsen & Nielsen 1985:110). It was emphasised that the bureaucrats exercised 
too large an influence and prepared the cases to avoid political debate. The authors 
thereby criticised the lack of long term political vision and tangible strategies for an 
integrated approach to hydrocarbon-projects in the general Greenlandic development.  
The book entitled Politics of the Northwest Passage, edited by Frankly Griffiths 
(1987) , includes two articles about hydrocarbons in Greenland. Greenlandic and Danish 
Attitudes to Canadian Arctic Shipping by Lars Toft Rasmussen (1987) points towards a 
potential shift in Danish-Greenlandic political attitude regarding Arctic shipping. While 
Greenland received Danish support to oppose Canadian Arctic shipping, its own 
hydrocarbon-project a few years later seemed to require a similar way of transport. While 
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this could lead to a more “cooperative Greenlandic attitude”, Rasmussen suggests that an 
“ambivalent” policy of opposing Canadian shipping while accepting it in Greenland 
would create problems regarding the public opinion. Since neither the Canadian nor the 
Greenlandic shipping was realised, it is still an open question. Lessons of the Arctic Pilot 
Project by Jennifer Lewington (1987) saw Canadian Arctic shipping, specifically the 
Arctic Pilot Project (see p.73), from a Canadian perspective and analysed why Arctic 
shipping never became the large scale endeavour it was predicted to be. Lewington 
concludes that a combination of fluctuation in oil and gas prices and political and 
environmental uncertainties made the investments seem too costly. In other words: the 
Danish-Greenlandic opposition is not a decisive factor in Lewington’s conclusion.  
The Danish journalist Philip Lauritzen wrote extensively on Greenland-related 
issues and specifically on the Greenlandic society and modern resource development, 
both as an idea and as reality. Though Lauriten’s work is not academic, it is such a great 
source of well documented information that I decided to include it. His book Olie og 
amuletter6 (1979) was an attempt to follow the Danish explorer Knud Rasmussen’s route 
from his fifth pan-arctic Thule-expedition. On his way through the circumpolar areas, 
excluding Russia, Lauritzen interviewed a mixed composition of residents, indigenous as 
well as immigrants. It is clear that Lauritzen himself is very sceptical towards 
hydrocarbon-exploitation and he points to many of the negative social and environmental 
consequences. A second book by Lauritzen is Stille – Isbrydende supertankere: en trussel 
mod mennesker, dyr og den arktiske stilhed7 (1982), which follows the Greenlandic 
opposition against the Arctic Pilot Project (see p.76). Lauritzen is highly critical towards 
the project and emphasises the uncertainties around Arctic shipping, which he thinks may 
turn out sparking an ecological disaster.  
Anthropologist Jens Dahl’s Arktisk Selvstyre8 (1986) is a historical analysis of the 
structural processes and the power relations leading to the decolonisation of Greenland. 
The central question posed is whether “the Home Rule is the beginning of actual self-
rule, does is bear the seeds within it – or is it merely colonialism in a new dress?” (Dahl 
1986:8). Dahl analyses the internal Greenlandic political process to investigate whether 
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the Home Rule process is in fact going where it was intended to. The book contains a 
comprehensive overview over the politics of natural resources from approximately 1975-
1985. Besides being a valuable historical work, it also contains some empirical material 
that I have utilised when needed.  
The second bulk of research is characterised by enquiring about relevant historical 
processes of Denmark-Greenland throughout the 20th century, though not specifically on 
hydrocarbons. What these works share, is an image of mineral resources as something 
that has had a prominent position regarding the Danish-Greenlandic view on Greenland’s 
potential for at least a century. The Danish historian Axel Kjær Sørensen’s Denmark-
Greenland in the Twentieth Century (2006) portray Danish-Greenlandic relationship and 
the historical process. This includes descriptions of the main historical events and the 
persons who shaped them.  
Christoffer Jakob Riis’ Retten, magten og æren9 (2003) focuses on a trial between 
the Danish Geologist Lauge Koch (1892-1964) and a group of fellow Danish geologists. 
Yet it provides good insights in the geological milieu in the 1920-40s and includes many 
statements about mineral resources in Greenland.  
Finn Lynge’s Arctic Wars: Animal Rights and Endangered Peoples (1992) 
provides along with Selvstændighed for Grønland?10 (1999) some of the few relevant 
works by Greenlandic scholars, with a perspective from Greenland’s point of view. 
Lynge shows how the campaign against seal hunting damaged the relationship between 
conservationist organisations and the hunting population. Lynge points at the 
unacknowledged cultural differences between typical urban, western conservationists and 
the Greenlandic hunter. To him, this prevents the drafting of a common approach to solve 
ecological issues. In his work on Greenlandic independence, Lynge asks what it would 
take to make an independent Greenland. Besides discussing some of the huge challenges 
an independent Greenland would face, Lynge concludes that the political visions have 
been replaced by everyday problems. 
Economist Martin Paldam posed in his book Grønlands økonomiske udvikling11 
(1994), a fundamental question regarding Greenland’s economic base which has been 
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relevant all along: “What does it take to close the gap?” The “gap” is the difference 
between the Danish block grant and the Greenlandic national product, which is less than 
half of the block grant. What economic activity can close this? Interestingly Paldam does 
not suggest hydrocarbon extraction as an alternative, because he sees possibilities in what 
is already there. This has been a key in my understanding of hydrocarbons in Greenland 
as perhaps more idea than reality.  
Writing about the environmental administrational challenges of contemporary 
Greenland, the Greenlandic planning engineer, Anne Merrild (2008, Merrild & Kørnøv 
2008), has focused on technical/legal aspects of natural resource planning preparing 
Greenland for what she terms a “mega-industry”. Interestingly, Merrild explains how the 
legal foundation of mineral resource project is separate from the general environmental 
management, which is another sign of the special status given to such projects.  
You will also find a few references to Jens Brøsted’s Et beskåret selvstyre12 
(1979), which provides an investigation of the Home Rule process.  
The third bulk consists of research that is not about Greenland, but hydrocarbons 
in general and the political processes of circumpolar areas. The reason for including this 
literature is to situate Greenland in a broader context. The research field of region-
studies, investigating such processes as regionalism and region-building in the Arctic, is 
well suited to understand Greenland’s political-historical circumsphere and how it was 
crafted. E. Carina H. Keskitalo’s book Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an 
International Region (2004) and a related article (2007), on the creation of the Arctic 
Council, represents a tendency in region-studies where the view of region is that of a 
socially constructed space. Along with Stokke & Hønneland’s International Cooperation 
and Arctic Governance (2007), they use the perspective of region-building, originally 
introduced by Iver Neumann (1992). Region-building combines Benedict Anderson’s 
understanding of nation-building (see p.17) with a Foucaultian discourse analysis.  
Various definitions of the Arctic and institutions like the Arctic Council imply 
that attention is turned towards particular issues while others are omitted. Since 
environmental protection was one of the main ingredients in the Arctic Councils, founded 
in 1996, the image of the Arctic as a vulnerable eco-system, including the indigenous 
                                                 
12
 An amputated Home Rule  
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residents, has been promoted. However, since the “normative contributions” of “the 
Arctic approach, has been far more limited, largely echoing broader international regimes 
already in existence” (Stokke 2007:182), it seems that some of the geopolitical aspects 
have been downplayed. What would happen in the Arctic if a large reservoir of 
hydrocarbon resources became exploitable?  
In a Norwegian context such reservoirs, discovered during the 1960s, were to 
become the single major source of state income: an oil adventure. Several publications 
scrutinise the contents of this concept. They were included because the Norwegian 
development has affected, or inspired the Greenlandic situation considerably. Øyvind 
Ihlen’s Petroleumsparadiset13 (2007) is an investigation of the Norwegian oil industries’ 
communication strategies as their self-understanding. Helge Ryggvik’s Til siste dråpe14 
(2009) is an analysis of Norwegian oil industry in relation to the global political economy 
of oil. Gudmund Skjeldal & Unni Berge’s Feber15 (2009) is a more subjective analysis of 
the contents of the Norwegian oil adventure. Finally there is Francis Sejersted’s 
Systemtvang eller politikk16 (1999), a historical analysis of how the oil-industrial complex 
developed in Norway and the special characteristics of this development. Common to all 
four publications is that the oil industry in Norway is seen as a special case compared to 
other oil-exporting countries. The oil industry is not the only influential perspective. 
Environmental protection and the general modernisation of society are examples of 
competing perspectives. Ryggvik and Skjeldal & Berge are critical towards the image 
framed as an oil adventure. Ihlen and Sejersted are more concerned with showing how 
the oil industry has permeated many areas which it used to stand in contrast to. The idea 
that hydrocarbon exploitation can be sustainable, as argued in Ihlen (2007:108) is a good 
example of this. 
 
2.2 Contextualisation  
With this thesis I want to reintroduce the implications and aspects of the Greenlandic 
hydrocarbon-issue as a subject of debate. However, the thesis cannot be said to adhere to 
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 The Petroleum Paradise  
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 To the Last Drop 
15
 Fever  
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 System forced or Politics  
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one specific field of research regarding hydrocarbons in Greenland, presented in the three 
bulks above. As the presentation shows, the research question might be more familiar to a 
region-building approach than to the existing literature on Greenland in terms of 
theoretical foundation. However, if I was to relate the thesis to analyses of Greenlandic 
hydrocarbons, the contribution to these would be that the hydrocarbon-issue is removed 
from its colonial/post-colonial constraints. Almost all Danish literature on Greenland 
pictures the Danish-Greenland in a colonial framework or invokes metaphors as “parent-
child” to describe the relationship between the two nations. There is a tendency to make 
the issue of Greenlandic hydrocarbons too special in the sense that it is based on a unique 
Danish-Greenlandic relationship. This is something I have deliberately tried to avoid. 
Another contribution is to insist on the existence of a Danish-Greenlandic hydrocarbon-
issue and of its considerable influence on real politics, even though in terms of quantities, 
whether barrels or kroner, it is almost non-existing. This is justified by the theoretical 
foundation presented in the next chapter. Another aspect of the non-existence is that very 
little research has been done on Greenlandic hydrocarbons outside the natural sciences, 
which is something I think is regrettable.  
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3.0 Theoretical Considerations 
This chapter describes my theoretical approach to answering the research question. I have 
interpreted hydrocarbons in Greenland through two related interpretive perspectives. My 
starting point is that the project of autonomous Greenland changed character in the period 
1975-1985, expressed as “the challenge that disappeared” and presented in 1.2.  
The first perspective has to do with the way hydrocarbons as an ecological 
dilemma becomes closely related to the management and framing of nature. This is where 
the discourse of ecological modernisation is relevant, since its manifestation is the 
“politico-administrative response to the latest manifestation of the ecological dilemma” 
(Hajer 1996:248). This framework is based on works by Marten A. Hajer, The Politics of 
Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process (1995) and 
the related book chapter Ecological Modernisation as Cultural Politics (1996), which 
investigates how ecological modernisation from around 1984 became dominant in 
western environmental politics. One of the main outcomes was the way ecological 
dilemmas – for instance acid rain or, presently, climate change – were encapsulated by 
regulative regimes: instead of posing a challenge to the process of modernisation they 
became part of it. 
The second perspective asks how the autonomous Greenlandic nation and the 
hydrocarbon-issue are co-produced. The interpretive perspective of co-production can be 
generally understood as “the proposition that the way in which we know and represent 
the world, both nature and society, are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to 
live in it” (Jasanoff 2004:2). Therefore it is of interest to know who did the representation 
of the Greenlandic nature and natural resources – and how it was done.  The approach is 
mainly based on two books by Shiela Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-production 
of Science and Social Order (2004, edited by Jasanoff) and Designs on Nature: Science 
and Democracy in Europe and the United States (2005). In addition, I have drawn on the 
works by Kristin Asdal, Scarce Resources (Nor. Knappe ressurser) (1998) and the article 
Re-Inventing Politics of the State: Science and Politics of Contestation (2007), which 
examine different aspects of Norwegian environmental policy in relation to science and 
technology. Asdal’s presentations of various Norwegian cases resemble the view on co-
production of autonomous Greenland: “If new objects, issues and realities are generated 
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in scientific practice, science is no longer a constraint on political action, but may 
actually produce politics” (Asdal 2007:309). The way Asdal presents the cases is also 
relevant from the perspective of ecological modernisation, since she describes what 
happens from the moment an environmental problem, or dilemma, arises until a 
regulative framework becomes dominant. In relation to the co-production of autonomous 
Greenland, I use Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991, a revision of the 
1983 version), which provides a re-interpretation of the concept of nation and suggests 
the term “nation-building” based on “national imaginings” as a way to describe it. The 
representations of such common narratives would therefore be of interest to the research 
question.    
The writings of Bruno Latour have been used to discuss perspectives on 
ecological issues and political ecology, problematising the definition and understanding 
of ecology in relation to modernisation. This includes: We Have Never Been Modern 
(1993) and To Modernize or to Ecologise? That is the Question (1998), in which it is 
suggested that political ecology has failed to promote their cause, because they 
misunderstood what ecology was. If this is the case, it might explain some of the change 
implied by ecological modernisation.  
 
3.1 Discourse of Ecological Dilemmas 
The reason for using the perspective of ecological modernisation was based on the 
impression that the change with and around hydrocarbons in Greenland came very close 
to the more general description of ecological modernisation. The parallelism of Hajer’s 
theoretical perspective and the Greenlandic hydrocarbons-case was stunning. The 
situation preceding ecological modernisation fits the discussion on hydrocarbons in 
Greenland in the 1970s and development of ecological modernisation described by Hajer 
is very close to the course of events in Greenland. 
The perspective of ecological modernisation turns attention towards the way that 
the hydrocarbon-issue was framed as an ecological crisis, a new ecological dilemma. 
When did Greenlandic hydrocarbons become problematic and to whom? Hydrocarbons in 
Greenland exist physically in a place as a part of the (Greenlandic or Arctic) nature.  The 
basic approach is that it is the exploitation − exploration, extraction, production and 
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transportation − of hydrocarbons that marks the beginning of the hydrocarbon-issue as an 
ecological dilemma. That such exploitation is closely tied to the development of the 
modern industrial society is implicit. It is assumed that one can identify two opposing 
ways, detailed content will be explained later (in 4.2, p.21), to understand nature in the 
Arctic: as a homeland, an indigenous view and as a frontier, a colonial view. The views 
hold rather different and conflicting opinions on nature and the connected rights and 
resources. Along with other positions, this resembles the situation before ecological 
modernisation, which in the 1970s was “comprised of a wide spectrum of – often 
antagonistic – views” (Hajer 1996:248)   
Ecological modernisation is a break with the past, because ambitions which were 
previously seen as antagonistic, economic growth and the resolution of ecological 
problems become connected. In our case we can substitute these two ambitions with the 
views of frontier versus homeland. The central thought is that ecological modernisation 
“recognises the structural character of the environmental problematic, while on the other 
ecological modernisation differs essentially from a radical green perspective” (Hajer 
1996:249). This is a new perspective on the regulative framework of managing the 
environment since industry is now seen not as an obstacle, but as a driver of green 
solutions. Captured by the phrase “sustainable development”, it is believed that industrial 
development, ideologically unchanged, can be turned into an ecologically friendly type of 
growth. The modernisation efforts were expanded to include nature and with an ever 
increasing scientific knowledge of the eco-system, a regulative regime could secure and 
control sustainability. Should an ecological problem arise, society would have “to 
modernise itself out of the crisis” (Hajer 1996:249). 
While the new Home Rule administration got into the constraints of everyday 
political priorities and became positive towards hydrocarbons exploitation, ecological 
modernisation provides an explanation of what happened. When much of the 1970s 
discussions on the hydrocarbon-issue implied a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ to exploitations, the early 
1980s was a much more blurred image, because no one gave such clear answers. With the 
perspective of ecological modernisation there is a particular turn in discursive structures 
that can be identified and help to un-blur what happened. This is the first part of 
answering the research question. 
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3.2 Co-producing Greenland 
The co-production perspective holds the view that the hydrocarbon-issue and the 
Greenlandic nation might have produced each other: “Natural and social orders, in short, 
are produced at one and the same time − or, more precisely, co-produced” (Jasanoff 
2005:19). As mentioned earlier (in 1.3), hydrocarbons have affected the Greenlandic 
national narrative by their physical existence and as an idea. The fact that hydrocarbons 
have never been extracted in Greenland makes this even more obvious. One could argue 
that the potentially related ecological crisis therefore was not there either. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that Greenlandic autonomy has a lot to do with hydrocarbons. How is that? This 
is where I found the co-production perspective relevant because hydrocarbons can be 
interpreted as more than an ecological crisis.   
Regarding the research question, the point is that the relation between 
hydrocarbons and the framing and management of the Greenlandic nature and natural 
resources is not a simple one-way relation (whatever that is). The social order of 
hydrocarbons (for instance an administrative and institutional framework) is understood 
as being created simultaneous to the creation of knowledge about hydrocarbons as a 
natural existence (for instance seismic surveys of the subsurface). Of course, this could 
also affect what is perceived as an ecological crisis. Therefore, as the analysis unfolds it 
will be important to ask if the process of creating autonomous Greenland redefines 
hydrocarbons and nature   
 When Anderson proposed a definition of a nation as “an imagined political 
community”, he framed nationalism as something creative, to be created, and not a fact or 
a feeling on waiting to be invoked (Anderson 1991:5-7). Making a nation as Greenland 
then “crucially depends on deploying persuasive representations of the symbol that 
signify nationhood” (Jasanoff 2004:26).  In a co-production perspective such 
representations are no less created than the imagined community they constitute: “any 
nation so conceived can certainly be seen … as a network that is partly held together by 
circulating technologies of representation and communication” (Jasanoff 2004:26). This 
turns attention towards the hydrocarbon-issue and the Greenlandic nation and how they 
are interrelated.  
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Another aspect of the co-production of the Greenlandic nation has to do with the 
colonial relation. Who or what produced the Denmark-Greenland and could it be that the 
colonial power is not the only part that creates a colonial relation? In other words: when 
Denmark abandoned being a colonial power, could it be that Greenland insisted on being 
a colony? In order to be able to explain the exploitation of hydrocarbons, the Home Rule 
administration could be in need of such a colonial image.  
So, who began to represent hydrocarbons? As a physical existence hydrocarbons 
are part of nature and can be represented scientifically in research by for instance 
geology. As an idea, the search for hydrocarbons could be represented by someone 
concerned by the consequences of exploitation, for instance hunters and fishermen. As 
Kristin Asdal’s (2007) points out in her article on the fluorine-poisoning from an 
aluminium-smelter in Årdal, Norway, the legitimacy of the opponents’ position is 
strengthened by scientific representation. The contestation of the poisoning, which was 
discovered by local farmers in the 1950s, was only recognised when a laboratory 
confirmed and quantified the pollutant. However, Asdal’s purpose is not to tell a story 
about something that was “reduced to numbers”. Rather, she understands the case as an 
example of “how laboratory science and technical procedures enabled policy” (Asdal 
2007:315). The scientific representation was in this case a creative force, since “political 
fluorine” as a new political space was made. In this perspective “science is no longer a 
constraint of political action, but may actually produce politics”. (Asdal 2007:309). If this 
is the case, they boundaries between entities such as “science” and “politics” might be 
difficult to draw. This example brings us back to the co-production of natural and social 
orders as mentioned above.    
The perspective of co-production points to instances where boundaries of usually 
separated fields dissolve only to be reproduced. The creation of autonomous Greenland is 
interesting in this aspect. The nation-building was closely related to the hydrocarbons-
issue which again was closely related the discussion of nature in Greenland, hence they 
were co-produced. Understanding the role of science, and primarily geology, in creating 
the hydrocarbon-issue as one that influenced real political events could be a good place to 
begin enquiring about this process of co-production.  
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3.3 Modernising Ecology 
Finally, I will dwell a little more on the content of ecology and nature, since the terms are 
so central to the theoretical perspectives of ecological modernisation and co-production. 
Latour’s analysis touches on both ecological modernisation and co-production. As the 
two interpretive perspectives, Latour also sees the tendency of ecological issues becomes 
increasingly integrated in a general modernisation effort. However, if Hajer asks what 
and co-production asks how it happened, Latour asks why. The reason it became 
modernisation instead of the intended ecologisation, was because ecology did not have 
“anything to do with nature as such” (Latour 1998:220). So what does that mean? 
When the discussions of hydrocarbons become a matter of this fjord, this hunting 
ground or this settlement, the problem is that it is no longer about ecology. This is 
interesting since the strongest arguments against hydrocarbon extraction are based on 
place/culture-specific positions (as will be explained in 4.3, p.24). In our example the 
Greenlandic hunters could be in such a position. The problem, according to Latour is that 
the legitimacy of the local-ecological argument is taken over by stronger positions, other 
regimes of justification17, for instance economic or administrative arguments, because it 
is not genuine. Arguments from the so-called green parties are caught up in larger 
constellations when for instances “green products” are presented as part of a sustainable 
way of life (Latour 1998:223). The argument that economic growth and environmental 
protection were opposites belonged originally to the green parties. As in ecological 
modernisation, this line of conflict seemed to have disappeared. One of the results of this 
was that the green parties lost their exclusive rights to the ecological issue, Latour argues. 
To provide an answer as to how this could happen, Latour asks: what if “ecology 
did not concern itself with nature?” (Latour 1998:227). The point is that descriptions of 
political ecology rarely fit the practice in which it engages. When the goal is protecting 
nature for it own sake, this is disturbed by the necessity to make scientific surveys in 
those areas to justify such protection, for instance to count populations. Or that the 
claimed understanding of ecological systems, by laws of science, as lists threatened 
species, is often subject to scientific controversies between experts. If political ecology is 
                                                 
17
 Latour refers to Boltanski and Thevenot (1991, Latour 1998), see also Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), 
but I wont go into this. 
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not about nature, what is it then about? The uncertainty about us and our surroundings 
should be a basic feature of ecology. Doing what is best for nature is more about 
“suspending our certainties” about what is good for everyone, for human and non-human 
beings. Like the co-production perspective, understanding the ecological system is just as 
much about society as nature. If that is the case, a complete understanding of specific 
ecosystems is not attainable − we cannot limit them. This uncertainty is contrasted by that 
of a modern administration, described by ecological modernisation, since the creation of 
a management of nature and natural resources demands scientific knowledge about what 
is managed. Latour argues that ecology should juxtapose itself to a modern 
administration of nature and holds the view that “We don't know what is interconnected 
and woven together. We are feeling our way, experimenting, trying things out. Nobody 
knows of what an environment is capable” (Latour 1998:231).  
While this might sound very confusing, the purpose of turning concepts as nature 
and ecology on their heads is to look at some aspects of them that might have been 
concealed. As with ecological modernisation and co-production, a change in the way 
arguments about ecology are legitimised can be observed, as with green parties, but 
perhaps the change is not only about ecology. If this is the case, autonomous Greenland is 
not moving closer to nature by the creation of a Greenlandic environmental regulative 
framework, because the apparent certainty this implies has nothing to do with knowledge 
of nature or ecology. 
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4.0 Method  
This chapter explains how the interpretive perspectives of the process in question are to 
be carried out as a piece of academic work. The theoretical perspectives do make some 
approaches more suitable than others. Hence it is shown how the choice of a certain view 
on discourse analysis and following conceptual tools will facilitate the analysis of the 
empirical sources. Aspects regarding possibilities and limitations of the chosen approach 
are also described. 
 
4.1 Discourse Analysis 
Applying discourse analysis can be done in numerous ways. It is normal to assert the 
foundational approach to Michel Foucault (Foucault 1972). The analytical stance is social 
constructivist, poststructuralist or postmodernist (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999:14, Kvale 
1997:51). Some things might differ among these, but several common properties seem to 
stand out. This includes connecting theory to method via conceptions of language, 
knowledge, meaning, practice and power. The foundational view is identified by 
Jørgensen & Phillips (1999:13) as four key premises that are typical for the field of 
discourse analysis: First, a critical approach to common knowledge; second, historical 
and cultural specificity; third, connection between knowledge and social processes and, 
fourth, connection between knowledge and (social) agency. It becomes clear, that the 
purpose is not to look behind the discourse in search of truth; truth is produced within the 
discourse itself. Truth is negotiated, or fought over, over time. And so it changes over 
time (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999:23-31). This has implications for the way power is 
understood as well. Foucault’s dual concept of power-knowledge builds on the idea that 
the power to define truth, and thus legitimate knowledge, is defined within a discourse − 
and vice-versa, because knowledge is itself the force by which a discourse becomes 
established.  
Based on this understanding this thesis understand the concept of discourse in line 
with Foucault, who treats it “sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated 
practice that accounts for a number of statements” (Foucault 1972:80, quoted in Mills 
2004:6).   
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My research design acknowledges that discourse analysis is central to the research 
question of this thesis and as the foundation of the theoretical approaches. There are a 
number of useful perspectives on discourse analysis. These ranges from quite text 
specific, linguistic oriented methods, such critical discourse analysis, to the more general 
approaches in which all social phenomena are relevant in principle, exemplified by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory (Jørgensen & Phillips 
2002:24,60). Due to my theoretical perspective, I wanted a definition which did not 
differentiate language and non-language, and was reasonably specific.  
This thesis employs the following definition of discourse analysis: “the 
examination of argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken 
statements as well as the practices through which these utterances are made” (Hajer 
2006:61).   
A basic assumption here is that language is more than a “neutral medium”. 
Change in language, such as the formulation of problems or of definitions, can induce a 
change outside language. Social patterns of everyday life can be changed by new ways of 
thinking and speaking (Hajer 2006:61). In our case, we assume that the way 
hydrocarbons in Greenland were related to the framing of the understanding of 
Greenlandic nature, during the construction of an autonomous Greenland, had thorough 
implications for the residents’ everyday life.  
While strategic behaviour is thus acknowledged it should also be observed that 
the politics of definitional conflicts often “transcend a simple conflict of interest” (Hajer 
2006:66). It is a fundamental view in this thesis that the change which occurred regarding 
issue of hydrocarbons indeed transcended a simple conflict.  
 
4.2 Clarification of Concepts 
To operationalise the charateristics of the discourse − to make the methodological 
approach even more clear (and useful) − a handful of conceptual tools have been chosen 
to analyse the empirical material (for the process of interpretation see 4.5, p.30). From the 
understanding of discourse and the definition of discourse analysis given above, it is clear 
that observing statements/utterances and related practices is the primary way in which we 
can identify a discourse. As tools to make sense of the heterogeneity of the observation, I 
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introduce three central analytical concepts, besides discourse, to be described below: 
discourse-coalition, story line and emblematic issue (Hajer 1995:20,52,65 respectively).  
The concept of Discourse-coalition is used to emphasise that all the dynamics of a 
discourse and the persons and institutions taking part in it might not, and usually do not, 
share the same goals or interests. The coalition shares narratives, story lines, terms and 
concepts, but coalition-partners might even want contradictory outcomes of for instance a 
specific political struggle. A discourse can therefore be seen as co-produced by the actors 
who refer to it. The fact that they have different positions can explain why this way of 
understanding the world is particular strong and resistant (Hajer 1995:65). Legitimising 
the exploitation of Greenlandic hydrocarbons might not imply agreement about income 
distribution and consequences of large-scale extraction.    
Story line is short-hand for a larger narrative. A discourse consists of many narratives 
that all refer to same discursive position. A narrative, individual or common, is a way for 
most people to express themselves and a fundamental way of understanding the world. A 
story line can be used in statements to point to a certain understanding of a problem. The 
feature of being a condensed statement makes it easier to see story lines in utterances. 
When for instance a news paper article is entitled The Road to Greater Independence 
Runs Through Jameson Land (Sermitsiak 1984: Oct 19th), it connects a larger national 
narrative, by using the story line “the road to independence”, with a concrete event, the 
Jameson Land Concession Project. The approach of this thesis uses the story line as the 
key concept to understand how actors order the many aspects of a discourse in to a 
relatively coherent point of reference. While the entire Greenlandic national narrative 
would make it hard legitimise hydrocarbon exploitation, the story line “the road to 
independence” seems to manage. This is because it is assumed that a full understanding 
of the discourse is not needed to grasp the story line. As such, the creation of an 
appropriate story line is a productive act in itself and might be seen as re-ordering 
understandings of the discourse (Hajer 1995:55). In this way the story line resemble that 
of a metaphor by reducing the discursive complexity of a discussion. Some story lines 
might even gain a “ritual character” because they have been part of a discussion for quite 
long (Hajer 1995:63). The “road to independence” invokes the idea of a continuous 
movement towards independence – as a ritual and not as an evaluation of what it would 
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actually imply for Greenland to be an independent country based on exploitation of 
hydrocarbons.  
Emblematic issue works similar to that of story line, though on a different level. In 
the present case of hydrocarbons in Greenland, there are several rivalling emblematic 
issues. The ecological dilemmas are not discussed in their complexities (the entire 
planet), but are usually separated into smaller bulks. When an issue is debated in public, 
what is debated is usually a symbolic condensation, an emblem whose value is that it 
captures something wider and carries a general understanding. If we consider 
hydrocarbon exploitation it can be framed through the perspective of a pollution threat. 
An emblematic issue could in this case be a “blowout”, for instance the Bravo-blowout in 
1977 (see p.60). It could also be framed according to the above story line, “the road to 
independence”, which would imply a less dramatic view on the environmental threats. An 
emblematic issue can dominate the debate and the understanding of an ecological 
dilemma. As such it can have a key role in a policy shift. Either way of understanding 
hydrocarbon exploitation as an ecological dilemma, focus on one aspect out of a complex 
whole.  
As an addition to emblematic issue, I use the term emblematic events (see 5.4, p.72). 
It is assumed that “issue” can meaningfully be replaced by “event”. It is used to describe 
how two events portray a conflicting understanding of Greenlandic hydrocarbons in the 
early 1980s, and therefore employ different discourses.   
Though frame is not used as a central analytical tool, the concept corresponds with 
the theoretical framework, and so is briefly mentioned. To make sense of how these story 
lines and emblematic issues connect to a larger discursive change is central to the 
research question. Frame or the act of framing, introduced by sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1974), is a way to understand how many small entities can be ordered in a 
comprehensive image. What is within the frame is what is seen or mentioned, the outside 
is irrelevant. What is within is internally coherent, connected and meaningful. When the 
research question enquires on the framing of Greenland’s nature, it therefore assumes that 
it was framed by someone and that the frame is something that can be described.  
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4.3 Two Discursive Positions 
This section describes two discursive positions: Homeland and Frontier. To gain an 
overview of the vast material available for potential analysis, it was a help to discover 
conceptual linkages between the various sources, described in 4.4. The difference in 
formulations between for instance official committee reports and a newspaper articles 
made it necessary to use a sorting device in the first-hand reading. 
In an important report, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry from 1977 by the Canadian judge Thomas Berger, 
opinions on the preceding years of struggle over rights and resources in were gathered 
(Berger 1977). Using public hearings Berger and his staff compiled hundreds of 
testimonies from a wide variety of people throughout Arctic Canada. Using Berger’s 
concepts, the Homeland and Frontier positions were introduced as an interpretive 
framework on nature in the Arctic, by Frank Sejersen in Kampen om naturen i Arktis: 
Arktiske folk og deres hjemland under pres18 (1996)19. Sejersen does not use “discursive 
postions”, but “ideologies”, to describe the concepts of Homeland and Frontier. However, 
since ideology in this thesis would disturb the theoretical perspective on nation-building, 
I shall pertain to the former.   
The meaning of a Frontier position is “the geographical place a colonial centre 
understands as its periphery” (Sejersen 1996:39). The implicit content of the concept is 
the frontier area as a passive, vast, exploitable area, and the southern colonial power as an 
active, expanding, intruding and demanding dynamic. The expander, the colonial state, or 
representatives of it − whether internal as in USA, Canada or Russia, or external as 
Denmark − seeks to extract all resources that could be of benefit. The frontier is an 
unexploited resource and the challenge is to make findings large enough to return 
investment.  The frontier is territory; it is a certain conception of nature. The people who 
lived in it were not really anything else than part of this: people of nature20, as indigenous 
people used to be called. As Sejersen (1996:42) argues, nature is seen in a modernistic 
perspective, as something to be controlled and conquered. In this line of thought the 
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 The Struggle of Nature in the Arctic: Arctic Peoples and their Homeland under Pressure 
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 Sejersen descirbes a third position − Wildland − but since this position is not utilised in the thesis, I wont 
include it here. 
20
 Naturfolk 
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frontier project can be described as ethnocentric and based on the substitution of one 
culture, the indigenous, with another, the colonial. The pre-Home Rule map of 
Greenland, and even the map of today, bears the marks of this. The mountains, fjords, 
settlements, actually most places are named after Danish, American or Norwegian 
explorers or scientists, or important names of their time (Sejersen 1996:43). Regarding 
hydrocarbons, the maps depicting the concession area appear as an extreme form of 
frontier-mapping (see figure 2, p.50). The concession block system, which is the way the 
rights to exploit hydrocarbons is granted, is a division of a petrologically promising areas 
into rectangular blocks, a grid which can seem to be pulled down over existing 
landscapes. 
The Homeland position is a widely different understanding of the same piece of 
Arctic Nature. Greenland was a place to someone long before it was discovered. This 
terra incognita was not at all unknown to the Greenlanders; it was their homeland. 
Understanding “the Arctic as a Homeland”, Sejersen (1996:48) formulates a more general 
mentality that he sees as representative of an indigenous position. Especially indigenous 
people’s relationship to their land is often highlighted as being very different from a 
western position (Sejersen 2004:71). For instance, experience, knowledge and attachment 
are conceived in place names, which have a function in everyday life. It is supposed that 
a modern, scientific, interpretation of the landscape, the use of straight lines etc. does not 
capture the Homeland landscape. Rather, the landscape is a place of lived experience, a 
memoryscape (Nuttall 1991, in Sejersen 1996:48). The many industrial resource projects 
are thereby opposed by a rather different concept of place, space and resources. While 
resource projects are limited in time, it is the people who live in the Frontier/Homeland 
who bear the social and ecological consequences of the industrial projects when the 
resource is exhausted (Sejersen 1996:49).  
The description of a Frontier mentality emphasises the resource extraction as the 
primary motivation for the colonial expansion and the Homeland position can be seen as 
a reaction towards this (Shadian 2006:250). The central argument in this reaction was that 
the indigenous rights over the land, the so-called land claims, were acknowledged legally. 
In the perspective, one can understand the initial “challenge” to the Danish management 
of Greenland’s mineral resources, described in 1.2, as a conflict between the Frontier and 
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the Homeland positions. I will use this Frontier/Homeland conflict-line as a point of 
departure when trying to understand how the hydrocarbon-issue was debated (See 5.3, 
p.53). The two positions will also be used in other contexts as points of navigation among 
a variety of statements. 
 
4.4 Empirical Sources 
This paragraph describes the four empirical sources on which the answer of the research 
question is based. As will be explained later, the aspects of reliability and validity are 
important aspects of this (Thagaard 1998:198, see 4.7, p. 32). Tracing documents that are 
referred to in research from the 1970-80s has been difficult and I have chosen to limit the 
time use and focus on fewer, but more central reports and documents.  
  
4.4.1 Policy documents 
The primary empirical source is official reports, documents and laws. As mentioned in 
the introduction, The Home Rule Act of 1978 as well as the closely related commissioned 
reports (Hjemmestyreloven 1978, Kommission om hjemmestyre i Grønland (KHG) 
1978a-d), is central to the perspective of this thesis: the co-production of autonomous 
Greenland and Greenlandic hydrocarbons. When one gets behind the bureaucratic 
formulations, they conceal quite a vivid discussion. Accordingly, the Home Rule Act can 
be seen as a point where a very visible struggle took place. As such, it has been a good 
starting point. Another bulk of reports is related to the management of mineral resources 
in autonomous Greenland: the administrative body, Fællesrådet vedrørende mineralske 
råstoffer i Grønland21 published annual reports from its introduction in 1979 (Fællesrådet 
1979-1998,1999-2009). I have also drawn on other related ministerial reports and 
summaries from various conferences published by Grønlandsministeriet22 and Nordisk 
Ministerråd23 (UKG 1974; Grønlandsministeriet 1978; Nordisk Ministerråd 1987). 
International legal and political documents, mainly The Law of the Sea (United Nations 
1982) and related comments have been necessary amendments to understand the wider 
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 The Joint Committee on Mineral Resources in Greenland (official translation) 
22
 Ministry for Greenland (official translation) 
23
 Nordic Council (official translation) 
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perspectives. All of these are presented when referred to in the text and included in the 
literature list.  
 It became clear that some aspects of relevant discussions were included in journal 
articles, but not in official reports. Therefore, detecting such omissions became an 
important part of the analysis. The official sources hardly ever mention how much an 
issue was debated, and eventually opposed, in public. In the Home Rule Commission’s 
report it was more the doubt created by fundamental questions such as “what is a 
people?” or “what does right to land mean?” that were central. The choice of single 
words appeared to be more important than the 20 pages of explanation. 
 
4.4.2 Newspaper Articles 
The second most important empirical source consists of articles from various Danish and 
Greenlandic newspapers from the period of 1980-1985, contained in the publication 
Press Extracts on Greenland. They were compiled, edited, translated and published at the 
Department of Indian and Northern Development (Press Extracts on Greenland 1980-
1985) in Ottawa, Canada, to inform about “Greenlandic subjects which would normally 
not find their way into Canadian media” (Press Extracts on Greenland 1980:i). 
Newspaper articles from the largest Danish and Greenlandic daily and weekly 
newspapers were translated into English and compiled in volumes by various editors. The 
distribution of selected newspapers is uneven and the principles of selection are unclear 
because of the official Canadian interests in the background. The state-owned oil 
company, Petro-Canada, also had interests in the collection. Even though this is alerting, 
the series is of interest to me because of its many articles categorised under “non-
renewable resources” – a natural and perhaps even advantageous consequence of Petro-
Canada’s involvement. In addition it might also be an advantage that the bias is visible 
and I can take precautions. Reading all Danish and Greenlandic newspaper articles on 
non-renewable resources from 1980-1985 could not have been possible within this time-
frame, so bearing the bias in mind I have compared with other sources. Over the course 
of five years it is my impression that the compilation covers the general trends rather 
well. A comparison in the same period with articles from other papers than those 
included strengthens this view.  
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Therefore, I have chosen to use this as my second source of data. Beginning with 
many hundreds of articles, I began sorting them by content. I looked for hydrocarbon 
related content, but also content that was indirectly relevant, for instance an article about 
two geologist’s expedition to what they called a “terra incognita” in North Greenland.  
Thus, drawing on a pool of 86 articles ranging from 1980-85, I analysed the content 
looking for discourses, discourse-coalitions, emblematic issues and story lines, and 
grouped these systematically. Besides adding background information, some of the 
articles include some valuable comments and interviews by central politicians and 
scientists. As is the case for newspapers, the attention on certain heated topics goes up 
and down as other issues appear. Bearing that in mind it is interesting to note how some 
issues persist over many years. Due to my grouping of articles, it was clear that two 
events continued to create discussion. This was a major help in choosing the two key 
incidents to analyse, the Arctic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land project. The strength 
of the time aspect is also visible when comments with years between them are compared 
and suddenly one realises that something has changed. I have used quotes to point out 
main arguments in the analysis of the data. Because the authors of the articles are rarely 
mentioned, the references are not included in the literature list. In stead, the references 
are found in a list of the articles is included in the References-chapter, Appendix 4. 
 
4.4.3 The Journal Grønland 
I have used articles from the journal Grønland in the period 1970-1985 as the third   
empirical source. The journal is composed of between 5-12 issues per year, each 
containing about 2-10 longer articles. It was founded in 1906 by a group of civil servants 
working with or in Greenland who formed Det grønlandske selskab24, during a period of 
severe criticism of the official administration of Greenland by culture-radicals25 in 
Copenhagen. From the start until 1953 the society published an annual report and from 
1953 a varying number of issues were published each year. The journal never had the 
ambition of gaining scientific status, rather the purpose of the society and thus the 
journal, was to inform about and strengthen the ties to Greenland (Jensen 2005). The 
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 The Greenlandic Society (official translation) 
25
 Kulturradikale 
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reason I decided to include the journal is that I consider it to be an important arena of 
discussion, perhaps more during the period in question than now. In terms of fields 
represented, this seems to be one of the broadest reaching arenas, where scientists, public 
officials, academics and politicians among others exchanged views on Greenland and the 
development in Greenland.      
 From 15 years of publications I sorted out articles dealing with primarily mineral 
resources, especially hydrocarbons, but also related to the discussion of Home Rule and 
other scientific results. This left me with 42 articles, from which I spent most time 
analysing one fifth of these. I worked my way though the texts much like I did with the 
newspaper articles. The References-chapter contains a list of all the articles in a separate 
appendix. The period of 15 years of enquiry gave an impression of how debated topics 
and the tone of the debate changed. Whereas the toughest discussions concerning 
hydrocarbons seem to take place in the early and mid 1970s, the 1980s show an 
increasing amount of non-controversial articles.  
 
4.4.4 Interviews 
The last empirical source was interviews with key-players. A key-player is someone who 
is or has been involved in the relevant processes on a level that gives special insight. The 
central qualification of a key-player is the quality of the insight and this makes both a few 
years of specialised experience and long-range association interesting (Harboe 2006:38-
39). I interviewed five such key-players, the time of the interviews ranging from 45 to 
150 minutes.  
I found that the interviews could strengthen my interpretation of the course of 
events. During the interviews, I explained my understanding and noted the interviewees’ 
reaction and comments. The function of the interviews became that of corrective devices, 
especially to get an idea about what happenings and events were important and which 
ones went unnoticed. They served as valuable background information and consequently 
there are only a few quotes included in the thesis. The interview guide is found in 
Appendix 5.  
I have carried out individual semi-structured interviews (Harboe 2006:42-43). I 
have used Steiner Kvale’s InterView (Kvale 1997) as a guide to the methodological and 
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ethical perspectives of interviewing. Individual interviews were chosen because of the 
great distances over which the potential respondents are spread. In a semi-structured 
interview the order of the questions can be partly changed during the interview (Harboe 
2006:42), so while my theme- and interview guides were the same before all interviews, 
the order became varied during the interviews.  
Four of the interviews were recorded and transcribed, while one interviewee did 
not permit this. Instead, notes were taken during, and after, the interview. It was a guiding 
principle to have a balancing number of Danish and Greenlandic interviewees. After 
having read some of the central documents of Greenland’s political history and 
systematically noted names of involved bureaucrats, politicians, experts and others, I had 
a list of approximately 15 names. As said, I interviewed five of the 15: two Greenlanders; 
with broad experience from Home Rule politics and administration, three Danes; one of 
them working in the Greenlandic administration. I believe there is an acceptable balance 
between Greenlandic and Danish interviewees. A more comprehensive list of the 
interviewees is found in Appendix 3.   
Regarding the ethical stance, all the interviewees have been given the possibility 
of anonymity and the right to review and revise everything they are quoted with. One of 
the interviewees wished to be anonymous. In the thesis, he is called “a Greenlandic 
intellectual”. I have used a Template of Informed Consent (SPREK 2008) based on the 
relevant Norwegian acts on science ethics before the interview. All information was 
given to the interviewees and agreed upon before the interviews. The document is found 
in Appendix 6.      
 
4.5 The Steps of Work 
This paragraph clarifies the circumstances around the formulation of my research 
perspective and research question. My first readings about Greenland began in the 
literature about Danish Arctic explorers. From a first fascination followed an interest in 
the Inuit lifestyle. This turned my attention towards the contemporary Danish-
Greenlandic relationship. As mentioned in the introduction, I saw the Greenlandic 
ambitions of finding hydrocarbons as problematic and paradoxical in the light of climate 
change. I decided to focus on the time where Greenlandic autonomy was negotiated to 
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look for explanations. When I began to read about other processes where nature was 
problematised (for instance Asdal 1998,2007 or Hajer 1995,1996), it occurred to me that 
what happened to Greenlandic hydrocarbons was in concordance with other cases.   
I had a handful of informal interviews prior to the writing. They were not 
recorded or analysed and their purpose was to direct my attention towards important 
subjects in order to be able to narrow down the case. I visited persons with knowledge 
about hydrocarbons in Greenland at the Danish Polar Centre and the Department of 
Eskimology in Copenhagen and Aalborg University in Aalborg. I also participated in a 
scientific conference (International Conference of Arctic Social Sciences (ICASS) 6) on 
related subjects in Nuuk in August 2008.  
I began to focus on some central documents − as the Home Rule and Self Rule 
Acts and reports. A basic discovery at this point was that hydrocarbons extraction, and 
especially opposition towards it, was somewhat controversial in the Greenland of today. 
Especially it appeared that the issue of hydrocarbons was still not really settled. This 
narrowed the focus down to hydrocarbons in stead of mineral resources in general. 
During the informal interviews, it became clear that it is oil, or in our case the inclusive 
term hydrocarbons, that matters in terms of state income. Crudely put, I was told that 
mines create jobs while oil creates income.  
As described in the introduction it is compelling how political autonomy times in 
Greenland coincide with hydrocarbon-times. Regarding the timeframe, I still had a 30-
year period of interest. It was difficult for me to focus on a specific period since I saw 
many features connecting the Home Rule of 1979 and Self Rule of 2009. Consequently I 
moved on with a wide time-frame. It was when I chose to analyse two specific 
emblematic events, the Arctic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land Concession that the 
period 1975-1985 stood out.  
 
4.6 Interpretation  
With my discourse analytical approach, my concepts and my empirical material, how did 
I actually extract and the relevant information? Doing discourse analysis, I made sense of 
the material ad hoc, as I gained knowledge of the field. Much like the method suggested 
by Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998), my first reading of the empirical 
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material was with the purpose of extracting a meaningful structure. Contrary to Grounded 
Theory I had no pre-existing method for extracting information from the material and my 
approach was based on certain theoretical considerations. The reading was both 
concerned with the totality and detail. Initially I looked for patterns, systems, internal 
logic, repetitions, key-words etc. and worked my way through. The overview reading 
qualified looking more into some paragraphs because they stood out as special in some 
way, an exercise that was repeated over and over again (See Kvale 1997:201-203).  
 After the first reading I formed six major categories in which I began to sort 
interesting statements. The categories changed as more material was read, and some of 
them proved irrelevant. Having sorted out what I perceived as relevant information from 
my four bulks of empirical material, I finally selected my categories. An example of such 
categories is found in Appendix 7. The two discursive positions described in 4.3 worked 
similar to a roadmap, a simple tool of navigation among discourses. For instance was the 
choice of the two emblematic events, The Arctic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land 
Concession (see 5.4), a result of their characteristic appearance in the news paper articles 
and their strong, but different, references to Homeland and Frontier positions. 
  Finally, the limits to interpretation are an important aspect. Can statements be 
read “one to one”? Do they say what they say? I mention this because the importance of 
Greenland in a Danish perspective can be seen in a larger geo-political context. So, when 
Danish and Greenlandic politicians debate “property rights” to the subsurface, it might 
not only be a subsurface containing minerals, but also a subsurface containing radar 
stations etc. I have not problematised these aspects in relation to my analysis, primarily 
because of the scope of my research question and the time available to answer it. Other 
limitations to the analysis are mentioned in 4.8. 
 
4.7 Combination of Sources 
At this point it would be suitable to explain why the above sections were necessary to 
include in the Method-chapter. The reader should be given ways to judge how and why I 
came to certain conclusions. To facilitate an evaluation of this thesis is an important part 
of maintaining confidence in the research. Reliability and validity are important in all the 
work phases of academic practice (Harboe 2005:87, Kvale 1997:231).  
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Reliability refers the credibility of the construction of data. Are the data reliable, 
and is the use of them reasonable? Would another researcher make the same conclutions 
from the same material? As touched upon earlier, this type of research has to leave much 
of the judgement to the reader. It is impossible to test the reliability in exact terms, but by 
tentative references and substantial quotations one can give the reader very good tools to 
criticise the analysis (Kvale 1997:202). External reliability has to do with the replication 
of the study and can be aligned with the discussion of generalisability (see below). 
Internal reliability is concerned with the process of collecting the empirical material 
(Thagaard 1998:198). Has the collection affected the ability to draw independent 
conclusions? Was the research biased during the collection or did the method inflict bias 
on what was collected? The description of empirical material given in 4.4 was given to 
shed light on my process of gathering and thereby secure reliability.  
Validity − the relevance of the analysis − has to do with the analysis of data. As 
above, validity can also be seen as internal- and external validity (Harboe 2005:88). Does 
the analysis represent the empirical sources in a reasonable way? Do my interpretations 
make sense to whom and what I have studied? Trying to answer such questions, external 
validity is about relationship between the analysis and the world around it. The core of 
the matter is that the categories and description on which the analysis is based needs to be 
recognisable in relation to “reality”. It should communicate or share something with other 
investigations in the field. As mentioned, I have used the formal and informal interviews 
to adjust my descriptions of the situations I analyse. Internal validity is the coherence of 
the steps in the research process and design and has to do with the theoretical and 
methodological choices. To do this I described the choice of discourse analytical 
approach in 4.1. A more elaborate explanation of the central concepts used in the analysis 
was given in 4.2. Finally, in 4.3, I described a discursive framework which has been 
influencing my understanding of the discursive positions. Securing that the data are valid 
has largely been part of the collection. Do I have enough information to answer my 
research questions? I have posed myself this question continuously and have decided to 
use the material presented in 4.4 (Kvale 1997:232, Harboe 2005:89).  
One of the ways, which I have relied on, to strengthen the aspects of the analysis 
described above, is triangulation. Usually triangulation refers to a combination of several 
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sources − three if one should take the meaning of the word as instructive − and 
sometimes a combination of qualitative and quantitative sources (Harboe 2005:117, 
Thagaard 1998:18). The four groups of empirical material − reports/documents/laws, 
newspaper articles, articles in the journal Grønland and key-player interviews − were 
chosen to triangulate my data, so possible weaknesses in my conclusion and decisions 
should be more likely to be uncovered. If I emphasised one event or interpretation as 
important from one source and it was never mentioned by the others, this should be 
examined. An advantage with a qualitative approach in this case, however, is that 
contradictory result can be an interesting sign in itself, and not only a problem. The 
reason two sources of data present widely different stories can thus unveil something 
previously unknown or unobserved (Harboe 2005:118). As mentioned the background 
and contents of this material were described in 4.5. 
 Generalisability is related to the degree to which the findings can be projected 
onto other parts of the world. The statistical generalisability – the degree to which a 
study sample can be generalized to a larger population – is a problematic aspect of 
research dependent upon key insights (Ihlen 2007:19). The chosen methodological 
approach for this thesis excludes statistical generalisability. But because one has 
consulted key-players with a comprehensive insight, one might generalise analytically, by 
claiming that, for instance, the identification of a discourse is common to more people 
than those interviewed or mentioned. Therefore, a discussion of representativity would 
focus on the analytical bias, for instance crucial aspects that I have not regarded, and not 
the numerical bias, since no such generalisations are pursued.  
The position of the author is not a neutral one. The best one can do is to explain 
the ingredients of the analysis, show the assumptions and preconditions, and present the 
analysis as consistently as possible and the arguments as reasonable and clear as possible. 
The interpretations and generalisations made are mine, in some cases inspired by others 
(where referred to), and therefore constructions whose legitimacy is to be judged by the 
reader (Kvale 1997:229, Ihlen 2007:18).  
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4.8 Limitations and Trails Not Followed 
Finally a few words about what this thesis is not about. Concentrating on Greenlandic 
hydrocarbons and their geographic, geo-strategic, geological, cultural positions in 
relation to Denmark-Greenland means that an analysis of Danish or Greenlandic internal 
is not my aim. The scope will not be for instance an ethnographic or a political analysis, 
so I will have to limit myself to situations where interaction between Denmark and 
Greenland takes place. Likewise, I have not been able to focus too much on the political 
development itself, as symbolised by the Home Rule and Self Rule agreements. Besides 
Greenland, other parts of the Danish kingdom, Iceland and the Faeroe Isles have gained 
independence and autonomy respectively. Though it could have made an interesting case, 
I will not compare the agreements and historical cases. Regional constellations such as 
the Arctic Council or the Nordic Council play an important part as a natural background. 
Also, the people in Greenland share many things with other circumpolar residents and a 
pan-circumpolar comparison of circumstances and experiences with hydrocarbons could 
have been fruitful, but is not carried out. A not analysed part the Danish-Greenlandic 
relationship is an interesting perspective of the way Danish bureaucracy was exported to 
Greenland in the first years of Home Rule. Lacking administrative professionals, the 
Home Rule administration was largely built by Danish personnel, with profound 
implications of course.  
The geopolitical aspect was touched upon in 4.6, and while I definitely 
acknowledge the existence of strong interests that consciously or unconsciously have 
affected the politics of Greenlandic hydrocarbons, I have not been able to include it in the 
analysis, at this stage. 
Following the technical and scientific knowledge of petroleum, and the concrete 
translation of this knowledge into other areas, such as politics, would be another aspect in 
understanding the dynamics of the hydrocarbon-issue. While I have focused on the 
general role of geology, more technical aspects are not examined closely. I chose not to 
read and interpret technical documents on exploration and extraction, and concentrated 
on places where some translation had already taken place, such as the newspaper and 
journal articles. If I were to take another round on this subject, more technical insight and 
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tracing the knowledge production from measurements and surveys to politics would be 
one of the top priorities. 
The political economy of hydrocarbons, prominently the development of the 
world crude-oil price, is already a large field of research. I have tried to include it at a few 
places, but probably less than I could have. The changes in price can be argued to be a 
crucial driver of hydrocarbon related activities. On the other hand, as the director of the 
Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum in Greenland, Jørn Skov Nielsen, informed me 
(interview with Jørn Skov Nielsen 2009), the huge industrial complexes that exploit 
hydrocarbons need to look beyond short-term fluctuations in price. What matters is what 
one expects in the long term. As a consequence, investment in exploration might not 
correlate with price − which is just one of a large number of hypotheses about the 
political economy of oil. Considering the scope of this thesis, I found it most useful to use 
crude-oil price as a source of inspiration, so as to understand political reactions and not to 
include it as a central analytical feature. 
  
So here we go. 
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5.0 Analysis 
The analysis is chronologically distributed over five sections, 5.1-5.5. Each section is 
ended by a “Summary and Discussion of Results”, which includes a table presenting the 
relevant emblematic issues, story lines and the main theoretical perspective that was 
employed.  
 
5.1 The Lottery 
The aim of this section is to point out some central historical structures and to start 
outlining the dynamics of interest. Who influenced the development of the knowledge 
production − especially concerning hard mineral resources, which later were to become 
so decisive in the Home Rule negotiations? The section provides a starting point for 
further investigation.  
 
Figure 1 Map of the political boundaries of the Arctic in 2006  
 
Source: UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2006 (courtesy of Hugo Ahlenius) 
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5.1.1 The Beginning of Danish Greenland  
It is common to assert the beginning of Greenland under Danish rule to 1721, when the 
Danish-Norwegian missionary Hans Egede headed an expedition to find descendants of 
the Norse settlers on Greenland. It was believed that they in their isolation had stayed 
Catholics! The King of Denmark-Norway wanted the Lutheran faith carried across the 
Atlantic. Egede found no Norse, but began to Christianise Eskimos, as the Greenlanders 
were called at the time. They were nevertheless regarded by the King as his subjects 
(Sørensen 2005:11). Gradually, an administration was built, the people were organised 
and goods traded. Political reform roughly mirrored what happened in Denmark, though 
with some delay. The relationship between the Danish and the Eskimos was relatively 
peaceful; it seems that Denmark did not meet too much resistance (Sørensen 2005:169).  
From figure 1 it becomes understandable how Greenland has played a strategic, 
geo-political role. The issue of Greenland received some attention around 1900, when 
explorers made it known to a wider public, though ownership was still unclear. It was not 
until Norway, somewhat chaotically, occupied a few patches of land on the coast of East 
Greenland in 1931, and Denmark filed a case at the International Court in the Hague, that 
Danish ownership of Greenland was internationally acknowledged. The Court ruled in 
favour of Danish interests on the 5th of April 1933 (Sørensen 2005:53). That the legal 
process of 1931-33 took place in financially hard times might have had implications not 
clear at the time. If Greenland really was “Denmark’s big lottery slip” as Daugaard-
Jensen, the director of the Royal Greenland Trade Department, put it in 1931 (in Riis 
2004:176), who arranged the lottery? 
 
5.1.2 The Geological Colony 
In the 1960s international oil companies started to show interest in Greenland because of 
seismic surveys indicating potential hydrocarbon deposits. However, geology had already 
been a prominent scientific discipline in Greenland for a long time. By the founding of 
Kommissionen for ledelsen af de geologiske undersøgelser i Grønland26 in 1878, the 
mineralogist Frederik Johnstrup and other prominent Danish Greenland-experts formally 
defined geological knowledge as the main aim of scientific research in Greenland. At that 
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 The Commission for the Direction of Geological Surveys in Greenland    
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time there had already been profitable cryolite extraction in Greenland for some decades 
and resulting state revenues were asked to be channelled back into more surveys 
(Arneborg & Secher 2005:11). Even though many of the popular expeditions had strong 
ethnographic and culture-radical elements, the professional criteria did not change much 
(Arneborg & Secher 2005:16). In fact, even though the commission changed its name to 
the more general Kommission for ledelsen af videnskabelige undersøgelser i Grønland27 
the attention was to be turned even more towards geological aspects.  
The different, but parallel carriers of two well-known explorer-scientists, Lauge 
Koch and Knud Rasmussen, personify the situation of early Greenland research pioneers 
and the change that was to come. While Knud Rasmussen, being one eighth Greenlander 
and fluent in Greenlandic, was an ethnographer and collected myths from Inuit from all 
over the circumpolar area, Lauge Koch was a geologist, who focused on the scientific 
achievements. Knud Rasmussen’s interactions with the Inuit made him a very popular 
symbol of Denmark-Greenland’s historical connection and upon his death in 1933 there 
was a public outcry (Riis 2005:284). It is quite instructive that Lauge Koch in his 
obituary of Rasmussen, praised him as an explorer, but criticised his scientific 
achievements (Riis 2005:286). The age of explorers was replaced by the ideal of 
scientific progress and Dr. Koch was one of the early translators of the Greenlandic 
geology into the language of western science. During Koch’s Three-year Expedition in 
1931-34 the ambitions were strictly professional and valuable mineral resources were 
cleverly used as bait for state support. The lottery slip was now presented by Koch to the 
Danish Minister of Finance “to ask him to look well-willingly on the work we have made 
in Greenland so far, and intend to continue in the future”, as Koch confessed in a letter to 
one of his colleagues, petrologist and mineralogist Helge Backlund (Riis 2005:198). It 
paid off: Koch’s project was financed and the expedition became a milestone of modern 
expedition technique at that time. The composition of the expedition staff speaks for 
itself: from a relatively mixed staff of geologists, botanists, zoologists and archaeologists 
in the beginning, the number of geologists soon tripled and the presence of other 
disciplines decreased. The change is also visible in the number of publication-pages (Riis 
2005:197,204). Yet the influence of geology did not stop here. In 1934 the Commission, 
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and thus Lauge Koch and other leading geologists, were assigned the highest authority 
regarding Greenlandic place names. This continued for many years and bore witness to 
how deeply the image of Greenland was inscribed with a geological perspective. For 
instance, almost half the place names in North East Greenland can be directly traced to 
Koch’s expedition (Arneborg & Secher 2005:16). Many of these names have later been 
changed by the Home Rule administration; however it only takes a glance at a 
contemporary map of Greenland to see their legacy.     
To understand how geology’s position could continue to be strengthened the way 
it was, the political context should also be included. That Denmark had increased its 
exploration activity in Greenland at the end of the 19th century probably has several 
reasons. Similar patterns were seen all over most of the industrialised world. What 
mattered was that the Danish state and other sponsors were willing to pay, that it was a 
national project, and that the link between exploration and science was strengthened. 
While the former has an adventurous, mostly heroic, storytelling as its end product, the 
latter has the scientific publication. Explorations of the early 20th century had both (Riis 
2005:300). At the time of the East Greenland dispute both Lauge Koch and Knud 
Rasmussen argued the Danish case at the international court in Haag. Since the Danish 
state had paid large shares of many expeditions to Greenland, this was a service the 
explorers willingly paid to their homeland (Riis 2005:21,198). It is an ironic addendum 
that the lottery slip-aspect of the geological research was to imply a temporary halt in 
Koch’s grand plans for further expeditions in East Greenland throughout the 1930s. The 
Danish Government feared that a large discovery of for instance gold, would threaten the 
fragile Danish sovereignty over Greenland (Riis 2005:202). Employing the co-production 
perspective, we note how the relationship between science and the valuable resources 
bounces back, or works both ways. Who is whose tool − or who is co-produced − is 
dependent on the perspective. While Greenland was framed by the geologists focus on 
mineral wealth, it also affected geology in Greenland, since the existence of a resource 
potential became the official reason to maintain scientific activity. 
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5.1.3 First Signs of Texas 
Throughout the 1930s, a bitter conflict between Dr. Koch and other parts of the Danish 
geological milieu developed. While Dr. Koch continued his research with an 
internationally mixed team of scientists, the mainly Danish opponents of Koch were to 
form the organisation that later would become the state agency Grønlands geologiske 
undersøgelse, or the Geological Survey of Greenland, which was established in 1946. In 
the end of the 1930s Koch’s opponents turned their attention to the geographically much 
less known West Greenland. Again, the mineral resources were an argument for the 
scientific activity. As one of the scientists said: ”We have to know, what valuable raw 
materials are hidden in the Greenlandic mountains” (Riis 2005:316, , author’s italics). 
The difference now was that the resource in question was hydrocarbons, or in this case: 
oil.  In 1939, the leader of the expedition described some of the results from the 
expedition, among others a silt-volcano emitting oil-mud into a river: ”The phenomenon 
is exactly the same as in the oil district of Texas” and “while we are optimistic, one 
should not expect to discover a new Texas. Still there are many indications of large oil 
deposits” (Riis 2005:318). Naturally the public was intrigued by such a comparison. It is 
noted that the existence of hydrocarbons was indicated, but not promised. As such, the 
scientific results appealed to the public imagination by framing the potential of Greenland 
in a certain way, but to know more about it, more research was needed. As the analysis 
will show, this resembles a pattern to be repeated by later constellations of science in the 
co-production of Greenlandic hydrocarbons.  
The oil adventure in Texas apparently had the ability to inspire dreams of 
Greenland’s resource wealth. A few years before the reference to Texas, the legal 
foundation had been written. It is quite common to set the beginning of Danish mineral 
resource extraction to 1932 when the introduction of the first legislation of the Danish 
subsurface was made. It was extended to cover Greenland in 1935. The legislature was a 
general act allowing the state to award licenses (Larsen & Nielsen 1985:98).  Therefore it 
is interesting that the situation in Denmark was so different. At the time it was not 
believed, at least not at state level, that the Danish subsurface contained any 
economically exploitable resources. (Flint-Stephensen 1980). 
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5.1.4 Knowledge Production during Decolonisation  
After World War Two Greenland’s economic and industrial status came to the attention 
of Danish policy-makers. The time was characterised by an optimistic belief in planning 
and large government schemes, reports and investments were launched in the 1950s and 
60s, notably devised by the so called Greenland Commissions28 of 1950 and 1960. The 
heavy investment from the 1950s and 1960s had transformed Greenland to something 
quite different from the Inuit settlements in Canada. It seems that Greenland was 20-30 
years ahead in terms of western standards of living and welfare services (Paldam 
1994:139). Formally a big shift happened through the revision of the Danish constitution 
in 1953. Integrating Greenland as an equal part of Denmark would abolish the colonial 
status and thereby remove Denmark’s obligatory reporting to the UN as a colonial power. 
The change was written into the Danish constitution and decided by popular vote − in 
Denmark. Because the Greenlandic politico-administrative body, the provincial council29, 
did not deem it necessary, the Greenlanders were never asked. Though the “missing 
referendum” created some doubts in the UN forum, an acknowledging resolution was 
finally carried out in 1954. From this year the provincial councils could appoint two 
members of the Danish parliament (Sørensen 2005:109-112). However, as Jens Dahl 
writes “one can characterise the historical development in Greenland from World War 
Two to the introduction of Home Rule as a formal rather than a real de-colonisation” 
(Dahl 1986:45). It is characteristic that the highest ranking Danish official in Greenland 
until 1979 was called Landshøvding (Sørensen 2005:170), drawing on the Indian chief as 
høvding, it translates as country-chief, a somewhat strange title for an official in an, at 
least officially, equal part of the kingdom.  
Based on a report of 1950 by the Greenland Commission, the predecessor of the 
Ministry for Greenland, it was decided that scientific research in Greenland should not be 
directed any longer. The scientific disciplines should no longer be part of large integrated 
expeditions; the age of explorers was definitely over. However when one looks at the 
distribution of publications it is clear that geology still remained one of the dominant 
disciplines. In 1975 scientific coordination was reorganised to include more emphasis on 
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communication and presentation to the public. The composition of the commission was 
influenced by the Greenlandic and the Danish parliament, even though there were not 
many Greenlandic researchers at that time. When the Ministry for Greenland was closed 
down in 1987, the Danish Polar Centre established in 1989, and the Greenlandic Home 
Rule seemed to work, the position was more neutral (Arneborg & Secher 2005:17-20).  
 
5.1.5 Summary and Discussion of Results 
One issues stand out as emblematic when looking at hydrocarbons before the 1960s: The 
East Greenland occupation that made its way to the international court. The aftermath of 
the East Greenland occupation legalised the Danish sovereignty, in 1933, over the entire 
Greenland and thus made all resources in Greenland part of Danish legislature. The 
discovery of oil-mud on a scientific expedition is important because it shifted attention 
from hard to soft minerals. The geologists could now provide knowledge of the resources 
that later was to become so defining for modern developments. 
Yet while hydrocarbons played a role in relation to Greenland, they were never 
believed to have the huge potential later given to them in the Home Rule debate. Nobody 
questioned the legitimacy of the Danish rights to extract resources from their colony.  
Greenland’s resources were used as bait to fund scientific expeditions. The phrase 
“lottery slip” is a story line that immediately revokes connotations of adventure. In 
combination with a comparison of Greenland and Texas: “same phenomenon as in 
Texas”, this gives a central role to hydrocarbons as an oil adventure.  
Regarding discourse coalitions of interest, geologists and related fields seem to 
have played a role in defining Greenland that gave some scientists influence far beyond 
their scientific realm. This includes the Danish-based, colonial (and post-colonial) 
scientists, explorers and administrators in Greenland. The combination of research and 
exploration points to the adventure aspect of the story lines, with oil adventure as the 
common denominator. This justifies a high level of attention to the role played by science 
in the construction of autonomous Greenland and its administration. Particularly geology 
became intertwined with the colonial administration of Greenland. This is strengthened 
by the establishment of The Commission for the Direction of Geological Surveys in 
Greenland and the mobilisation of scientist-explorers at the international court in Haag 
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science. That leading geologists were responsible for the naming of Greenlandic place 
names is another example of geology’s central role. 
In relation to hydrocarbons it does not seem that the post World War Two 
development did much to change the situation. Even though the abolishment of 
Greenland’s colonial status was a big step in political development, the change is not 
clearly visible regarding mineral resources.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Results from 5.1 
Emblematic Issue(s)  − East Greenland occupation in the 
international court 
Story line(s) − The lottery slip 
− Same phenomenon as in Texas 
Main Theoretical Perspective  − Co-production 
 
 
5.2 The Last Frontier? 
If hydrocarbons in Greenland were merely used as bait in the 1930s, this changed in the 
1960s. After the discovery of hydrocarbons in the North Sea it was Greenland’s turn. 
Interest from many foreign companies prompted the Ministry for Greenland to revise the 
legislature in order to promote this development. This resulted in a much more detailed 
framework than for the Danish North Sea. What were the factors that made minerals, and 
eminently hydrocarbons, the central issue of development in modern Greenland? Were 
did the knowledge come from?  
 
5.2.1 A Comprehensive Thing  
It was on a background of general development optimism on behalf of Greenland’s 
industrial future that Minelovskommission for Grønland30 was established in 1960. In its 
report of 1963 the commission articulated the principles of what would become the first 
central legal document on hydrocarbons in Greenland. This was Mineloven31 or the 
Mining Act as it will be called here (UKG 1974:12). This act would later become one of 
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the cornerstones in the debate of Greenland’s autonomy. In line with ambitions in other 
areas of industrial development the main intention of the Mining Act was to catalyse 
private initiatives to explore and extract mineral resources, both hard and soft, in 
Greenland. Despite the continuous interest and activity concerning minerals in 
Greenland, it had never become a reliable financial source. During the 1960s things 
began to happen elsewhere. The first Danish North Sea oil field, Kraka, was discovered 
in 1966 and discoveries continued over the next years. When the Dan-field went into 
commercial production in 1972 it was the first commercial oil field in the North Sea, just 
before the Norwegian Ekofisk. The Danish company A.P. Møller had used national-
minded argumentation to acquire their sole North Sea concession, but it was foreign 
companies’ attention that convinced the Ministry for Greenland that a more thorough 
approach was needed in Greenland. (UKG 1974:13-16).  
The Mining Act of 1965 began “All mineral raw materials in Greenland belong to 
the State”. This was provocative to those Greenlanders who desired autonomy, not to 
mention the rights to their land and its resources. While the Mining Act outlined the 
Danish general perspectives and intentions it was not specific regarding rights to 
hydrocarbons exploration and extraction. The Danish Ministry for Greenland, established 
in 1960, had resource exploitation in Greenland as part of its responsibility. To draft a 
framework for Greenlandic hydrocarbon concessions Udvalget vedrørende tilladelser og 
koncessioner i henhold til lov om mineralske råstoffer i Grønland32 was established in 
1969  (UKG 1974:12). From here on, I will call it The Concession Committee. This was 
new ground for the Danish administration and no one in Denmark really had the 
necessary experience and competence in the field of managing subsurface mineral 
resources. But still optimism prevailed: “To make principles and systems for oil 
exploration in Greenland was a comprehensive thing, one could see that” (Interview with 
Gert Vigh 2009 (my italics), see Appendix 3)  
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5.2.2 Various Geologies 
The atmosphere expressed in the multi-disciplinary journal Grønland reflected the 
optimism regarding Greenland’s mineral resource potential. Accordingly, the Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry for Greenland, Erik Hesselbjerg, opened an article with: “Today 
we stand on the brink of one of the most exciting periods in Greenland’s most recent 
history” (Hesselbjerg 1971:65). He described how commercial interest in Greenland’s 
minerals had increased since 1968 and that interest had moved from land based mineral 
towards including off-shore areas: from mining to hydrocarbons. Industrial activity in 
Greenland corresponded to the intentions in the Mining Act of 1965, and Hesselbjerg 
noted that “it would probably be fortunate, if possibilities for large scale exploitation of 
the Greenlandic subsurface turned up” (Hesselbjerg 1971:65).  
Hydrocarbons represented something new, something exiting. Acknowledging 
that Denmark lacked professional knowledge in the hydrocarbon field, Hesselbjerg 
welcomed the fact that there were foreign companies – American, Canadian, German, 
French and Italian – that took the initiative. In Denmark, it was the state-agency, the 
Geological Survey of Greenland that carried out most of the research about Greenlandic 
geology. It was from the Geological Survey that all relevant information came when 
prospects of the subsurface was examined (Hesselbjerg 1971). The Geological Survey 
had its opinion on the profitability of the deposits, known as “Economic Geology”, but 
maintained its neutral, non-political position. As the state geologist Karsten Secher  
wrote, “the mapping done by Geological Survey of Greenland is part of the State’s 
general ambition of gaining knowledge about the country’s geological composition and 
history, and as such contributes to the localisation of valuable mineral raw materials” 
(Secher 1971:14). The director of Geological Survey, K. Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen, and one 
of the geologists, Nils Henriksen, followed up on Hesselbjerg’s 1971 article by outlining 
the financial shortcomings of a continued large-scale exploration. Out of a long list of 
research tasks to be completed in eastern Greenland “one of these includes future oil 
exploration” (Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen & Henriksen 1973:66).  
The key to turn optimism into larger state finances could be a comparison with 
Norway, which recently had begun the production of oil. Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen & 
Henriksen described the geological situation of East Greenland: the main extension of 
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sediments – implicitly those out of which hydrocarbons are formed – “are assumed to be 
similar to those outside the Atlantic coast of Norway, Svalbard and East Greenland”. 
Indicating how the huge hydrocarbon potential of the Norwegian continental shelf had 
sparked an “intense” survey activity, Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen & Henriksen noted that the 
sea off East Greenland remained almost un-explored. The “comprehensive thing” is 
resonating in the background: ”The oil discoveries in the northern part of the North Sea 
has shown which economic and political implications such oil discoveries have”. This 
was Norway’s oil adventure. Turning to Greenland and its east coast it was a “plausible 
geological assessment that this shelf area mainly consists of sediments, just like off the 
Norwegian west coast” (Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen & Henriksen 1973:68).  
This “geological assessment” connects two nation-building processes: Norway, a 
nation on the brink of an oil-induced modernisation, and the nation of Greenland yet to be 
defined. The Greenland journal continued to publish articles about the hydrocarbon 
potential all over Greenland. However, the link to Norway was not only geological. The 
administrative framework that the Concession Committee drafted for Greenland was 
largely inspired by Norwegian practice (see p.48).  
 
5.2.3 To Open Up Greenland 
As a pretext to the further discussion of hydrocarbons in Greenland it should be noted 
that what is popularly termed the first oil crisis − a result of several Middle Eastern oil 
exporting countries reducing oil output  − led to a quadrupling of world crude oil prices 
in the course of 1973 (Noreng 2006:26). This naturally affected other oil exporting 
countries whose state revenues witnessed a dramatic rise. As a consequence, the 
Concession Committee had to re-write their economic framework. The effects of the first 
oil crisis will not be analysed, but it can be assumed that, if anything, it did not lead to a 
decreased interest in the Greenlandic hydrocarbon-issue. As the Concession Committee 
remarked in its report of 1974: “The expected future oil prices imply that if oil is 
discovered in Greenland the economic revenue will be considerably larger than under 
present circumstances” (UKG 1974:5).  
With a short article entitled About opening up Greenland (Berg 1973) Cand. 
Scient Hans Berg made a comparison between the situation in the 1930s and the 1970s. 
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Berg connected the industrial aspiration of the 1930s with ignorance towards Greenlandic 
opinion on the administration of mineral resource. Has this also been the situation in 
1973? In the following journal issue Erik Hesselbjerg was the first to dismiss such a 
comparison. In his opinion Berg’s short undocumented article could give the impression 
that “the direction is towards an uncontrolled exploitation of Greenland’s resources … 
over the heads of the Greenlandic society”. This was not the case, Hesselbjerg wrote and 
emphasised that it was the “long term, gradual and controlled development” that was the 
aim (Hesselbjerg 1973a:124). The critical tone was picked up again in a later issue by 
catholic priest Finn Lynge, who reminded about the Canadian experiences with mineral 
extraction – this time mining – in Inuit lands. Based on these examples a tough attitude 
towards commercial interests was necessary, he concluded. The solution was “a ban on 
fraternising with the permanent residents” (Lynge 1973:165). A rather different position 
was presented in the next issue, where geological engineer Aksel Mikkelsen – who 
privately had applied for an oil concession already in 1951 –  asked for more state 
initiative: “at one time or another there has to be drilling … to make clear whether there 
are possibilities for oil production on Greenland’s west coast”.  Mikkelsen wanted a 
central administrative unit composed of geologists from the Geological Survey, a legal 
adviser from the Ministry, representatives from the industry, the Nuclear Energy 
Commission and the provincial council to “rapidly work out all issues about the best 
possible exploitation of Greenland’s resource to the best for Greenland as well as 
Denmark”. He ensured that “no Dane today thinks about exploiting the Greenlandic 
resources without the Greenlanders” (Mikkelsen 1973:193).  
Hesselbjerg subsequently replied to Finn Lynge’s article by stating that “the 
Ministry has no illusions about the development of mineral extraction in Greenland being 
unproblematic”. Arguing for a “flexible and nuanced” approach, Hesselbjerg disagreed 
with Lynge about what he termed an “encapsulation policy”. Hesselbjerg stated that 
participation and coexistence was the ambition of the Ministry (Hesselbjerg 1973b:247).       
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5.2.4 Concessions and Drillings 
As mentioned above, it was not before the early 1970s, in the wake of the first oil crisis 
and upon the evidence of the North Sea discoveries, that the Danish state saw the 
potential for energy supply and state income (Rønne 1986:97). By then it was too late in 
many respects. Today the sole concession owner, A.P. Møller, still holds the most 
valuable areas of the Danish North Sea.  
This is contrasted by the Concession Committee’s Rapport til Ministeren for 
Grønland33 of 1974 (UKG 1974), which shows that the Danish system was not copied in 
Greenland, apart from a few exclusive 50-year concessions are not counted in. In stead, 
when several surveys from the late 1960s indicated a reasonable possibility of 
hydrocarbons in Greenland, the inputs to an administrative framework came from outside 
of Denmark. It was the impression that the principles of this framework could be 
expected to play an important role in Greenland’s future. Co-author of the Concession 
Committee’s report, Gert Vigh, explains that establishing contact with Norwegian experts 
was among the first things the Concession Committee did. The visit to the Norwegian Oil 
Council chairman Jens Evensen was one of the main influences that formed the approach 
to hydrocarbons in Greenland. Legal foundations and experience from primarily Norway 
and Canada, but also the UK and the Netherlands, was consulted and so were the relevant 
authorities in these countries (UKG 1974:1,14). Because of the Danish practice of using 
50-year exclusive concessions, there was not much expertise on licensing in Denmark at 
the time (UKG 1974:14-17).  
The basic model proposed, influenced by “the Norwegian pattern”, was a block 
system that divided the area in question in rectangular 400 km2 blocks, as seen below on 
figure 2 (UKG 1974:2). The concessions were given in 10-year periods and were possible 
to prolong up to 16 years. If discoveries were made it would automatically extend the 
concession period to 30 years.   
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Figure 2: Map showing the concessions off-shore western Greenland which were awarded in 1975.  
 
Source: Dahl 1986:66 (Courtesy of Geodetic Institute Denmark and Jens Dahl) 
 
The decision was made to include three off-shore areas off West Greenland, accounting 
for approximately 10 percent of the Greenlandic continental shelf accounted for by then. 
An area in Eastern Greenland, around Jameson Land, and another in North Greenland 
was mentioned, though not yet included. The Concession Committee determined that “all 
three regions can be seen as potential oil reservoirs” (UKG 1974:67). The focus was on 
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West Greenland because it was better known. The outline of the proposed model-
concession was to grant the right to explore hydrocarbons and the right to the discoveries 
within the area and the period of the concession. The conditions included the principles 
of relinquishment: the concession area would decrease during the 10-year period and the 
state could freely administer such relinquished areas (UKG 1974:1-6). 
Francis Sejersted refers to Jens Evensen as the one who shaped Norwegian oil 
policy in the 1960s (Sejersted 2006:16). Evensen and his secretary Nils Unsen had from 
1963, been trained in hydrocarbon-related legal, technical and economic issues by 
officials from Phillips. As chairman of the Norwegian Kontinentalsokkelutvalget34, 
Evensen was able to influence the design of the first Norwegian concession round 
(Skjeldal & Berge 2009:32, Ryggvik 2009:73-74). In his historical review of the 
development of Norway’s oil-industrial complex, Sejersted divides the entire period from 
the initial exploration until present time in three phases: the enclave-model phase, the 
“norwegianification”35 phase and the abandonment of “norwegianification” phase. A 
main (f)actor in designing the guiding principles of the first phase, the enclave-model 
phase, was Jens Evensen. In the enclave-model phase industrial development was 
connected to modernisation of society in general. It was based on a strong connection 
between state and industry and state initiative could be required if private efforts did not 
lead to the desired outcome. However, the industrial actors were not to be discriminated 
by state activity (Sejersted 2006:19). Through “the Norwegian pattern” and the thoughts 
of modernisation implied by the enclave-model phase, Evensen had the opportunity to 
affect the main principles of the first model-concession made in Denmark, on behalf of 
Greenland. The concession was not valid for Danish territory, which was still covered by 
A.P. Møller’s sole concession. It was worked out by a small group of bureaucrats in the 
Ministry for Greenland. Many things point to a similar approach in Greenland as in the 
enclave-model mentality. Industrialisation was modernisation and Greenland was to be 
modernised. Hydrocarbon extraction was from the beginning tied to a belief in the use of 
such a development to modernise society. This corresponds with Danish ambitions on 
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behalf of Greenland and later with the Home Rule Government ambitions of a more 
autonomous economy.  
  The Concession Committee of 1969 delivered its report to the minister of 
Greenland in April 1974. Much had happened throughout the five years that had changed 
the basic conditions of the report. As mentioned, the first oil crisis and the following 
price increase meant that the economic framework had to be re-calculated. In Denmark, 
the model-concession had to be approved by the Danish parliament and a parliamentary 
committee. Greenland was represented by three members in the Concession Committee. 
In addition the administration of Greenland’s provincial council was consulted. If the 
Greenlanders had disapproved, no formal procedure would have given them access to 
veto the concession (Larsen & Nielsen 1985:96).  
The model-concession was finally approved, though there was not full agreement 
among the Greenlandic members. A concession round was held, and in 1975, 13 
concessions were granted to a majority of foreign companies, as shown by figure 2. This 
led to the drilling one exploration wells in the summer of 1976 and four in 1977 (Dahl 
1986:65). 
 
5.2.6 Summary and Discussion of Results 
At this point it is appropriate to pick up the section headline: the last frontier? What 
seems to be the case is that the Frontier position is implicitly part of much of the 
argumentation. Finn Lynge’s objections are the contours of a more fundamental critique. 
It is not a question of the development pace, but a question of which type of development 
is desired. Without exception, the articles by Danish scientists and administrators assume 
that knowledge production is build on Danish, Copenhagen-based institutions. While 
most acknowledged the necessity of consulting Greenlandic representatives, the direction 
of the development was not an issue. “To open up Greenland”; a provocative title, but the 
attitude can be traced in many articles as an unarticulated theme − like saying ’let’s get 
started’. On this background the Frontier position can be applied within certain limits.  
 Of course the North Sea discoveries, and especially the Norwegian ones, played a 
role in raising hydrocarbons to the headlines once again. The Norwegians had shown how 
it was possible to regulate hydrocarbons, attract foreign expertise and investment, but still 
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keep a large share of the revenue. The Norwegian nation had been co-produced by 
hydrocarbons and a “politics of hydrocarbons” was already visible in Norway. If 
someone mentioned that, for instance, the seabed of Greenland resembled the West 
Norwegian shelf, connotations of an oil adventure would be implicit − much like the link 
to Texas in the previous section. 
If hydrocarbons activities were to become the new dynamic in the development of 
Greenland, what was needed more than anything, was knowledge of the area. The 
Geological Survey of Greenland was a natural choice since state geologists were active in 
Greenland already. Because of the way the Geological Survey of Greenland positioned 
itself, evaluation of economically viable reservoirs became a central activity.  
The story line “a comprehensive thing” is taken to describe the expectations of the 
Greenlandic hydrocarbon concession. This includes granting 13 concessions and allowing 
5 exploration drillings off the west coast. The fact that the concessions and drillings were 
opposed is believed to be the beginning of the first broad appearance of a Homeland 
positions. This will be explained further in the next section. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Results from 5.2 
Emblematic Issue(s)  − North Sea Oil discoveries/Norwegian 
discoveries 
− The West Greenland concessions and 
drillings  
Story line(s) − A comprehensive thing  
− To open up Greenland  
− The Norwegian pattern 
Main Theoretical Perspective − Co-production 
 
 
5.3 Negotiating Resources 
This section will seek to clarify how the Home Rule process was intertwined with the 
hydrocarbons-issue. In other words, this section will emphasise how the Greenlandic 
nation was co-produced by and with hydrocarbons. By initiative from Jonathan Motzfeldt 
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and the Provincial council, a purely Greenlandic Home Rule committee was established 
by the minister of Greenland in 1972 and delivered its report three years later (Sørensen 
2005:143).  
Shortly after the Danish-Greenlandic Home Rule Committee, officially named 
Kommissionen om Hjemmestyre i Grønland36, popularly called 
Hjemmestyrekommissionen, was established in October 1975. The Danish-Greenlandic 
commission was granted the mandate to propose a specific legislation regarding a 
Greenlandic autonomy and therefore its work and report became subject to debates in 
both Denmark and Greenland. The Home Rule Commission, as we shall call it, was to 
clarify how and whether transferring responsibility − from a Danish to a Greenlandic 
administration − would be feasible. The Home Rule Commission had 7 members from 
each part and one chairman appointed by the Minister of Greenland. It was recognised 
that Greenland had legitimate reasons to pursue autonomy. This was regarded as “a 
natural consequence of the Greenlandic democratic institutions that has taken place since 
the 1950s” (KHG 1978b:5). While Greenland’s de-colonisation of 1953 had been a 
Danish controlled and initiated political development from the beginning, this was to 
change. What we shall term the Home Rule process started in the early 1970s, when the 
Greenlandic ambitions of autonomy began to be articulated and ended with the Home 
Rule arrangement’s formalisation in 1979.  
When the Home Rule Commission’s report was published in April 1978 (KHG 
1978a-d) it included topics that had put a strain on the Danish-Greenlandic relationship 
(Brøsted 1979:7). The question of the right to the resources was “without a doubt the 
most difficult and the most decisive test to the Danish-Greenlandic will to continue the 
common kingdom…” (Lars Emil Johansen in KHG 1978b:14). Apparently, the process 
of co-production of Greenland and its hydrocarbons did not go unnoticed. Where did the 
hydrocarbon-issue influence the negotiations more specifically and what characteristics 
made it different from other topics?  
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5.3.2 Two Views on Home Rule  
In the previous section it was concluded that the Homeland/Frontier positions could be 
recognised in the discussions. This section will try to assess if they prevail as preferred 
positions and, if so, in which way. Concealed in the overarching process of co-production 
to be described, two different views of interpretation on the Home Rule process are 
introduced. I use these two views to clarify what can be perceived as a double function of 
the Home Rule process, pointing both backward and forward in time. In this way, the 
Home Rule process both settles the existing order and suggests the contours of a new one. 
In doing this, the ground is prepared for the change to come − it forms the basis of the 
emerging discourse of ecological modernisation. 
The first view understands the Home Rule process as a negotiation of issues 
which were already disputed, most importantly subsurface resources. During the 1970s, 
such new questions were forcefully brought into the realm of the Danish-Greenlandic 
relationship and the Home Rule process can be seen as a summary of these debates, 
which can be roughly illustrated by the Homeland/Frontier line of conflict. In this sense, 
the process points backwards in time. Where do we observe this in the Home Rule 
process?  
The second view dwells on the outcome of the Home Rule process; the politico-
administrative response to the new questions which were raised in this process. The 
creation of one administrative framework for minerals presupposes that a scientific 
consensus could be created. Or at least, that the discussion would recognise that a 
consensus was needed to make it work. The consensus has a name: ecological 
modernisation. This view on the Home Rule process is more concerned with its 
implication of the future framework, thus pointing forwards in time. How did the 
involved parts speak or act under the new institutional arrangements, as compared to the 
past debates? 
 
5.3.3 First View: New Questions, New Politics 
In the late 1960s, a relatively small group of young, educated Greenlandic men began to 
constitute what could be called a Greenlandic cultural elite. They began to formulate 
what Finn Breinholdt Larsen & Anne Marie Pagh Nielsen later called “the new politics” 
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of Greenland (Larsen & Nielsen 1985:99). Influenced by the political thoughts of the 
1960s left-wing as they were, familiar with political- and organisational milieus in 
Denmark, young political voices such as Jonathan Motzfeldt and Lars Emil Johansen 
formulated the decisive thoughts of “a more Greenlandic Greenland” (quoted in Dahl 
1986:46). As a precursor for future political activities the organisation Young 
Greenlanders Council had been founded in 1963. Though they themselves could have 
been accused of internal elitism, they succeeded in communicating their indignation into 
a broadly ethnically founded Greenlandic nationalism (Dahl 1986:37). One of the reasons 
behind the desire of Home Rule, stated by the purely Greenlandic Hjemmestyreudvalget, 
or the Greenlandic Home Rule Committee, was that: ”Greenland and the country’s 
indigenous, Eskimo population differ from the rest of Denmark in so many ways that the 
relationship between the Danish and Greenlanders can never be similar to the relationship 
between Sealanders and Jutlanders37 (Hjemmestyreudvalget 1975, in KHG 1978:13).   
A consequence of the enhanced political activity and consciousness was the 
appearance of Greenlandic political parties. It is reasonable to indicate that the issue of 
hydrocarbons was part of the motivation, and the scepticism towards Danish stewardship, 
as exemplified by figure 3.  
Figure 3: The Parca People 
− Couldn’t the Danish state be entrusted the exploitation of oil in Greenland? 
− Would you ask an alcoholic to guard your beer?   
 
Source: Brøsted 1979:56 (Courtesy of Per Danker) 
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When the Greenlandic Home Rule Committee published their report in February 1975 it 
called the mineral resource area “large and decisive to a coming Greenlandic Home 
Rule” (Hjemmestyreudvalget 1975, in KHG 1978:13). A Provincial council member 
suggested replacing the Mining Act opening sentence with the formulation that “all 
mineral raw materials in Greenland, and all kind of riches found in our country are owned 
by the permanent residents in Greenland. Research and extraction of such minerals is the 
prerogative of the provincial council” (Sørensen 2005:149).  
The national and social-democratic party Siumut (“forward” ) was founded by 
many of the central Greenland politicians in the Home Rule process. In the first political 
programme regarding mineral resources from 1977, Siumut stated that “the resource 
administration shall be moved to Greenland, to create alternative and critical research in 
this field” and that “some forms of «non-Greenlandic» resource exploitation shall be 
isolated from the rest of the society” (Dahl 1986:90-91). The moderate and Danish-
oriented political party Attasut (“interdependence”) was the counterpart to Siumut. The 
two parties were of the same size and both quite rapidly established local offices in towns 
around Greenland. Attasut’s political programme reflected a comprise-seeking attitude 
towards the Danish-Greenlandic relationship. Attasut’s programme only referred to 
mineral resources by stating that “the Home Rule shall possess competence regarding the 
nations resources” and that this competence should be “created in understanding with the 
Danish authorities” (Dahl 1986:207). The radical leftist Inuit Atagatigiit (“community of 
the people”) was only of marginal influence in the beginning. The party had its 
background in the Young Greenlanders Council which was radicalised during the 1970s 
with Aqqaluk Lynge as one of the founding figures. In a resolution from 1979 Inuit 
Atagatigiit stated that: “All oil and hard mineral concessions must immediately be 
cancelled and the related plans stopped, because of consideration for, and defence of, 
nature and all its life that is an inseparable part of the Greenlandic people’s culture and 
way of thinking”. In addition it should be mentioned that the party’s share of votes 
increased somewhat during the early 1980s and in 1983 Inuit Atagatigiit formed a 
government with Siumut (Dahl 1986:101,170). In the Danish political landscape, a rather 
broad consensus prevailed regarding Home Rule and the question of rights to resources. 
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The only parties opposing to official Danish point of view were on the outer left and right 
wings and had marginal influence on the course of events (Sørensen 2005:151).  
Another sign indicating Greenlandic opposition was the occupation of the 
Ministry for Greenland by the Young Greenlanders Council in 1975. Symbolically, it 
took place while the staff was busy presenting the model-concession to the parliamentary 
committee. The occupants were angry about what they saw as outright colonial policy. 
This, more than anything, underlined a political shift regarding Greenland in the 
Greenlandic and Danish public. As mentioned, 13 concessions were awarded in 1975, 
despite public and political doubts, and 5 explorative drillings were carried out in the 
summer of 1976-77. As Gert Vigh remarked: “a considerable anxiety about what was 
being planned began to appear in Greenland, but also to some extent in Denmark” 
(Interview w. Gert Vigh 2009, see Appendix 3). 
 
5.3.4 A Game of Words 
Progress in the negotiations of the Home Rule process included a quite detailed 
settlement of which rights that belonged to whom. The question was delicate. Would the 
answer set a precedent and decide the future ownership of presumably huge energy 
reserves? That the question of resources and rights was important is also immediately 
visible from the contents of the Home Rule Commission’s report. While other areas 
concerning the tangible aspects of Home Rule introduction are sub-categories that either 
could or could not be transferred to a Home Rule administration, the raw materials area 
was a category of its own (KHG 1978a:3). The question of property rights to land 
including subsurface resources posed serious problems on a principal level. The State 
Department was asked and two separate reports were ordered by two Professors in Law, 
Peter Germer and Ole Espersen, who disagreed strongly about the what was the right 
conclusion (KHG 1978a:18, KHG 1978b:3).  
The eighth section of the Home Rule Act covered the natural raw materials area 
and was the legal foundation of the Raw Material Agreement. The eighth section was 
motivated by “the acknowledgement of the Greenlandic population’s fundamental rights, 
protecting the interests of the kingdom, the principle of equality and the joint decision-
making” and was introduced with the words in subsection one: “The permanent residents 
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of Greenland have fundamental rights to the natural resources of Greenland” 
(Hjemmestyreloven 1978). 
It was in this context that the phrase “fundamental rights” from the Home Rule 
Act’s eighth section, subsection one, was subject to debate and revisions. The Danish 
commission member from Venstresocialisterne38, which opposed the report conclusions, 
Steen Folke, described this in detail. He did not support the conclusions in Home Rule 
Commission’s report. In stead he was allowed to write a minority statement which was 
included in the report (Folke 1978).  Part of the minority statement was used to shed light 
on the negotiations behind the “fundamental rights” formulation of the eighth section. 
Folke described how Lars Emil Johansen from Siumut “declared that he was able to 
accept this solution if the Home Rule Law and the Mining Law stated that the property 
rights of Greenland’s subsurface belong to the permanent residents”. This was not 
accepted by the Danish half of the commission and Folke describes how at the next 
meeting, Johansen proposed a “flexibilisation” of this formulation by:  
 
“replacing the taboo word «property rights» with the more imprecise and non-binding «fundamental 
rights». Even this formulation was not enough for the Danish members. Lars Emil Johansen’s proposition 
states that: «The permanent residents of Greenland have the fundamental rights to the natural resources, 
including mineral raw materials in Greenland’s subsurface». But the Danish members would not accept the 
phrase «the fundamental rights». Again Lars Emil Johansen had to give in and accept removing the small 
word «the», before the final compromise was finished on the seventh meeting June 1977” (Folke 1978:106-
7). 
 
Folke’s minority statement disagreed with the Home Rule Commission in most aspects. 
The quote provides crucial insights in the process of negotiations. 
Political interpretations were debated, exemplified by The Danish Prime Minister, 
Anker Jørgensen’s speech to the Greenlandic National Radio in august 1977. Not 
mentioning the debated drilling, Jørgensen nevertheless touched upon the hydrocarbons-
issue. Emphasising “reciprocal solidarity” he said that “in Denmark it has always been 
the entire society, not the individual property owner or any local groups, who has owned 
the wealth available in the subsurface”. Though this should not exclude the recognition of 
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“special rights” based on “belonging to the land”, the common kingdom was the basic 
unit (Jørgensen 1978:73).  
During the Home Rule process, in a debate in the Danish parliament in October 
1977, two Home Rule Commission members, the Danish, conservative Erik Ninn-Hansen 
(ENH) and Greenlandic Lars Emil Johansen (LEJ) of Siumut picked up on Jørgensen’s 
line of argument.  
 
LEJ: “And Mr. Ninn-Hansen says it is a Danish tradition that one does not grant the property right 
of the subsurface to individuals or groups. I shall turn the attention to the fact that the issue is not 
individuals, nor groups. It concerns a people”  
ENH: “It cannot be that one group of people in a part of the kingdom can have some rights, 
spoken of as property rights, that do not exist in other parts of the kingdom” (KHG 1978b:17-18). 
 
The positions of the debate resemble the arguments in the speech delivered by the Danish 
Prime Minister in August that year. 
The Home Rule Commission summed up the content of fundamental rights in its  
report at the presentation of the eighth section, though not mentioning the different 
possible formulations that Folke discussed. It is emphasised that fundamental rights “has 
the nature of a political statement in principle” and that certain “political-moral demands” 
are part of it. But, “a strictly legal interpretation cannot be made”. These political-moral 
demands are then asserted as “originating from an emotional cohesion between a 
population and the land it has lived on in hundreds of years” and that “this cohesion does 
naturally lead to demands of certain rights not captured by legal language” (KHG 
1978a:26).  
 
5.3.5 Blowouts – the Right to Pollute? 
Having observed how the issues of the “new politics” were settled in the political 
negotiations, the issues of ecological concern represent a turning point in an analysis 
oriented towards the co-production perspective. Since territorial rights issues had been 
somehow settled, another question concerning rights arose: the right to pollute. 
Exemplified by the accidents described below, the attention began to turn towards 
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ecological issues as the legitimising standard. This will be elaborated on in the next 
section. 
In April 1977, the Bravo-platform in the Norwegian North Sea oil-field Ekofisk 
experienced a blowout − an uncontrolled flow liquid of gas from a well sometimes mixed 
with sand − from one of its production wells. Between 9-20.000 tons of oil leaked into 
the sea. The blowout was out of control and lasted for more than a week. Luckily, the 
environmental impact was minimal: half of the oil evaporated into the atmosphere and 
favourable weather conditions kept the oil away from the coast, allowing for mechanical 
and chemical treatment at sea (Westergård/SNL 2010, SNL 2009).   
In October of the same year, in the Danish sector of the North Sea, an A.P Møller 
owned oil rig experienced a similar blowout. The rig was located in the Vagn-1 field 10 
km from the German sector and was an exploratory well. This time it was gas, water and 
sand that blew out of the well. The gas ignited shortly after and burned for 12 hours 
before extinguishing by itself. Again, due to the circumstances it was difficult to portray 
it as a pollution accident: if oil had been involved, an international effort would have 
been required. Because it was not required by Danish security standards, contrary to for 
instance Norway, A.P Møller did not keep any pollution-control equipment on the rig 
(Bülow 2009, Fischer 1978:63-65). 
Many felt that the anxiety addressed in relation to the West Greenland off-shore 
concessions was justified by the two North Sea accidents. The Bravo-accident prompted 
both the Provincial council and the temporary Danish-Greenlandic Styringsudvalg 
vedrørende mineralske råstoffer i Grønland39 − which was responsible for the political 
supervision of the west coast drillings − to suggest a halt in exploration activities before 
security issues had been resolved. Yet, the Danish Government decided not to interfere 
and the exploration drillings continued in the summer of 1977 (Larsen & Nielsen 
1985:97).  
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5.3.6 Second View: Hydrocarbons of Equality  
The Greenland autonomy was written into Dansih legislature as 
Hjemmestyreordningen40, formalised by Lov om Grønlands hjemmestyre41. I will refer to 
this entire body of agreements as the Home Rule Arrangement. The arrangement was 
approved by the Danish parliament in November 1978 and accepted by popular vote in 
Greenland − 73 percent in favour − early in 1979 (Sørensen 2005:151-153). To finalise 
the Home Rule Arrangement, as I will call it further on, it was necessary to outline 
Mineral raw materials as a separate agreement, which had been hotly disputed for some 
time already, as described in previous sections (see also Brøsted 1979:55). Specific 
details regarding mineral resources were suggested in a separate act which became 
formalised as Råstofloven42 in 1979.  
In total, Råstofloven and the related administrative framework were commonly 
spoken of as the Råstofordningen, or the Raw Material Agreement as I will call in from 
here. The Raw Material Agreement guided all activities which were related to mineral 
resources in Greenland. As part of the agreement, the Home Rule Commission suggested 
a joint committee as a forum where projects and decisions could be debated and prepared 
before presentations to the national parliaments were made. The result was Fællesrådet 
vedrørende mineralske råstoffer i Grønland43, Fællesrådet or the Joint Committee (KHG 
1978a:66). As shown in figure 4-6, in different versions, the Joint Committee would 
consist of three-five members from both Denmark and Greenland. The mineral raw 
materials should be managed by a separate administration – Råstofadministrationen or 
The Raw Materials Administration – which would integrate legal, scientific and 
economic aspects in one body (KHG 1978a:134).  
A “principle of equality” (KHG 1978a:25) was a guiding idea that shaped the 
configuration of the agreement. In the decision making process that meant a “double veto 
right”; no fundamental decision within the Mineral raw material area could be taken in 
the case of disagreement. Not only did each government have the right to veto, but if only 
one government member wanted it, the vote would be tried the parliament, also called the 
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double veto. It was emphasised that the decisions in the Joint Committee mainly were 
“decisions about the development pace” (Foighel 1978:3). The Home Rule Commission 
acknowledged that Greenlanders had reasons to mistrust parts of such a development. In 
the balancing act between rights and interests it was recognised that the content of the 
development could be discussed. The Greenlanders, it was recognised, had the right to 
shape it, the right to secure the special Greenlandic lifestyle and to benefit economically 
(KHG 1978a:26).  
That the agreement was separated from the overall Home Rule Arrangement 
raised criticism and suspicion of the Danish state wanting to secure future control. This is 
mirrored in the three figures depicting the institutions established as a consequence of the 
agreement, fig. 4-6. In Danish political scientist Jens Brøsted’s version, figure 4, the 
geographical distribution of the institutions is used to change the perspective on the 
“principle of equality”.  
 
Figure 4: Danish political scientist Jens Brøsted’s version of the institutional composition of the Raw 
Material Agreement 
 
Source: Brøsted 1979:74 (Courtesy of Jens Brøsted) 
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As Brøsted emphasises, a majority of the related institutions were to stay in Denmark and 
consequently exercise influence. Moreover, the Greenlandic access to knowledge about 
the mineral resources issues was limited by the long distance. In Brødsted’s version it 
seems as though they have to cross the Atlantic. As a critical comment, Brøsted’s version 
tries to “equalise” Denmark and Greenland by twisting and turning the map normally 
centred on Denmark, which makes Greenland look like a far-away periphery. 
A similar approach is displayed by Danish anthropologist Jens Dahl in figure 5, 
who states that the Mineral Raw Material Administration in real terms is a part of the 
Danish State apparatus (Dahl 1986:120).  
 
Figure 5: Danish anthropologist Jens Dahl’s version of the institutional composition of the Raw 
Material Agreement 
 
Source: Dahl 1986:121 (Courtesy of Jens Dahl) 
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Though not referring to a map, the “principle of equality” is obviously criticised by Dahl 
too. Dahl systematically distinguishes to types of contact between the institutions. The 
double arrow depicts “political and administrative competence and decisions” and the 
single arrow “administrative and technical information”. In addition, Dahl specifically 
operates with three realms of influence: the Greenlandic (upper left), the Danish (upper 
right) and below both an international realm composed by the oil and mining industry. In 
Dahl’s version everything that reaches Greenland is transferred through the Joint 
Committee (“Fællesråd”), while “administrative and technical information” from “mining 
and oil companies” is transferred through the Raw Materials Administration before 
reaching the Joint Council. 
 The official version published in the Home Rule Commission’s report is shown in 
figure 6. As could be expected, this version emphasises the “principle of equality” in that 
the illustration is symmetrically composed. 
 
Figure 6: The official Home Rule report version: Sketch of the political and administrative structure of 
the Raw Material Agreement 
 
Source: KHG 1978a:67 (Courtesy of the Home Rule Commission) 
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In fact, the only thing disturbing the symmetry (and equality) of the figure is on the 
Greenlandic side, the “Greenlandic Municipalities”. It is tempting to draw the 
interpretation of figure 6 rather far: in its symmetry, it almost has something quasi-
religious about it.  The horizontal line across the entire figure separates the political realm 
from the administration, knowledge production and commercial interests. On the one 
hand, the figure seems to state that political decisions are taken solely by evaluation of 
controllable objective information. From the theoretical perspective of co-production, 
such a division is artificial, because the realms co-produce each other. On the other hand, 
and in line with ecological modernisation, it portrays what a politico-administrative 
response might look like. The two arrows connecting the Joint Committee and the Raw 
Materials Administration can be seen as a closed circuit where disagreements are settled 
before the national parliaments (and the press and public) are involved. Suddenly, the 
hotly debated issue of hydrocarbons in Greenland could be “modernised out of the crisis” 
(Hajer 1996:249). 
  
5.3.7 Optimism and Pessimism in Qaqaortoq 
At Konferencen vedrørende mineralske råstoffer i Grønland44, held in Qaqortoq in South 
Greenland in June 1978, Danish-Greenlandic politicians, administrators and scientist 
gave their view on the Greenlandic mineral resource potential (Grønlandsministeriet 
1978, see details in appendix 1). As one would perhaps have expected there was a 
majority of Danish speakers, yet it was not overwhelming and the overall appearance was 
one of equal representation. The Home Rule Commission’s report had been published 
and the Raw Material Agreement proposed. Though nobody could be sure if the 
proposals would pass at the time of the conference, the contours of a future 
administrative framework were clear. The following résumé of the conference is made to 
give an early impression of what a “principle of equality” could look like.    
There was a sense of optimism towards future development when Jonathan 
Motzfeldt of Siumut stated that mineral resource extraction, can “not merely be a national 
concern, but in most cases will be an international matter.” In a resource-hungry world, 
one had to acknowledge certain “economic laws” as a basis for decision making, 
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something that could have “decisive importance for Greenland’s future.” Summing up 
these statements Motzfeldt describes how “we have been part of debates and discussion 
regarding this very exciting and very complicated beginning of an oil adventure” 
(Motzfeldt 1978:4, my italics). Following this perspective, the Mayor of Sisimiut in West 
Greenland, Emilie Lennart, went into details regarding the town of Sisimiut’s potential as 
off-shore supply base. The specificity of the presentation is remarkable. Lennart notes 
how approximately 205 persons will be employed, detailed down to 16 different 
categories of employment, for each drilling operation. Yet the possibility of employing 
Greenlanders would in the short term be limited to “indirect functions” and service 
(Lennart 1978).  
Skepticism from a Greenlandic point of view was stated by the chairman of the 
Greenlandic Workes Union, Odaq Olsen, Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament, 
Lars Emil Johansen and chairman of the Greenlandic Business Development Board, 
Angmalortok Olsen. The scepticism was based on principal arguments. A “debate about 
the purpose” was needed, because it was “not the development of raw materials that shall 
dictate the development of the Greenlandic society” (Olsen 1978:4). Johansen 
emphasised the need to “reduce the dependency of foreign countries” regarding import of 
goods and services. While Johansen, on behalf of Siumut, would not exclude mineral 
extraction on land, he (and Siumut) were against off-shore drillings (Johansen 1978:4). 
What the sceptics shared with the optimists was the belief in the existence of resources 
worth developing. When Olsen (A.) questioned the existence of resources in his 
presentation, he indicated that companies could have left the impression of dry wells to 
save the “hidden resources” for a “favourable situation” in the future: “one wonders when 
such a «favourable situation» will appear, so that they will begin the extraction up here” 
(Olsen, A. 1978:3). The message is: the resources are there, the discussion is about who 
will own them and how extraction is to take place. 
 Scepticism or not, the idea that resource extraction was readily available was 
challenged by Director of Geological Survey of Greenland, K. Ellisgaard-Rasmussen, 
former chief of police and Master of Law, Jørgen Hertling and Head of Department, Gert 
Vigh. As Hertling remarked, “common to hard and soft minerals is that large 
uncertainties are always attached” and therefore it would be “worrying to have too large 
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expectations to minerals as a basic source for the Greenlandic economy” (Hertling 
1978:3). Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen was even more dismissing in his geological review of 
raw materials which could be classified as potential: “I deliberately do not mention oil, 
since its existence is not proven anywhere.” According to Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen, it 
would take at least a decade before any resource could be put into production. However, 
in an attachment to the presentation added after the conference, Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen 
wanted to show how “sorrow can be turned to happiness.” While he put the western off-
shore “on hold with regard to oil”, he saw an area on the east coast who could be 
“matured” in the future (Ellitsgaard-Rasmussen 1978:2,9). Vigh did not change the 
impression of the oil adventure being quite remote. The optimism of the concession of 
1975 seemed to have faded, since the positive sign from the exploration drillings was a 
weak trace of gas. Vigh also mentioned East Greenland, however the surveys “are taking 
place regarding possibilities in very long terms” (Vigh 1978:12).  
Since fisheries still was the primary export and state income (in addition to the 
Danish block grant) it was natural to include presentations of potential problems 
regarding co-existence of off-shore activities and fisheries. Pollution by hydrocarbons to 
the sea was the main theme. Olsen (A.) and Johansen had already made clear statements 
which linked pollution to the protection of fisheries and hunting. As Johansen stated 
hydrocarbon extraction onshore could be allowed if related “pollution does not damage 
the main commercial interests”. Niels Carlo Heilman from the Greenlandic Hunters and 
Fishers Association was positive to hydrocarbon extraction, even from a fisher’s point of 
view. Heilman saw two types of risk connected to offshore activities: first, blowouts or 
other types of oil spills with immediate consequences, a risk he considered as “minimal”.  
Second, the “consequences for the fisheries on a daily basis” caused by waste and 
damaged material (Heilman 1978:2). Poul Johansen, a biologist from Greenland’s 
Biological Surveys, emphasised that it was “reasonable that the environmental problems 
have an important place in the raw materials debate, since there is a potential conflict 
between exploiting minerals resources and living resources (fishery and hunting)”. 
Regarding pollution from hydrocarbon activities, Johansen (P.) distinguished between the 
phase of exploration and the phase of production. While the anxiety so far had been about 
“oil spill related to the drillings”, like the Bravo-blowout, Johansen stated that oil 
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pollution in Greenland “so far only had come from the (normal) traffic of ships” (my 
parenthesis). In this perspective, the risk of oil pollution related to production “was based 
on much more experience”, than in the exploration phase (P. Johansen 1978: 6-7).  
All though four large bulks of presentations at the conference do not give a 
complete account of the content of the statements, they do tell a story. Many remarks 
could have been made to challenge the optimism about the view that risk was only 
attached to exploration. As Johansen (P.) remarked about the production phase, the 
danger of pollution could increase when going from exploration to production. Still, the 
different views of the presentations did not rule each other out. Acting under the new 
administrative framework they stayed within positions where all opinions aired at the 
conference could be included, at least on a rhetorical level.    
 
5.3.8 Summary and Discussion of Results 
The relation between the two views on the Home Rule process is artificial in the sense 
that they took place within one interactive process. Still I think it showed how the Home 
Rule process was able to contain the two opposite directed positions of Homeland and 
Frontier (the first view) and a third position which in crucial aspects resemble ecological 
modernisation (the second view). Working with ecological modernisation this 
containment is interesting since the ability to redefine the character and solutions of 
environmental problems was crucial to the eco-modernistic development. In this case it 
was the “Greenlandic Greenland” reacting against blowouts and 400 km2 concession 
blocks. At the same time it was the Danish Ministry for Greenland reacting against what 
they saw as antisocial Greenlandic rights claim, with potentially powerful consequences.  
 The first view focused on the effort to answer the Greenlandic claim of ownership 
and rights. Due to the words used, and the framing of the discussion by the “new 
politics”, it seems reasonable to understand this discussion as a struggle between the 
Homeland and Frontier discourses. This is also exemplified by the negotiation of 
“fundamental rights”. However, the problem was that the new questions about resource 
rights were posed in a way which made negotiation between the Frontier and Homeland 
position very difficult. Exemplified by the debate between Lars Emil Johansen and Erik 
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Ninn-Hansen, the distance between the positions seemed unbridgeable. Where Lars Emil 
Johansen saw a people with rights, Ninn-Hansen saw a kingdom with interests.  
Yet within the Home Rule Arrangement, the Raw Material Agreement stands out 
as representing a seed of change. This was the focus of the second view. The 
hydrocarbons were representing something that both parts strived to get. Establishing a 
separate administrative unit to negotiate questions of mineral development behind closed 
doors, before entering the realm of public debate, is exactly the “politico-administrative” 
response indicating a new regime that Hajer describes as ecological modernisation.  
The majority of Danish and Greenlandic politicians wanted a Greenlandic oil 
adventure. The game of words showed that while the aim − hydrocarbon extraction − 
could be agreed upon, the disagreement was “caught” in the language to describe that 
aim: rights versus interests. Would it have been possible to let it all fall, to break off the 
Home Rule process, because of such a disagreement? It probably would not. Instead, a 
new discourse-coalition was crafted, which was able to include the members of the two 
struggling positions.    
However, it might be a little early to conclude that the Homeland and Frontier 
positions could be dismissed of. Indeed, they continued to be important markers of 
political discussions about hydrocarbons in Greenland. The story line “principle of 
equality” both points to the way hydrocarbons became a Danish-Greenlandic project, but 
also that the “equality” was questionable. As is indicated by the figures 4-6, the last one 
being the official version, not everyone agreed that “equality” was the right description.  
The conference in Qaqortoq is a good example of how the hydrocarbon-issue (and 
to some extent other mineral resources) affected the framing of the area. As we noticed, a 
long list of aspects regarding exploration and extraction were touched upon. Statements 
foresaw an “oil adventure”, while others estimated that “no oil was discovered” and that 
at least a decade would pass before discoveries not yet made could be exploited. Of 
course, due to the nature of the conference no one could write off the hydrocarbon-issue, 
but the obvious disagreement about the speakers’ understanding of the development 
conditions could at least have been an eye-opener. Among the speakers at the conference 
no one was asked to speak about a scenario where no mineral resource extraction at all 
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was to take place in Greenland. But curiously, regarding hydrocarbons this is exactly 
what has turned out to be the case.  
Present at the conference was optimism, scepticism and pessimism mixed with 
relevant information and timely questions. My intention of containing them in the 
subsection above was to see how the hydrocarbon-issue was used, now that the Raw 
Material Agreement made up the political-administrative condition in the background. As 
such, it is no surprise that none of the speakers played exclusively on the 
Homeland/Frontier line of conflict. One way of understanding the conference is as a 
preliminary exercise before the Joint Council and the Raw Materials Administration 
came into power. Since the Joint Council should contain discussions perhaps not suited 
for parliamentary disputes, the way the conference succeeded to include a variety of 
opinions on the hydrocarbon-issue must have been satisfactory.    
 
Table 3: Summary of Results from 5.3 
Emblematic Issue(s)  − The blowouts 
− The Raw Material Agreement  
Story line(s) − A more Greenlandic Greenland 
− Fundamental rights 
− Principle of equality  
Main Theoretical Perspective  − Ecological modernisation 
 
 
5.4 Opposition and Administration − Two Emblematic Events 
In this section, I intend to ask how two emblematic events framed hydrocarbons in 
relation to the Greenlandic nature in rather different ways. It is interesting if and how the 
views in the debates around the events resemble patterns of the known discourses 
Homeland and Frontier and thus connect to the Home Rule negotiations. Also, how do 
they show that the emerging discursive structure, ecological modernisation, is gaining 
strength?  
By the end of 1978 all of the five exploration wells were declared dry by the 
concessionaries and the West Greenland off-shore concessions were given up (Joint 
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Committee 1981:9). This left the newly formed Joint Council without any promising 
hydrocarbon projects. When a Danish-American company proposed a large-scale 
exploration in eastern Greenland, we can at least expect that the proposal was received 
with interest. This was be become the Jameson Land Concession. Yet the section begins 
with another kind of event. The Arctic Pilot Project, a Canadian proposal of Arcitc 
shipping, triggered a discursive pattern that made use of the arguments of the 1970s, 
observed before and during the Home Rule process. Denmark-Greenland formed a 
somehow surprising discourse-coalition opposing the Arctic Pilot Project.  
 
5.4.1 The Arctic Pilot Project 
Arctic Pilot Project was a plan for transportation of natural gas from northern Canada in 
icebreaking tankers going from the Canadian Arctic. The tankers would carry the gas as 
Liquid Natural Gas, popularly abbreviated LNG. Shown by figure 7, the gas was to be 
transported to a south-eastern Canadian harbour on a proposed route along Greenland’s 
west coast, in some places as near as 25 kilometres to the coast (Rasmussen 1987:150, 
Petro-Canada 1979:8). During the 70s many hydrocarbon discoveries had been made in 
the Beaufort Sea and the Arctic islands, especially of natural gas. The project represented 
a solution to the problem of accessing consumer markets further south. Nothing similar 
had been tried before; relying on ice-breaking vessels for an Arctic transport route 
through ice-covered waters was indeed a pilot project (Lauritzen 1982:24). The initial 
vision was to start operations in 1983 and move into full scale activity in 1985, which 
implied all year operation of the vessels (Lauritzen 1982:37, Rasmussen 1987:150).  
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Figure 7: Map showing the proposed route of the Arctic Pilot Project 
 
Source: PC & ATGL 1979:4 (Courtesy of PC & ATGL) 
 
The timing was an important factor for the Arctic Pilot Project since investments in the 
fields depended on gaining revenue. In addition, the gas price was decisive to the 
profitability of such a large scale project. In 1977 there was a shortage of gas in Canada, 
but more importantly also in the United States. The Canadian situation was changed with 
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huge gas discoveries in Alberta and off the east coast in 1979. Then, contrary to 
expectations, the price on crude oil rose record high in 1979 and 1980 − called the second 
oil crisis − after the Iranian revolution and the commencement of the Iraq-Iran war 
(Noreng 2006:26). This brought new hope into the Arctic Pilot Project, just as it was 
close to being abandoned (Lewington 1987:171).  
It was also a busy period regarding the political and administrative situation of 
Denmark-Greenland. The Home Rule Arrangement was on its way and an autonomous 
Greenlandic representation was to be taken into account. The Danish Ministry for 
Greenland had been contacted in 1977 by the newly founded state-owned Petro-Canada 
and asked to meet with Canadian officials. A sceptical Danish bureaucracy saw many 
drawbacks and few benefits, which was stated firmly in a letter of response. Still, it was 
agreed to meet in august 1977 (Rasmussen 1987:152). The chairman of the Greenland’s 
Provincial Council was informed in September the same year. Much more did not happen 
for the next two years. Then two things happened on the same day. The 17th of January 
1979, Petro-Canada officially announced that it had submitted the Arctic Pilot Project to 
the National Energy Board, the Canadian federal regulatory authority (Lewington 
1987:168). The same day the Greenlanders voted yes to Home Rule with an 
overwhelming majority. As communication went ahead through diplomatic channels, 
during the summer of 1979 the Danish government decided to consult the newly elected 
Greenlandic government before taking a position. In addition to a presentation and 
overview to the Greenlandic authorities, the ministry publicised information about the 
project to the public. The severe scepticism revealed in the Greenlandic parliament’s 
autumn-session was summed up by Greenland’s first premier, Jonathan Motzfeldt, in a 
letter of reply dated November 1979 (Lauritzen 1982:34-40).  
One of the aspects touched upon by the Ministry’s request was the legal context. 
Canada was not obliged to ask for opinions nor permission from Denmark or Greenland, 
but would be able to carry the project though in compliance with international law. 
Among other things, the Law of the Sea45, part II, section 3, article 17 rules that “Subject 
to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea” (UN 1998, my italics). The LNG carriers 
                                                 
45
 Also known as UNCLOS – The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
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would fall under the category of innocent passage. Importantly, the Law of the Sea was 
not finalised at this time, which meant the countries were not yet regulated by it. In 
March 1982 the problems of commercial all-year arctic shipping were taken up by 
Danish and Greenlandic representatives, who issued a statement commenting on the draft 
of the article. Though I have not analysed the possible effects of the statement, it is 
interesting to note that the Greenlandic, through Denmark, was heard in an important 
international forum.  
In December 1979 it was decided to establish a “techno-scientific workgroup” on 
behalf of the Danish authorities and Petro-Canada (Rasmussen 1987:152, Lauritzen 
1982:40). In addition, the Canadian government proposed an environmental agreement in 
1976 as a framework to guide regulation and actions in case of accidents. The Canadian 
Minister of Northern and Indian Affairs, John Munro, visited both Denmark and Nuuk to 
ease concerns and speed up the negotiation process (Lewington 1987:174). The 
Canadians wanted to sign the agreement before any further decision on Arctic shipping. 
As part of a larger set of Arctic ambitions, the Canadian authorities “pressed for the 
agreement” and were “prepared to go to considerable lengths to comply with the Danish 
safety demands” (Jyllandsposten 1981: May 27th)46. The Danish side remained sceptical 
and the Canadians were “getting a bit impatient”, according to the same article. 
Apparently timing was an issue here as well. The agreement was finally signed in 1983, 
but what happened to the Arctic Pilot Project?  
 
5.4.3 Unified Protests 
In the beginning the Arctic Pilot Project was only a leaflet, a rough sketch of the 
visionary project that was to come. Groundwork was to be done before the official 
application, which ended as just described. From the destiny of the project we now turn 
towards the framing of it, on behalf of the Danish-Greenlandic public and their 
governments.  
                                                 
46
 As mentioned in 4.4.4, the newspaper articles are not included in the literature list, but compiled in a 
seperate list in appendix 4. The articles were read in English after they had been translated from Danish. 
The translation are therefore not mine. 
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Figure 8: Ice Breaking LNG Carrier (artist’s rendering) 
 
Source: PC & AGTL 1979:3 (Courtesy of Scott)  
 
In their application to the Canadian National Energy Board in 1979 the applicants 
proudly states: 
 
” The acknowledged resource wealth of the Arctic can be made accessible only through the 
application of advanced technology and the acquisition of practical operating experience, while at 
the same time respecting the physical and social nature of the northern environment” (Petro-
Canada 1979: 12). 
 
Who could disagree with that? Many people in Greenland, Denmark and Canada 
disagreed strongly. On a formal level neither the Danish nor the Greenlandic 
administration welcomed the proposal. Over the span of its existence of five years the 
project aroused an unprecedented, and perhaps unrepeated, unified opposition among 
Inuit and other organisations. The founding of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
commonly called ICC, in 1977, which a few years later represented the Inuit in 
international fora, can be seen as an example of this (Shadian 2005:249). Based on the 
application, the Arctic Pilot Project quickly became a visible and hotly debated issue in 
the media. It can be regarded as one of the most important issues at that time (Rasmussen 
1987:151). In the course of 1980 it rose to become one of the first big issues for an 
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autonomous Greenland. During the work of opposition, the indigenous organisational 
opposition was tightened and strengthened, contacts were made, articles written and so on 
(Shadian 2005:257). The Danish and Greenlandic governments, ICC and other 
indigenous and environmentalist organisation all agreed that the project seemed to be 
“exporting problems from Canada to Greenland” (Rasmussen 1987:152). In most of the 
process it was evident that the opponents of the Arctic Pilot Project were a group with 
little influence and power. If the Canadian parliament had decided to carry the project 
through they had been free to do so. A Danish paper stated that “What would seem to be 
involved is a native population that forcefully emphasises its own cultural values and 
ecologically balanced way of life, versus a greedy and uncaring world whose over-use 
and one-sidedly economic philosophy threatens to crush it”. Greenland seemed to have a 
“moral right” (Information 1982: Mar 6th). It was “Greenland’s struggle”, “fighting 
against the Canadian oil industry” and the Arctic Pilot Project should be “defeated” 
(Information 1982: Mar 6th, AG 1982: Jan 20th).  
The broad based Danish-Greenlandic opposition was suspicious of the way the 
project was presented. On the first Arctic Pilot Project leaflets from 1977, the map 
illustrating the tanker route only included Canada. Even though the vessel went closer to 
the Greenlandic coast this remained a blank slate (Lauritzen 1982:34). Even though it 
was later corrected when appointed from the Ministry for Greenland, there was 
something suspicious about the whole thing. According to an article, the Canadian 
politicians made a “show” to give the impression take they took the Greenlandic opinion 
seriously (AG 1980: Oct 20th). Petro-Canada’s attempt to engage with the public 
themselves was conceived as “a flock of foreign agents travelling up and down the coast 
spreading their propaganda” (AG 1982: Jan 27th). Economic arguments and scenarios, 
whether prosperous or poor, only contributed to the suspicion that behind the cooperative 
attitude, objections were not being heard. In an article entitled Arctic Pilot Project is to 
be pushed trough with offers of jobs and money it was stated that “Arctic Pilot Project 
should not expect that wide spread resistance to the project in Alaska, Canada and 
Greenland will be swept aside, just because the people behind Arctic Pilot Project wave 
dollar bills in front of us” (AG 1982: Jun 9th). Petro-Canada and the Arctic Pilot Project 
were seen as industrial imperialism of the worst sort. As in many previous cases of Arctic 
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resource extraction the local residents would feel the negative impact, potentially long 
time after the project, while others would reap the benefits. In this perspective fighting 
the Arctic Pilot Project formed a piece of a larger picture; as figure 10 illustrates, it was 
nature against the “oil industry” − or the Homeland against the Frontier.   
 
Figure 9: Cartoon: All clear! Full speed ahead! 
 
Source: Lauritzen 1978:318 (Courtesy: unknown) 
 
The main arguments against the Artic Pilot project had to do with the ecological 
consequences of the project. The “export of problems” was not only from one country to 
others, it was also from the human, industrial society to nature. That animals − especially 
sea mammals as seal and whale traditionally caught be hunters − became the focus point 
was a consequence of the ecological argument (Lauritzen 1982:41). Many feared that “a 
huge ecological cycle, reaching far beyond the arctic, will be smashed to pieces” 
(Information 1981: Jun 26th) and the Greenlandic politicians raised concerns about noise 
pollution, problems related to icebreaking, air pollution and danger of oil spills. None of 
the Greenlandic politicians “saw any possibility of a Danish-Canadian compromise with 
respect to the super tanker service from the Arctic islands in Canada down to the Davis 
Strait” and it was argued that “animals circulate all over these waters between Canada 
and Greenland so it does not help just to move the navigation” (AG 1980: Oct 2nd).  On 
the contrary, as the Danish zoologist Berthel Møhl pointed out, “marine life, particularly 
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whales, is so sensitive to the engine noise that they could disappear from the area west of 
Greenland” (JP 1981: May 27th).   
Yet, it was not only the animals that were threatened: the “hunting culture of 
Canada and Greenland will be sabotaged” (Information 1981: Jun 26th). Since hunting 
and fishing continued to be “Greenland’s most important industry” it was a sensitive 
matter, exemplified by the president f the ICC at that time, Hans-Pavia Rosing: “we shall 
be killed, but we shall continue to breathe” (AG 1980: Oct 2nd). Connecting the issue of 
environmental protection with the Greenlandic traditional way of life seemed a logic step 
in this context. As the Mayor of Qanaaq, Ussarkak Kujaukitsok, said: “We must make an 
attempt to ally ourselves with foreign environmental organisations to secure a stable 
future for sealing and whaling in Greenland” (AG 1982: date unknown). Support was 
also gathered in other arenas, for instance when Attasut’s Otto Steenholdt was seeking 
“help from the environmental ministers of the Nordic countries as well as from associates 
devoted to the protection of animals and of nature.” According to the article, Steenholdt 
“pleaded for help” in the Nordic Council (AG 1982: Mar 4th). Interestingly the Danish 
representation questioned “what the Greenlanders themselves would do if and when there 
is oil production in Greenland, and this oil has to be transported to other markets” and 
pointed out that pollution from a LNG carrier spill might be much less serious than that 
of oil (AG 1982: Mar 4th). This possible line of conflict was not picked up. Instead 
Danish actors did a lot to distance themselves from Petro-Canada and the project 
(Rasmussen 1987:151). Suddenly it was “Denmark to the rescue of Greenland against 
Canada”, as the above quoted article was entitled (AG 1982: Mar 4th). 
The experimental character of the Arctic Pilot Project was an aspect that 
strengthened scepticism. As the application stated, it was “in the nature of a pilot project 
that there are elements of uncertainty to be evaluated” (Petro-Canada 1979:9). The story 
of the Arctic Pilot Project has been described as one about a corporate chameleon who 
tried to change according to public and political demands (Lewington 1987:163). This, 
and other similar projects announced along the way, contributed to widely different 
estimates of the extent of the industrial endeavour. Estimates ranged from three tankers 
operating all year (Flensborg Avis 1981: Apr 14th) to the passage of 2000 tankers a year 
(Jyllandsposten 1981: May 27th).  
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The uncertainty could be seen from different perspectives. From the Arctic Pilot 
Project consortium, the project was a matter of gaining important knowledge, but from a 
Danish-Greenlandic perspective, the uncertainty was an argument against it. A huge 
accident could become an ecological as well as a social disaster and no survey could 
guarantee freedom from risk or harm. As the Greenlandic President of the ICC, Hans-
Pavia Rosing put it: “it is clearly an experiment, the consequences of which cannot be 
assessed by anyone” (Helsingør Dagblad 1981). It was a matter of who had the burden of 
proof. Was it the intruding part or was it the opposition?  
As mentioned, the Arctic Pilot Project applied to the Canadian National Energy 
Board in the beginning of 1979. The board would not begin the hearing before it had 
satisfactory documentation of the project’s environmental implications. After several 
legal escapades it was decided to begin the hearings in February 1982. The Inuit, 
represented by the Canadian Inuit organisation Inuit Tapirisat Canada, were an important 
part of the opposing forces. Urged by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, also the 
Greenlandic Home Rule Government accepted to testify for the Canadian Inuit, even 
though Petro-Canada did what they could to prevent it. At the hearings, presentations of 
traditional hunting techniques were among the things contributed by the Greenlanders. 
Hunter Bendt Frederiksen testified that “I know if only a small motorboat passes through 
an area, no fish are caught the next day on that route” (AG 1982: Mar 10th). But also 
other issue were included as arguments against the Arctic Pilot Project. The Greenlandic 
delegation requested above mentioned Danish zoologist Bertel Møhl to give a testimony 
of his studies of possible negative effects of supertankers on the marine environment (AG 
1982: Jan 20th). At hearings at the National Energy Board the problematic uncertainty of 
the project was emphasised by Finn Lynge in his testimony: “Would it not be more 
justified that Arctic Pilot Project should have to prove to us that the tankers do not create 
pollution?” (Socialistisk dagblad 1981: Mar 10th). In short the view was captured by an 
article title: Arctic Pilot Project is a Blemish on Canada’s Reputation as a Humane 
Country (AG 1982: Mar 10th).  
When hearings began the Arctic Pilot Project was under pressure from falling 
demand of gas due to the recession of early 1980s in the USA and Canada. In August 
1982 the hearing chairman suspend the hearings until a reasonable marketing programme 
 81 
was put together. It was not, and the process was closed in August 1984 (Lewington 
1987:176-178).  
 
5.4.4 The Jameson Land Concession 
The other of the two events was quite different. Making hydrocarbon exploration of 
Jameson Land offered something very valuable to both Danish-Greenlandic politicians 
and administrators. Since the last drillings in the summer of 1977, and contrary to 
attention the topic had received in public and political discussion on the Home Rule 
Arrangement, there had not really been much activity around hydrocarbons in Greenland. 
So, when a Danish-American consortium contacted the raw materials administration to 
review and revive an existing concession in Jameson Land in East Greenland, it is 
reasonable to assume that it was welcomed. 
 
Figure 10: Map showing the Ittoqqortoormiit area, including Jameson Land, on which Nordisk 
Mineselskab had a 50-year concession from 1952.  
 
Source: Dahl 1986:144 (Courtesy of H.C Gulløv) 
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Holding a sole concession of a somewhat arbitrary square of land in East Greenland from 
1952 and lasting 50 years, Nordisk Mineselskab, or the Nordic Mining Company, was one 
of the few private companies, along with A.P. Møller in Denmark, which had been able 
to purchase the right to resources when no one believed there were any. Contrary to the 
North Sea, Nordisk Mineselskab had not done much to explore the potential (UKG 1974) 
The largest share owner in Nordisk Mineselskab wanted it to be different. The American 
Atlantic Richfield Company − popularly called ARCO − who owned 35 percent of the 
shares, was not unfamiliar with Arctic hydrocarbons (Joint Committee 1982:7). In 1979 
Nordisk Mineselskab and ARCO contacted the newly formed Raw Materials 
Administration and proposed to begin explorations in Jameson Land, East Greenland 
within Nordisk Mineselskab’s concession area. As one of the operators of fields and 
facilities in relation to Prudhoe Bay it had been part of the Alaskan oil boom. Its 
experience with Arctic hydrocarbon extraction and investment capacity clearly impressed 
the Danish/Greenlandic representatives. The Joint Committee meeting of august 1980 
was held in Anchorage, Alaska, to allow examination of the “very big” facilities in 
Prudhoe Bay and Valdez (Joint Committee 1981:8).  
 The West Greenland off-shore Concession had been given up during the 
introduction of the Home Rule in the summer of 1978 and no other private explorations 
in Greenland followed. Now that there was an administrative and political body to 
address mineral resource questions, it might not be surprising that the Jameson Land 
project was warmly welcomed and took up a lot of the Joint Committee’s attention (Joint 
Committee 1981:7). The political agreement followed and in the autumn of 1980 the 
basic principles of the resumption of hydrocarbon explorations in Greenland was in place 
(Joint Committee 1981:9).  
The negotiations ended in late 1984 and the concession was signed in early 1985. 
Another result of the Joint Committee’s work was the formulation of public participation 
through a joint company, called Nunaoil, whose ownership was 50-50 Danish and 
Greenlandic. It was emphasised as part of the principles of equality that guided the 
overall arrangement (Joint Committee 1982:11) 
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5.4.5 Greenland’s Own Arctic Pilot Project?47 
It soon became clear that the event could become controversial within the Danish-
Greenlandic relation. Whereas the Arctic Pilot Project opposition received broad support 
and guarantees of no more off-shore drillings had been given by central Greenlandic 
politicians, the new potentially large-scale hydrocarbon project in Jameson Land took 
shape. When the Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiak entitled an editorial “Greenland’s 
own Arctic Pilot Project”, it focused on the conflicting attitudes regarding the Canadian 
project and the Danish-Greenlandic one (Rasmussen 1987:155).  Would this project lead 
to public protests as well? How would the Home Rule Government deal with it? Would 
Jameson Land re-write the story of Danish control and colonialist resource policy in the 
light of the Home Rule Arrangement’s principles of equality?  
 On the face of it there was agreement on the issue between the Danish and 
Greenlandic government. While Arctic Pilot Project was based on foreign relations, this 
was an internal matter of the kingdom. This meant that negotiations took place within the 
administrative framework. If there were disagreements they could be discussed behind 
closed doors until a satisfactory compromise had been found. The Greenlandic parliament 
actually ended up reversing the political image of proponents and opponent of 
hydrocarbon exploration. The moderate and Danish friendly Attasut was suddenly 
sceptical, and two of its parliament members ended up voting no to the final agreement in 
1984 – against a majority of 23 votes. They “felt convinced that irreparable harm would 
be inflicted on the hunting and fishing industries in Illoqqortoomiut…’ (Sermitsiak 1984: 
Nov 9th). Masking possible disagreement was also a major shift in focus from that of the 
Arctic Pilot Project. Whereas Arctic shipping had been the large looming threat, the 
framing strategy now became that of pushing the issue of transportation as far as possible 
in the background. Quoted in a newspaper, the premier at that time, Jonathan Motzfeldt 
of Siumut, framed the issue as follows: “exploration is one thing and oil transport from 
the area is another thing”. He continued that: ”if oil is found, we will decide at that time 
what to do” (AG 1984, July 11th). In the same article Jonathan Motzfeldt estimated that 
the question of oil transport was not “to be topical until about 10-15 years from now”. 
Driving a wedge between exploration and extraction/transportation suddenly allowed the 
                                                 
47
 This headline was taken from Rasmussen 1987 
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politicians to avoid the filthy reality of hydrocarbons, quite a remarkable achievement. 
The message was that exploration was the challenge right now and attention should be 
turned towards the negotiations of the concession.  
One of the most debated issues concerning the tangible exploration plans was the 
location of the supply base of Jameson Land (see figure 10). The place favoured by the 
companies, Hurry Fjord, implied navigation within sight of Illoqqortoomiut. While the 
supplies for the exploration phase were not larger than a few shiploads, the locality was 
nonetheless very controversial. The sound outside of Illoqqortoomiut was a very 
biologically productive area. Besides the hunters association and local politicians some of 
the most vocal voices were Danish. A worried Danish ornithologist, Hans Meltofte, 
wrote: “there are indications that the home rule authorities are suddenly changing their 
attitude now that economic interests of their own are at stake” (AG 1983: Nov 30th). And 
in an open letter to the Greenlandic parliament, the chairman of Greenpeace Denmark 
complained that: “those were the days … only two years ago! Of late the politicians 
certainly sing a different tune: the prospect of oil discoveries in Jameson Land has 
eclipsed the lofty ideals of protection of the environment, balance between man and 
nature etc” (AG 1984: Feb 22nd). In this perspective, the legitimate right to criticise 
Arctic industrial activity is the most serious implication, since: “how will it be possible to 
argue and fight against the much larger Canadian project which will follow the Arctic 
Pilot Project?” (AG 1984: Feb 22nd). This focus on legitimacy followed the approach 
used against the Arctic Pilot Project, seeing the Jameson Land Concession as a precursor 
to something larger.  
The decision to start exploration seems to be defendable only when it is de-
coupled from the decision of extraction and transportation. It is in this light we must see 
statements such as “the road to greater independence runs through Jameson Land” 
(Sermitsiak 1984: Oct 19th). Clearly, such a framing can be seen as an attempt to re-
establish the moral right to continue. When the political independence naturally is 
connected to economic independence, the resource extraction becomes a way to secure 
the Greenlandic autonomy, and the cultural identity it was meant to defend. In Jonathan 
Motzfeldt’s words the agreement was “decisive for the credibility of Greenland as a 
distinct society” (Sermitsiak 1984: Oct 19th). This is important because it shows that the 
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co-production of Greenland and hydrocarbons was leading to a new order. Along with the 
co-production of Greenland as both an autonomous state and as one with interests in oil 
extraction, the Homeland and Frontier positions are increasingly caught up within the 
same project of ecological modernisation. The argument of economic self-sufficiency as 
the road to independence was complying with a Danish point of view. The economic 
stability and viability that Denmark had tried to create in Greenland since the 1950s now 
seemed within reach. 
The suspicion that permeated the relations to Canadian interests was replaced by 
visions of the workers needed and the political consequences if the discovery was 
sufficiently large. Still, the image of Jameson Land as a place for oil discovery appealed 
to many. The waving of “dollars bills in front of us” had suddenly changed meaning. In 
the article “Jameson Land – local workforce involved in first work phase”, the chairman 
of the workers organisation optimistically stated that “already at this early date, local 
labour will be employed in the oil activity in Jameson Land” (AG 1983: Sep 21st). Other 
articles tried to estimate the proportions and the impact on the Greenlandic society and 
although these were “entirely based on the assumption that ARCO/Nordisk Mineselskab 
makes a single oil find that is commercially exploitable, meaning a find of 500-800 
million barrels of available oil” it left an impression of huge possibilities. Under such 
conditions it was “not unrealistic to expect a 20-25 year production period” (AG 1983: 
Jul 20th). Other figures that probably made good headlines focused on the total 
investment sums in case of discovery: “Oil Companies Ready To Invest 100 Billion 
Kroner In East Greenland” (AG 1980: Nov 20th) and “New Concession Will Pave The 
Way For Investment of Billions in Greenlandic Oil Explorations” (Weekendavisen 1983: 
Aug 19-25th).   
   
5.4.6 A Change in Attitude 
In many ways the dilemma of Jameson Land is obvious from a Greenlandic point of 
view. On the background of earlier protest and opposition towards hydrocarbons projects 
such as the Arctic Pilot Project or the west coast offshore drillings, it was easy to be 
accused of an inconsistent policy in the support of the Jameson Land Concession.  
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As the editors of Press Extracts on Greenland observed: 
 
“There has been a change in the political parties in regard to oil exploration in Jameson Land. The 
Inuit Atagatigiit which used to be against oil exploration now approves as does the ruling Siumut 
party; whereas the Atassut party, the more conservative of the three parties, who originally was the 
one who approved, is now against oil exploration.” (Press Extracts on Greenland 1986:ii) 
 
In a similar perspective, the editorial of the Greenlandic newspaper noted that “now the 
situation has suddenly become reversed”, but also asked East Greenland to show 
solidarity with the rest of the country (AG 1984: Oct 10th). Was it an isolated case, a 
change that only had something to do with Jameson Land, or was it a change in attitude? 
Were all the citizens of Greenland now suddenly proponents of hydrocarbon exploration 
and expecting solidarity from the East-Greenlanders?  
 Indeed, looking through the newspaper articles there are a bulk of utterances that 
seem to strengthen this view. Illustrative is the Greenlandic chairman of Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, Hans-Pavia Rosing, who was “of the opinion that techniques in 
the field of oil extraction and transportation are currently developing so quickly that it 
should be possible to discover an environmentally safe way of moving the oil away from 
Jameson Land”. He emphasised that “we are naturally on the side of the local population, 
as we were in the Arctic Pilot Project case” (AG 1983: Sep 21st). What was going on? A 
important part of the Home Rule authorities’ balance act was of course the fact that 
Greenland’s economy relied on far too few sources, fishing and hunting, which were (and 
are) vulnerable to climatic changes. Seen from this perspective it is therefore completely 
in line with a responsible, far sighted approach when Jonathan Motzfeldt remarked that: 
“in realistic terms, we are simply forced to find an alternative that can supplement and 
support our present financial base” (Sermitsiak 1984: Nov 2nd). The focus on 
technological development, to provide the needed certainty and safety, closely follows 
the Canadian argumentation in favour of Arctic shipping in the Arctic Pilot Project.  
One could however doubt the importance of such political manoeuvres to avoid 
loosing voters. Was it, behind the political debates, and seen from an administrative point 
of view business as usual? One of the problems in the first years of Home Rule was that 
the implementation of knowledge, the training of staff, negotiating concessions, 
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exercising control and so on, takes time. The Home Rule Administration did not have 
sufficient capacity, nor the skills, to challenge the Raw Materials Administration. That 
the Raw Material Agreement implied that almost all the know-how remained in 
Copenhagen could be understood as serving not only Danish, but also Greenlandic 
interests. A complete, powerful and skilled administration that could negotiate with the 
industrial contacts, which, as the Jameson Land Concession exemplifies, was of interest 
also to Greenlandic politicians (Davies et al 1984:xiii).  
That the Raw Materials Administration and other bureaucratic units supported the 
Copenhagen-based, existing structures was to be expected. The Home Rule was a 
Greenlandic project and not part of the ambitions of the staff in the Ministry for 
Greenland and related agencies. Many of the employees were part of a Danish career 
system (Dahl 1986:141-143). No doubt this was a sore point for both Danish and 
Greenlandic representatives. When a research project entitled Offentlig Styring af olie og 
gas i Grønland48 (Davies et al 1984) publicly criticised the equality of the hydrocarbons 
management and questioned if the politicians had sufficient knowledge about the subject 
it touched that sore point. The report concluded that “the original intentions of equality 
between Greenlandic and Danish decision-makers in the entire decision process has not 
been achieved” and the Raw materials collaboration rested on an “instable balance” 
(Davies et al 1984:iii). As could be expected, the politicians did not welcome the critique. 
The leader of the left wing party Inuit Atagatigiit and later president of Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference, Aqqaluk Lynge, captured the general attitude towards the report when he 
stated: 
  
“that the bureaucrats play a dominant role in the meetings of the joint council, as is alleged, is pure 
nonsense. Both the Greenlandic and the Danish politicians represented on the council are 
extremely competent persons. Moreover I do not think that the scientists have been very thorough” 
(Sermitsiak 1984: Apr 27th). 
 
Thorough or not, according to the 368 pages report the problem was that the goals were 
not clear. One of the authors, Anne M. P. Nielsen, said that it was “her impression that 
civil servants play a dominant role in the meetings of the joint council, that there is no 
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clear political programme with respect to oil development” (Sermitsiak 1984: Apr 27th). 
An aspect of this critique also concerns the proposals that were forwarded by the Raw 
Material Administration. There are several examples of how projects were scheduled 
only to take place in the summer half, when employment is full in Greenland, and how 
economic considerations undervalued the importance of hunting to the Greenlanders 
(Dahl 1986:143).  
 
5.4.7 Summary and Discussion of Results 
The two emblematic events point respectively towards the past and the future. The 
structure of the Arctic Pilot Project event makes use of a well known line of 
confrontation, Homeland versus Frontier. It brings to mind discussions between Denmark 
and Greenland in the mid-1970s, only now with changed discourse coalitions. In the 
Jameson Land project an old concession suddenly becomes revived within a new 
administrative structure. The arguments are now much more blurred and when local 
politicians or environmentalist attempt to revive the Homeland/Frontier structure, it is 
dismissed by leading politicians and bureaucrats. It becomes possible to say that some 
questions, which were recently posed with great strength in the Arctic Pilot Project, are 
now irrelevant or at least can be postponed, as the question of transport from Jameson 
Land.  
Arctic Pilot Project became “Greenland’s struggle”, captured by the story line 
“nature against the oil industry”. “Nature” in the story line is composed by a combination 
of the ecological consequences of the shipping and the Greenlandic way of life, the 
hunting and fishing. In this context, hydrocarbons represent “the oil industry” as an 
industrial product and not nature. The Greenlandic nature needed protection against 
outsiders, and the protection should be provided by Greenlanders – or perhaps Danish. 
The story line “export of problems” in many ways points to the local/regional tensions of 
the event. The word “export” exemplifies the importance of locating the problem: it was 
exported to Greenland from Canada. The anxiety expressed by ICC on behalf of 
Greenlandic and other Inuit hunters was about local threats (p.80). As such, the way one 
understands environmental problems resembles the arguments against the west coast 
drillings (p.57). The main arguments against ecological threats kept the threats local, kept 
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them Danish-Greenlandic. If we follow Latour’s argument (see 3.3), this is not about 
ecology because such local-based has more to do with modernisation than ecologisation.  
The Canadian and Danish-Greenlandic discourses appeared clear cut and it should 
be noted that the Danish-Greenlandic coalition was able to stay together even though the 
Home Rule negotiations were not far behind. However, the most remarkable thing is not 
the agreement over the issue, but the agreement in itself. Crucial discrepancies seem to be 
played down and suddenly one could call “Denmark to the rescue of Greenland against 
Canada”, a story line which points to the way the colonial relation suddenly was 
replayed, but now on Greenlandic initiative. In other words, if one argues that Denmark 
wanted to keep Greenland as a colony, it can also be argued that it was Greenland that 
wanted to stay a colony in some ways.  
Interestingly, although the framing of the debate surrounding the Jameson Land 
Concession follows the structure of the Arctic Pilot Project, the difference is that the 
arguments shifted hands and consequently that the legitimate conclusions were altered. 
The uncertainty of environmental effects which could have duplicated the discussion of 
threatening Arctic shipping was therefore not a problem. The uncertainty made it possible 
to postpone the decisions relating to the extraction and production of hydrocarbons, and 
concentrate on the less impacting exploration-activities. There are many examples of 
what I interpret as relatively realistic, if not to say pessimistic, estimates of the prospects 
of the project and the meagre chances of large discoveries. Of course this could be a 
game played by the commercial interests because pessimistic estimates could give more 
favourable concession terms. But at least this could have curbed the political optimism.  
When Jonathan Motzfeldt stated that “the agreement proves that the Raw Material 
Treaty49 between Denmark and Greenland works” (Sermitsiak 1984: Nov 16th), it seemed 
to strengthen the idea that a discursive change had taken place. If Hajer’s concept of 
ecological modernisation is utilised here, the story line “change in attitude” describe an 
aspect of this change. The challenges posed by the ecologically problematic aspects of 
Jameson Land did not call for an alternative approach. Rather it called for more of the 
same, more management. In this perspective, the change in Greenlandic attitude is 
therefore an approximation to an existing development, a discursive formation which was 
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already underway: Ecological modernisation. If one accepts this, what was accomplished 
by the Jameson Land Concession could turn out to be be the opposite of “Greenland as a 
distinct society”. It seems that a distinct Greenlandic political project was in fact given up 
as an alternative.  
   
Table 4: Summary of Results from 5.4 
Emblematic Event  Arctic Pilot Project Jameson Land Concession 
Story line(s) −Export of problems 
−Nature against the oil 
industry 
– Denmark to rescue 
Greenland 
− A change in attitude  
− the credibility of Greenland as a 
distinct society 
− The road to greater independence 
runs through Jameson Land 
Main Theoretical 
Perspective 
− Ecological 
Modernisation 
− Ecological modernisation 
 
 
5.5 Consolidation and Change 
With this section I want to ask what characterised the management of Greenlandic 
hydrocarbons after the Raw Material Agreement devised the administrational practice. 
Did the new situation make it possible to take legitimate positions for hydrocarbon 
exploitation? If this was the case, the “change in attitude” observed in the previous 
section would have been turned into a more permanent condition, which can be termed 
ecological modernisation. 
As we saw, the meagre results led the companies to give up their concessions on 
the west coast. What happened to the five exploration drillings in the western off-shore 
area – the “comprehensive thing”? How did science, in this case primarily state-
geologists in the Geological Survey of Greenland, act towards the political and public 
debates about hydrocarbons and how was the scientific estimates interpreted by others? 
By asking such questions, I expect to find examples of how the process of co-production 
continued to shape Greenland and its hydrocarbons.  
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5.5.1 Estimates and Perspectives 
In an article in the journal Grønland the state-geologists Karsten Secher and Bjarne Leth 
Nielsen examines the “background of the expectations regarding oil and mineral raw 
material from a strictly geological point of view”. They summarise the Danish and 
Greenlandic positions: 
  
“From the Greenlandic side was the desire of total property right to the Greenlandic subsurface … 
and some have seen a potential economic rescue in a coming oil adventure and a flourishing 
mining industry. Opposite to those desires is a Danish reluctance towards giving away the entire 
property right to Greenland’s subsurface” (Secher & Nielsen 1979:44)  
    
Concerning hydrocarbon activities so far, the authors concluded that “the intense debate 
about to the coming oil millions has until now proven to be wishful thinking not based on 
existing conditions” (Secher & Nielsen 1979:45). Could it be that geologists and 
bureaucrats really did try to downplay the availability and the economic potential of 
hydrocarbons? If they were, others were ready to pick it up. Figure 11 is an example, 
though published in 1986, of an illustration of estimated reservoirs by Geological Survey 
of Greenland.  
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Figure 11: Approximate outline of sedimentary basins in Greenland and adjacent shelf areas with a 
petroleum geological potential  
 
Source: Christensen 1987:338 (Courtesy of Geological Survey of Greenland)   
 
Interpreting the geological information carried by figure 11 could be done rather 
differently depending on what one wanted to conclude to be possible. The marked areas 
indicate a “petroleum geological potential”. Were the areas potential in the sense that all 
one needs is thorough investment in exploration? Or are they potential in the sense that 
they might or might not ever be relevant for hydrocarbon production?  
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If we consider Jameson Land, some of the newspaper articles were more 
moderately entitled: Conditional Consent to Oil Explorations (AG 1980: Oct 16th), New 
Oil Explorations Imminent (Politiken Weekly 1980: Sep 26th - Oct 2nd), Greenland’s 
Landsting50 to make Final Decision about new Oil Drillings (AG 1980: Sep 25th) or New 
Plans for Danish-American Oil Explorations in Greenland (Børsen 1981: May 25th). 
However, they still left the impression that the oil explorations would happen and that it 
merely depended on a political decision. At a quite early stage, the director of Nordic 
Mining Company, Roberto Kayser, who presumably had an interest in downplaying the 
hydrocarbon potential to improve the concession terms, estimated the chance of finding 
oil to 5 percent (AG 1980: Nov 20th). How does one interpret that? Were the chances 
good? 
The more optimistic articles appeared to believe so. The estimates were rather 
explicit, exemplified by the title First Oil Well – 10 to 15 years Ahead (AG 1982: Aug 
11th). Other articles compared Greenlandic prospects with other stories stating that 
“according to experts there is every possibility that the Greenlandic sub-surface contains 
oil deposits”. The article linked the Greenlandic story to earlier successes: “The structure 
in this area is very similar to the Alaskan area, where the largest oil discoveries in recent 
years were made” (Vestkysten 1981: Jun 15th). The Norwegian oil adventure was also 
included: “from a geological point of view, there is every probability of finding oil in 
East Greenland on the same scale as that of the oil discoveries in the North Sea west of 
Norway” (Weekendavisen 1983: Aug 19-25th). An articles estimated the construction of a 
production plant, a harbour, pipelines, approximately 300 production drillings at a total 
cost of 100 billion Danish kroner and the oil to be transported by six ice-breaking super 
tankers “if 2,4 billion barrels are found”  (AG 1980: Nov 20th).  
 Other areas were also subject to survey and evaluation. Peary Land in North 
Greenland was discussed in the Joint Committee on the basis of research made by the 
Geological Survey of Greenland in 1978-80. Referring to the Geological Survey, it was 
stated that “a necessary condition for the existence of oil or gas deposits is fulfilled”. 
While the present amount knowledge was not enough to make a “certain conclusion”, the 
Geological Survey “assessed the qualities of the area to justify further investigation” 
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(Joint Committee 1982:15). The newspaper article Everything Points Towards Oil and 
Gas in Peary Land held that “geologists have discovered rock specimens in the 
northernmost part of Greenland, Peary Land, which may very well contain oil”. 
Following this, the article stated that “this does not mean, however, that oil and gas are 
actually a certainty” below (AG 1982: Aug 25th). Commenting on an expedition to Peary 
Land, geologists called it a “terra incognita” geographically speaking, and though they 
were cautious making promises, they could have “an opinion on the probability of finding 
oil and gas” (Kristeligt Dagblad 1981: Jun 17th). Part of the co-production of knowledge 
about the existence of Greenlandic hydrocarbons is observed to take place in the 
interpretation of geological estimates and statements. Because they are unspecific, they 
are used to form a much more certain framing in the newspaper articles. As the 
geological interest moved to new areas, the exercise of making estimates was repeated, 
regardless of the past results. 
 
5.5.2 Geological Professionalism 
Because of the problematic and even conflicting aspects of the Jameson Land 
Concession, its relation to the general geological research effort in Greenland is 
interesting. The Greenland government “decreed that future off-shore explorations will 
be out of the question” (Politiken Weekly 1980: Sep 26th-Oct 2nd) and Siumut-leader Lars 
Emil Johansen stated that: “Siumut is still categorically against oil drillings in the sea, but 
possibilities of drilling on land should be investigated” (AG 1980: Sep 25th). With such 
positions one should expect that ambitions for other explorations, especially off-shore, 
would be looked upon with scepticism. 
In a formal perspective, it was a question of which raw material-related research 
activities that needed a hearing in the Joint Council, and subsequently political approval, 
and which could be handled by the Raw Material Administration. Thus, the Greenlandic 
Government noted that there had been “changing formulations in relation to the 
determination of the «dividing line»” (Joint Council dok. 27/83, cited in Dahl 1986:145). 
A relevant aspect of the question of determining such a “dividing line” was whether a 
relatively short-term political decree, such as the Greenlandic Government’s ‘no’ to 
future off-shore explorations, had any impact on scientific activities. While such a 
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guarantee made sense to a Greenlandic Government that was trapped between a 
vulnerable economy and political ambitions, it was probably not very interesting to 
geologists specialising on Greenland. Yet, despite the guarantee, the Greenlandic 
Government did acknowledge the need for “as early as possible to possess the most 
comprehensive background knowledge … regarding an environmentally responsible 
arrangement of later oil activities” (Joint Council 1984:28). Was it believed that scientific 
research was neutral and that a decision about industrial oil activities was a separate 
question?  
An exploration drilling is a rather expensive project and something that requires a 
certain financial capacity. Perhaps the companies had given up the concessions too early? 
Not all the data from the drillings was analysed and geologists from the Geological 
Survey of Greenland wanted to “form a much more complete picture of the geophysical 
conditions”. The Greenlandic Prime Minister and Joint Committee Chairman at that time, 
Jonathan Motzfeldt, “flatly denied” that it had anything to do with oil development: ”not 
at all. It has nothing to do with the policies of the Government … They want to complete 
the work out of purely professional interest” (Sermitsiak 1984: Apr 27th).  In the same 
article the director of the Geological Survey of Greenland, Martin Ghisler, maintained 
that “a new interpretation of the data may show that the explorations were done in the 
wrong places off the west coast. It may be possible to point out new exploration sites, and 
this is of course of commercial interest”. From Ghisler’s statements it can be observed 
that he does not separate professional/scientific and commercial interest. This indicates 
the “professional interest” mentioned by Motzfeldt is part of a political demarcation, not 
substantiated by the “professionals”. Could it be that a “commercial interest” was 
problem for Motzfeldt, but not for Ghisler?  
 
5.5.3 Towards New Activities 
The seminar Olje- og gassutvinning i Vestnorden51 (Nordisk Ministerråd 1987), arranged 
by the Nordic Council in 1986, did not display such different opinions on the commercial 
aspects of hydrocarbons as mentioned above. Instead, the statements made at the seminar 
seemed represent an integrated view on the ambitions of more hydrocarbon-activities. 
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The no-to-off-shore guarantee had been left for good. With the views of ecological 
modernisation as part of administrational and political practice, the co-production could 
take new forms. The framing of the hydrocarbon-issue at the seminar points towards the 
legitimacy of new activities.  
In 1986, the world crude oil price had dropped to the lowest level of the decade, 
one third of the price from 1980, something that affected the liquidity and consequently 
the exploration budgets of many oil companies (Noreng 2006:14-23). Partly as a result of 
this, the Jameson Land Concession area was relinquished in 1990, as the terms of the 
concession, seismic survey and exploration drillings had not been fulfilled.    
Aqqaluk Lynge, a Greenlandic politician and member of the Greenlandic 
Government at the time, began by reminding that the Raw Material Agreement did not 
fulfil all of the Greenlandic desires. Nevertheless, he saw the Raw Material Agreement as 
a “sustainable construction”. Regarding future hydrocarbon activities, Lynge stated that 
the Greenlandic Government “wholeheartedly” supported more activities on “both shelf 
and land areas, by several companies”. The Government did not want be dependent on a 
single project − Jameson Land. He presented how Nunaoil, “owned fifty-fifty by the 
Danish state and the Home Rule”, along with The Geological Survey of Greenland was 
to carry out a six year seismic programme, KANUMAS (Lynge 1986:29-36).  
While Lynge was careful to spell out that KANUMAS was short for Kalaallitt 
Nunaata Marine Seismic programme52, the director of The Geological Survey of 
Greenland, Martin Ghisler, seemed not to be concerned about the symbolism of names. In 
his presentation KANUMAS was “planned and presented by The Geological Survey of 
Greenland”, not mentioning Nunaoil. In addition to 22.000 km of seismic lines along East 
and West Greenland, the programme implied reprocessing the well data from 1976-1977. 
Ghisler avoided any reference to opinions outside the geological realm. The much 
debated off-shore explorations of 1976-77 were the referred to as “shelf area which has 
been subject to the oil companies’ surveys”. The eastern part of Peary Land “demands 
another oil-geological assessment”; marine-seismic surveys were “negative in an oil-
geological perspective” and “the largest continuous area which is oil-geologically 
interesting” is on the North Greenlandic shelf. In a co-production perspective it is 
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interesting that Ghisler uses the phrase “oil-geological”, which facilitates the same type 
demarcation made by Motzfeldt in the previous subsection. Another example on the 
problematic boundary between science and politics, is when Ghisler asserts that Jameson 
Land “probably” has the best hydrocarbons potential considering “the very large 
extraction and transportation problems in North Greenland” (Ghisler 1986:39-41). This 
seems to extend an oil-geological assessment a bit because Ghisler obviously has an 
opinion about what project should be preferred. 
The Raw Material Administration was represented by Secretary Birthe V. 
Steffensen. She explained the content of the Jameson Land Concession and its relation to 
the Danish North Sea concessions. Having spent most of the time presenting the Jameson 
Land Concession, and finally the future plans for explorations, she ends her presentation 
by noting that the concessionaries had stopped all activities because of the low oil prices 
of 1986 (Steffensen 1986: 151). That this uncertainty about if the plans are ever carried 
out is interesting because the presentation is so specific, exemplified by figure 12 below: 
 
Figure 12: Illustration of public involvement. X-axis: Extend of public involvement. Y-axis: 
Maximum daily production in 1.000 barrels per day. 
 
Source: Steffensen 1986:153 (Courtesy unknown) 
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As displayed by figure 12, the administrative framework included a model showing the 
official Danish-Greenlandic involvement in relation to the potential production. It shows 
how this involvement could increase from 25 percent at 0-200.000 barrels per day to 50 
percent at 375.000 barrels per day. As a comparison, the Danish and Norwegian North 
Sea outputs were 60.000 and 823.000 barrels per day, respectively (BP 2009). Who could 
tell what was most realistic: 0 or 375.000 barrels, or somewhere in between? 
The concessionaries pointed to the world crude oil price decrease of 1986 as the 
reason to suspended explorations in Jameson Land for two years ahead. Meanwhile they 
would renegotiate the concession term. They were not alone − Greenland wanted to 
renegotiate the terms of Denmark and Greenland’s sharing of the public revenue from 
hydrocarbons exploitation. The conclusion by Steffensen mirrored an uncertain situation: 
“the framework for oil activities which was described here will possibly be subject to 
considerable change within a foreseeable future” (Steffensen 1986:121-156, my italics). 
Expecting a new process of co-production to take place, it is noted how the time 
perspective is “a foreseeable future”. I interpret Steffensen’s statement as an indication of 
that Greenlandic ambition for hydrocarbon-activities now had taken the initiative in 
designing the administrative framework.  
The last Greenlandic presentation was a thorough review of “hydrocarbon 
activities in Greenland” by the Secretary from the Home Rule, Mads Christensen. As 
mentioned by Steffensen. He referred to the expression of “some discontent” about the 
model of sharing public revenue of hydrocarbon extraction. Along with Lynge, 
Christensen argued that the Greenlandic share will only replace the Danish block grant 
and thus there are “no real incentives for Greenland”. The West Coast drillings − the 
“comprehensive thing” − are not forgotten: “there is no reason to omit the fact that it 
plays a certain role in this context that the offshore drillings that took place in 1976 and 
1977 gave rise to a widespread Greenlandic resistance, in the public opinion and among 
our (Greenlandic) politicians, towards off-shore drilling” (my parenthesis). The fear of 
damage to fisheries and environmental impacts in case of oil spills or blow-out accidents 
made up the basis for that attitude. The paragraph is exactly equal to a passage in Lynge’s 
presentation. Still in line with Lynge, Christensen states that this “widespread 
Greenlandic resistance” had changed during “the latest couple of years”: a “growing 
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political understanding” about the sensitivity of only having one concession resulted in a 
long-term strategy, with activities “on-shore as well as off-shore Greenland”.  As 
Steffensen, Christensen’s presentation indicates that change is going to happen on 
Greenlandic initiative. Passing the hurdle of “Greenlandic widespread resistance”, 
Christensen seems sure that this has been resolved. The creation of the Greenlandic 
nation continued closely connected to the hydrocarbon-issue. As Christensen concludes: 
“it seems that things are on the move” Christensen 1986:329-340). In fact, they were 
already moving. 
  
5.5.4 Summary and Discussion of Results  
The analyses showed that seemingly objective presentations of knowledge could create a 
politics of hydrocarbons. When Secher & Nielsen wrote from a “strictly geological point 
of view” they nevertheless commented on the Home Rule process and the expectations of 
an oil adventure.  
Reprocessing the west coast data was initiated at a time when Greenlandic 
politicians many times had stated that no offshore activities were ever to be carried out 
again. How do we understand the state-geologist’s attempt to reopen the case? As 
Jonathan Motzfeldt, representing the Greenlandic Government, stated it was of 
“professional interest”. From the perspective of co-production it makes little sense to 
insist on the boundary between geology and politics regarding hydrocarbons. From the 
early 1970s to the mid 1980s the hydrocarbon-issue had changed character. It was no 
longer one problem among others. During the Home Rule process hydrocarbons 
manifested themselves as the fundamental question which could break the negotiations. 
From being a threat to the definition of a “Greenlandic Greenland”, hydrocarbons became 
a cornerstone in the ambitions of autonomous Greenland, as noted in 5.4.7. A politics of 
hydrocarbons had come into being, with its own institutions, strategies etc., which 
included politicians, scientists and administrators. Such a constellation made up the 
Greenlandic presentations at the seminar Oil- and gas extraction in the Western Nordic, 
in which Lynge and Christensen referred to a “growing political understanding” about 
strategies regarding hydrocarbons. It seems that Motzfeldt (in 1984) wanted to close the 
discussion of new hydrocarbon-activities by referring to a “purely professional interest”. 
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Two years later (in 1986), Lynge and Christensen talk about activities in “on-shore as 
well as off-shore Greenland”. When an administrative framework had been formalised 
the discussion went from being about basic questions – oil or no oil – to a detailed 
discussion about how to carry out the hydrocarbon activities.   
 
Table 5: Summary of Results from 5.5 
Emblematic Issue(s) − The reprocessing of West Coast data  
Story line(s) − Oil-geologically interesting 
− Growing political understanding 
− A sustainable construction  
Main Theoretical Perspective − Co-production 
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6.0 Summary of Results 
The analysis, which was distributed over five sections, sought to answer the research 
question by interpreting relevant statements and events from the period in question. It 
also included preceding events and statements to contextualise and to identify relevant 
parts of the process. This chapter will summarise the results, schematically presented in 
table 6 below.  
 The first section investigated some of the historical background of hydrocarbons 
in Greenland. This pointed towards geology as the field where many of the general 
thoughts about Greenland’s potential in a Danish perspective were spawned. This 
framing was exemplified by Greenland being presented as a “lottery slip”. Not only was 
geology the first and leading scientific discipline in Greenland for many years. Many 
prominent and popular explorers were also geologists. The case of the East Greenland 
occupation in the international court is the most important event during the period 
examined by the section. It shows that the combination of science and exploration was a 
powerful tool in gaining territorial control over all of Greenland.  
 The second section focused on the connection between hydrocarbons and modern 
development of the Greenlandic society. The core event, emblematic for its time, was the 
discovery of North Sea oil, or perhaps more the consequences it had. The Mining Act of 
1965 and the Concession Committee indicated the beginning of a growing interest in 
hydrocarbons exploitation as a crucial factor of Greenlandic development. Several 
institutions filled the positions of supplying the needed knowledge, for instance the 
Geological Survey of Greenland. Though the development was questioned by many, the 
concessions off the west coast were granted. Protests against the Danish controlled and 
initiated industrial development began to be more visible. It now became clear that the 
Homeland position was a significant force of legitimacy and argumentation. The 
discussion at the time, exemplified by story lines such as the “comprehensive thing” and 
“to open up Greenland”, is now placed between the opposing positions of Homeland and 
Frontier. Curiously, the story line “the Norwegian pattern” represents something new in 
the sense that it differs from a strictly Danish framework.  
Stating that Greenland was Denmark’s last frontier is to simplify too much; 
developments took place within a broader regional context. Concerning administrative 
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attitude − exemplified by the Concession Committee − it is also a slight move away from 
the Frontier position. Towards what seemed not to be entirely clear at the time. 
 The third section went more thoroughly into relating hydrocarbons to the broader 
political development in Greenland, represented by the Home Rule process as the major 
event. The section had a double view on the Home Rule process.  
The first view was on the new questions and new politics which were raised and 
debated before and during the process. It focused on the Greenlandic statements relating 
to the Homeland position with an ethnic/national emphasis. This was exemplified by the 
story line “a more Greenlandic Greenland”. The new politics, especially of the Siumut 
party, provided the background for a broad Greenlandic questioning of resource 
extraction. This was influenced by the west coast offshore concessions, the 
“comprehensive thing”, and the Danish dominated administrative process around this.  
Many on the Greenlandic side of the Home Rule Commission insisted that 
Greenlanders were a people with rights, while the leading Danish negotiators insisted on 
solidarity in the sense that no-one in the kingdom should have special rights. The 
discussion of the phrase “fundamental rights” illustrates this. However, regarding 
hydrocarbons the ethnic or national rights question was not the only challenge. The 
blowouts in 1977 are important because they reinstalled the environmental perspective in 
the rights-debate. The blowouts showed the risk of pollution as something that could 
change the hydrocarbon-issue. It was not only a debate about the right to explore and 
extract, but also about the right to pollute.  
The second view emphasised the solution provided by the process, exemplified by 
the Raw Material Agreement. The point was to look for changes brought about by the 
hydrocarbon-issue in the way nature was going to be managed after the Home Rule 
process. The Home Rule process was seen as a first step towards ecological 
modernisation in the sense that the Home Rule Commission actually managed to devise 
an administrative solution. The story line “principle of equality” captures the way the 
Raw Material Agreement framed the natural resources. From being a contested area, it 
seemed that now hydrocarbons would be the primary driving force in a Danish-
Greenlandic partnership. Figure 4-6 displayed that everybody did not see the agreement 
as “equal”. In fact, the insistence on the term “equality” is interesting since almost all 
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institutions are placed in Copenhagen. An overview of the presentations from a 
conference in Qaqortoq was analysed in relation the coming joint administration of 
hydrocarbons. While many relevant and difficult questions were brought up, the 
conference itself seemed to take place without major confrontations. The diverging 
opinions presented at the conference did not exclude one another.    
 The fourth section is where the turning point regarding discursive structures was 
made explicitly visible − from the conflict line of Homeland/Frontier towards ecological 
modernisation as the primary realm of reference. The section examines two emblematic 
events, the Artic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land Concession. The events are 
emblematic in the sense that they each portray core features of the discursive changes of 
hydrocarbons in Greenland in the period. The aim is to understand how hydrocarbon 
activities in Greenland continued under the Home Rule administration, where central 
politicians had argued against the concessions and drillings on the west coast.  
It was found that the Arctic Pilot Project exemplified lines of argumentation 
closely related to a Homeland/Frontier conflict. The opposing discourse-coalition 
employed many of the same arguments as the Greenlandic side in the Home Rule 
process, which resembles the Homeland position in many aspects. The Canadian interests 
behind the project were aligned to a position close to the Frontier. Since it was concluded 
that this argumentative structure by and large was left behind during the Home Rule 
process, it seems that the discussion of the Artic Pilot Project relates backwards in time.   
The Arctic Pilot Project was argued to be an event that mobilised a very broad discourse-
coalition opposing the project. The coalition consisted of a large spectrum of political, 
administrative, organisational and public opinions. Almost everyone in the coalition 
agreed that this was an “export of problems”. Most aspects of the project were subject to 
suspicion, exemplified by the story line “nature against the oil industry”. 
On the other hand, The Jameson Land Concession was not understood as having a 
discourse-coalition with a similarly clear aim. Though the two events may seem alike, 
there were obviously large differences. It became apparent that many of the same 
ingredients used to oppose the Arctic Pilot Project were present: There were objections 
based on ecological arguments, both with regard to damage to nature and possibilities of 
hunting. The concession-project was experimental in the sense that it was the first of its 
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kind in Greenland, and it could reasonably be understood as a precursor for further 
industrial developments. The huge difference was that those who stated the ecology-
based arguments against the Jameson Land Project had a much smaller coalition. It was 
some Greenlandic, but mainly Danish voices, who wanted to conserve the Greenlandic 
environment, exemplified by the open letter from the Chairman of Greenpeace Denmark. 
The members of Attasut who voted against the concession objected to the pace, the low 
level of involvement of the locals and the lack of information. But they did not question 
the project in principle.  
The coalition which carried the Jameson Land Concession through used the core 
arguments in a new way; something indicated by the story line “change in attitude”. The 
uncertainties related to the concession-project were turned to an argument for, not 
against. The central issues involved were separated. Ecological challenges could now be 
a matter of supply base localisation or compensation to hunters and fishers or damage 
done by the seismic surveys. But the basic link provided by the Homeland position, in a 
Homeland/Frontier conflict, was not legitimate any more. The issues did not compose a 
broad and interconnected front as they did in the opposition-coalition. Similarly, the 
hydrocarbon-activities were separated into exploration and extraction. The section shows 
how it became possible to postpone the discussion of the latter. More knowledge was 
needed before such a discussion was relevant and before decisions could be made. In 
other words, more management and more surveys. This is why the Jameson Land 
Concession is understood as a definitive turn towards ecological modernisation. The 
related story line was termed “The credibility of Greenland as a distinct society” to mark 
how such a change was seen as central to Greenland’s “road to greater independence”, 
another story line. The ambitions of autonomous Greenland now were on a par with the 
ambitions implied by ecological modernisation. With these issues in place, hydrocarbon 
extraction could become part of the narrative of autonomous Greenland too.     
 The fifth section of the analysis ends the period in question and looks beyond by 
describing central arguments from a conference which took place in 1986. The section 
picks up on the views articulated by the “change in attitude” related to the Jameson Land 
Concession. From a co-production perspective, emphasis is now turned towards 
scientists, state geologists in particular, and the way politicians and administrators frame 
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nature through the hydrocarbon-issue as a scientific area. The emblematic issue of the 
section is the reprocessing of west coast data; thereby re-producing (recycling?) the story 
line termed the “comprehensive thing” in section two. The section notes how Greenlandic 
politicians defended the reprocessing as a “professional interest”. In this perspective, the 
possibilities of relating vague geological estimates to other realities, for instance the 
Norwegian North Sea discoveries, were investigated. The section finds that many 
newspaper articles convey over-optimistic conclusions, but also that geologist pointed to 
the desires of a Norwegian-like oil adventure. This is also exemplified by figure 11 
(p.93), with the areas of “oil-geological interest”. Even if geologists and politicians 
wanted to separate things, the section indicates how the hydrocarbon-issue mixed desires 
and facts. The process of co-production continued to shape the way hydrocarbons was 
related to the narrative of autonomous Greenland.  
The statements from the seminar in the section are confirming the result from 
section four, especially concerning the Jameson Land Concession. There is now a 
“growing political understanding” of the need for mineral resource projects and the Raw 
Material Agreement is characterised as “a sustainable construction”. That the Jameson 
Land Concession was terminated during 1986 did not disturb the presentations of for 
instance public involvement, figure 12 (p.98), by the newly founded Danish-Greenlandic 
oil company Nunaoil. The Raw Material Agreement had worked the way it was supposed 
to and the desire of new hydrocarbon-activities based on a “growing political 
understanding” was seen as a culmination of the change. 
  
Table 6: Summary of Result from 5.1-5.5 in a Chronologic Perspective 
Time / Section Emblematic Issues 
(or event) 
Story lines Main 
Theoretical 
Perspectives 
1920-1960 / 1  − East Greenland 
occupation in the 
international court 
− The lottery slip  
− Same phenomenon as 
in Texas 
− Co-production 
1960-1975 / 2 − North Sea Oil 
discoveries/Norwegian 
−A comprehensive thing  
− To open up Greenland 
− Co-production 
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discoveries 
− The West Greenland 
concessions  
− The Norwegian pattern 
1975-1980 / 3 − The blowouts 
− The Raw Material 
Agreement 
− A more Greenlandic 
Greenland 
− Fundamental rights 
− Principle of equality  
− Political-moral 
demands 
− Ecological 
modernisation 
1980-1985 / 4a − Arctic Pilot Project −Export of problems 
−Nature against the oil 
industry 
– Denmark to rescue 
Greenland 
− Ecological 
modernisation 
1980-1985 / 4b − Jameson Land 
Concession 
− A change in attitude  
− the credibility of 
Greenland as a distinct 
society 
− The road to greater 
independence runs 
through Jameson Land 
− Ecological 
modernisation 
 
1985-1987 / 5 − The reprocessing of 
west coast data  
− Oil-geologically 
interesting 
− Growing political 
understanding 
− A sustainable 
construction 
− Co-production 
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7.0 Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to answer Q1: How did the issue of hydrocarbons relate to 
the framing and management of Greenland’s natural resources and nature between 
approximately 1975 and 1985? 
 
The issue of hydrocarbons gave content to an eco-modernist turn in the administrative 
framework of autonomous Greenland. From 1975-1985 a change of the framing is visible 
through the way problems relating to the hydrocarbon-issue is discussed, both in formal 
fora such as the Danish parliament and the Home Rule Commission as well as more 
informal fora such as news papers and the Journal Grønland.  
The research question prompts attention to the way events and statements became 
legitimate. I found that hydrocarbons were part of the Danish discussion about Greenland 
from a quite early stage, something which framed the image of Greenland. Larger events, 
such as the case of the East Greenland occupation in the international court and the North 
Sea discoveries helped legitimise hydrocarbon-related statements through the connection 
to central narratives.  
Two important aspects of the hydrocarbon-issue show that it was changing 
character: ecological issues and Greenlandic rights claims. In the beginning all of these 
were intertwined, strongly connected within the Homeland position, in a way that made it 
hard to recognise their difference. This is indeed related to the framing and management 
of the Greenland’s natural resources and nature. During the Home Rule process it 
slowly became clear that the right to extract and the right to pollute represented two 
different issues. While the new politics of Greenland had claimed the right to govern 
both, the sovereign right to extract was given up. The character of the Raw Material 
Agreement proposed an administrative framework that dealt with the politics of 
hydrocarbons including pollution, but left the rights question behind with a vague 
formulation. Since the rights question was solved, the environmental problems remained 
the main issue.  
This way, the hydrocarbon-issue became related to the increased focus on the 
management of nature and natural resources. While earlier the hydrocarbon-issue had 
revoked conflict between rights and interests, it began to revoke conflict between modern 
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development and nature. Contrary to the rights-discussion, the ecologically problematic 
aspects of hydrocarbon-activities were not settled. In the case of Greenlandic 
hydrocarbons, this implied that a basic yes/no standpoint regarding exploitation became 
difficult to insist on, because nobody knew the consequences for sure. Thereby, the 
Greenlandic hydrocarbons and nature became a complicated matter, something that 
should be managed. From this perspective, the Home Rule process can be summed up as: 
Those who manage are those who have the right to pollute and vice-versa. 
 Hydrocarbon-activities in Greenland had the potential to become an ecological 
dilemma. The politico-administrative turn, begun by the Raw Material Agreement, was a 
change of framing and management which by and large resembled Hajer’s ecological 
modernisation. During the Arctic Pilot Project and the Jameson Land Concession, the 
argumentation around the hydrocarbon-issue became an environmental question. The 
environmental challenge it posed centred attention on local problems and risks; it was 
still a matter of blowouts or other oil spills. With regards to Latour, it can be questioned 
whether this was about ecology or just another way to modernise. It seems as though the 
administrative framework, which was originally made for hydrocarbons, was extended to 
cover the environment too.  
The hydrocarbon-issue gradually moved towards the centre of the creation of 
autonomous Greenland. Hydrocarbons in Greenland and the Greenlandic nation were co-
produced in the same process. Thus, when hydrocarbons were connected to an ecological 
modernisation it allowed the newly formed Home Rule administration, in a joint Danish-
Greenlandic effort, to adopt this, not only as a road to independence, but as something 
giving credibility to Greenland as a distinct society.  
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Appendix 2: List of Articles from the journal Grønland 
The journal Grønland, chronological list of articles. The style of reference is: year(issue), 
pages: author(s) (author’s profession or back ground): title 
 
1970(5), pp. 129.136: Bjarne Leth Nielsen (Cand. scient. in Geology): På spor af sjældne 
metaller i sydgrønland – man har boret på kvanefjellet, kan uranmalmen brydes? 
 
1970(6), pp. 173-179: W. Dansgaard, S.J. Johnsen & H.B. Clausen (Physics Laboratory 
II, H.C.Ørsted Institute): Grønlands klima – før,nu og 50 år frem 
 
1970(8), pp. 225-228: Gert Asmund (Chemical Engineer and PhD): Danmark bør have et 
institut for minedrift 
 
1970(12), pp. 374-375: Erling Høegh (Politician, Chairman of the provincial council 
1967-71): Grønland, minedrift og selvrespekt 
 
1971(1), pp. 14-21: Karsten Secher (State geologist): Geologi i Grønland – en geologisk 
vandreudstilling til grønland 
 
1971(3), pp. 65-76: Erik Hesselbjerg (Permanent Secretaty in the Ministry for 
Greenland): Muligheder i Grønlands undergrund? 
 
1971(12), pp. 365-374: Bjørn Thomassen (?): Prospektering i Østgrønland 
 
1972(4), pp. 97-110: Erling Fundal (Mag. Scient): Det vestgrønalndske jern – geologiens 
arbejdsfelt og eskimoens værktøj 
 
1973(2), pp. 58-64: Børge Fristrup (Senior lecturer) og Jørgen Taagholt (Ingeneer): 
Geofysisk aktivitet i det nordøstligste Grønland 
 
1973(2), pp. 65-69: K. Ellitsgård-Rasmussen (Director of the Geological Survey of 
Greenland) & Nils Henriksen (statsgeolog): Perpsektiver ved fortsat geologisk 
udforskning af Nordøstgrønland 
 
1973(3), pp. 100-102: Hans Berg (Mag.Scient in etnography): Om at lukke Grønland op 
 
1973a(4), pp. 123-126: Erik Hesselbjerg (Permanent Secretaty in the Ministry for 
Greenland):  
»Om at lukke Grønland op« 
 
1973(5), pp. 164-166: Finn Lynge (Pater): Cominco, Greenex og socialmedhjælperne – 
nye problemer, gamle problemer 
 
1973(6), pp. 181-189: Martin Ghisler (Geologist): Malmefterforskning i Grønland 
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1973(6), pp. 190-193: Aksel Mikkelsen (Engineer): Om at lukke op for Grønlands 
resourcer 
 
1973(6) pp.194-198: anonym & (Paul Marshall (Engineer)): Grønland – et 
udviklingsland, interview med Paul Marshall 
  
1973(7), pp. 242-245: Dan Laursen (Dr.Phil): Profiler af udenlandske videnskabsmænd i 
Grønland. V. 
 
1973b(7), pp. 246-249: Erik Hesselbjerg (Permanent Secretaty in the Ministry for 
Greenland): Ingen illusioner om, at begyndende mineralvirksomhed i Grønland bliver 
problemfri 
 
1974(3), pp. 65-71 : Ellen Boye (?): Samarbejde rundt om Nordpolen 
 
1974(5), pp. 143-154: Bjarne Leth Nielsen: Uraneftersøgning og uranforekomster i 
Grønland 
 
1974(6), pp. 195-196: Arctic People’s Conference: Dansk oversættelse af resolutionen 
fra Arctic People’s Conference, 22-25 november 1973 
 
1974(7),  pp. 225-230: Ole Petersen og Robert Petersen (Linguist): Sælfangeren og vejret 
 
1974(9), pp. 285-292: Jens Dahl (Anthropologist): Minedrift og samfund 
 
1974(9), pp. 273-284: Ole Stecher og Peter Thy (?): Minedrift i Grønland – om 
rentabilitet af malmforekomster og muligheden for en effektiv kontrol med mineselskaber 
 
1975(7), pp.209-212: Jørgen Jørgensen (Historian): Omlægning af kommission for 
videnskabelige undersøgelser i Grønland  
 
1975(7), pp.213-220: Jørgen Taagholt og H.C.Bach: Hvad foregår der af videnskabelig 
aktivitet i Grønland i dag? 
 
1976(1), pp.5-14: Finn Lynge: En administrator fra de canadiske nordområder ser 
tilbage – interview med Graham Rowley 
 
1976(2), pp.58-64: Jakob Janussen (?): Hvad er hjemmestyrekommissionen og hvad laver 
den egentlig? 
 
1976(7), pp.209-214: Jens Brøsted og H.C.Gulløv: Grønlandsk hjemmestyre på danske 
betingelser? 
 
1977(1), pp.22-24: Isi Foighel (Dr.jur, Chairman of the Home Rule Commission): 
Hjemmestyrekommissionens arbejde, ligeværdigt samarbejde og neutralt formandsskab 
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1977(3), pp.69-85: Ole B.Olsen og Anker Weidick (Engineer): Vandkraft i Grønland – 
perspektiver og problemer 
 
1977(3), pp.95-104: A. Eichstedt Nielsen og Georg Lind Petersen: Status for Grønlands 
energisituation 
 
1977(3), pp.86-90: Jørgen Taagholt og Preben Gudmandsen: Det ukendte land under 
indlandsisen 
 
1977(6), pp.165-170: Carl Johan Ohsten (?): Nedlæggelsen af kulminebyen Qutdligssat 
 
1978(1), pp.70-76: Anker Jørgensen (Premier Minister of Denmark 1972-73, 1975-82): 
Anker Jørgensen’s tale i Grønlands Radio 8. august 1977 
 
1978(1), pp.64-69: Lars Emil Johansen (Politician, GL): MF Lars Emil Johansens tale i 
folketinget den 16. januar 1974 
 
1978(3), pp.106-109: Axel Kjær Sørensen (historian): Ophævelsen af Grønlands 
kolonistatus et grønlandsk krav? 
 
1978(6), pp.191-203: Angmalortoq Olsen (?): Betragtninger om hjemmestyre med 
specielt henblik på erhvervslivet 
 
1979(2), pp.44-51: Bjarne Leth Nielsen og Karsten Secher: Grønlands mineralrigdomme 
 
1980(5), pp.117-144: Jørgen Taagholt: Forskning i Polhavet  
 
1981(1), pp.16-21: Peter Appel (Geologist): Geologiske undersøgelser i Isukasia, Nuuk 
kommune 
 
1981(2), pp.33-40: Bjarne Leth Nielsen: Ti års regional uraneftersøgning i Grønland 
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Appendix 3: List of Interview details 
 
Gert Vigh (DK) – Retired Director of the Raw Materials Administration. Face-to-face 
interview 21.04.09. 
 
Kim Andersen (DK), MP (Denmark), Chairman of the Joint Council (from 2003), face-
to-face Interview 22.04.09 
 
Kaj Kleist (GL), Retired Director of the Home Rule administration. Telephone interview 
18.05.09 
 
Jørn Skov Nielsen (DK), Director if the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum in 
Greenland, recommended by the Home Rule representation in Copenhagen. Face-to-face 
Interview 25.05.09 
 
Anonymous (GL), Greenlandic intellectual. Telephone interview 03.07.09 
 
 124 
Appendix 4: List of News Paper Articles 
Press Extracts on Greenland 1981-1985  
 
 
   
Issue Page 
in 
issue 
Date Newspaper Title & author (if stated) 
v1n1 10 1980 Sep 12-19 Politiken 
Weekly 
Heated debate on development of resources 
in Greenland 
 16 1980 sep 25  Atuagagdliutit / 
Grønlandsposten 
(AG) 
Greenland landsting to make final decision 
about new oil drillings  
 9 1980 Sep 26 Politiken 
Weekly 
New Oil Explorations Imminent 
v1n1 38 1980 oct 2  AG The Canadian supertankers will be put into 
operation  
 42 1980 oct 2  AG Greenland is to participate in negotiations 
about supertankers 
 45 1980 oct 2  AG Qaanaaq wants to from common front with 
inuit in Canada againt supertankers  
 5 1980  Oct 16 AG Oil and the East Greenlanders 
 7 1980 Oct 16  AG Conditional Consent to Oil Explorations  
 37 1980 oct 16 AG The landsstyre maintained its opposition to 
tankers  
 44 1980 oct 16  AG Against supertankers 
v1n2 2 1980 nov 20 AG Possibility of Danish approval of APP  
v1n2 6 1980 nov 20  AG Oil companies ready to invest 100 billion kr 
in east Greenland  
v1n3 9 1981 mar 5  AG Peary land next goal in oil exploration  
v1n4 10 1981 april 14  Flensborg Avis Denmark is hesitating with an 
environmental treaty for arctic natural gas  
 16 1981 apr 19 Helsingør 
Dagblad 
Canada’s economy and the environment in 
the arctic ocean are the pavons in the game 
for a new supertanker route 
v1n5 7 1981 may 25  Børsen New plans for Danish-american oil 
explorations in Greenland  
v1n5 8 1981 may 27  Jyllandsposten Canada is pressing for environmental 
agreement with respect to Greenland  
 6 1981 jun 3 Jyllandsposten Environmental agreement with Canada in 
connection with the arctic pilot project 
delayed  
 10 1981 june 15  Vestkysten Oil pipeline across greenland 
v1n5 11 1981 jun 17  Kristeligt 
Dagblad 
Interesting results in north Greenland  
 13 1981 jun 17  Helsingør Opposition to supertankers along the coast 
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Dagblad of Greenland and Canada 
 14 1981 jun 22  Jyllandsposten Attempt to continue research in Greenland   
 1 1981 jun 26  Information Postcard from Greenland (VII): a new Alta 
 15 1981 jul 24 Kristeligt 
Dagblad 
Arctic gas 
v1n6 28 1981 oct 20 Jydske tidende 
Sønderborg 
Greenland fears Canadian supertankers  
 26 1982 jan 6  AG Dkr 200,000 to Danish peary land 
expeditions 
 29 1982 jan 20   AG APP hearings begin February 2 
 30 date lost  AG We must ally ourselves with environmental 
organizations 
 34 1982 jan 27  AG Defeat app? 
v1n7 19 1982 mar 4  AG Denmark to the rescue of Greenland against 
Canada  
 7 1982 mar 6  Information Greenland’s struggle 
 10 1982 mar 10  Socialistisk 
dagblad 
Greenlandic criticism of Canadian 
supertanker project 
 12 1982 mar 17  AG APP also reads ag 
 13 1982 mar 17  AG APP is a blemish on canada’s reputation as 
a humane country 
 14 1982 mar 17 AG APP would like to go to Greenland 
 15 1982 mar 24 AG Greenlandic participation in the second part 
of the app hearings as well 
v2n1 5 1982 jun 9 AG APP is to be pushed trough with offers of 
jobs and money 
 6 1982 jul 9-15  Politiken 
Weekly 
Industrial research in Greenland  
 7 1982 jul 20 Næstved tidende The search for oil on again in Greenland  
 10 1982 aug 6-12  Politiken 
Weekly 
Oil venture in jameson land encounters 
resistance amongst hunters 
 13 1982 aug 6-12  Politiken 
Weekly 
Greenlandic oil search free for state 
 15 1982 aug 11 AG First oil well – 10 to 15 years ahead 
 17 1982 aug 18  AG APP gas may smooth relations between USA 
and Europe 
 18 1982 aug 25 AG Everything points towards oil and gas in 
peary land 
v2n2 29 1983 apr AG 995,000 kroner for research in jameson land 
v2n3 51 1983 jul 1  Sermitsiak ICC sets same conditions for jameson land 
as for APP 
 8 1983 jul 20 AG Greenlandic workers in jameson land? – 
part 1 (søren Andersen and jens matiesen) 
 14 1983 aug 10  AG Greenlandic workers in jameson land? – 
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part 2 
 19 1983 aug 19-25 Weekendavisen New concession will pave the way for 
investment of billions in Greenlandic oil 
explorations 
v2n4 1 1983 sep 7  AG Marine agreement to safeguard the fragile 
arctic 
 3 1983 sep 21  AG New joint company entering the search for 
oil 
 5 1983 sep 21 AG  Concession not obtained without a fight 
 7 1983 sep 21  AG Jameson land – local worksforce involved in 
first work phase 
 8 1983 nov  30  AG Supertankers threaten hunting population 
and environment in east Greenland” (Hans 
Meltofte, ornithologist 
v3n1 7 1983 dec 21  AG Joint council rejected acceleration of 
jameson land project 
 9 1983 dec 30  Sermitsiak Jameson land and the environment (Ole 
Oxholm, editor-in-chief) 
 15 1984 feb 22  AG Open letter to the landsting (Jesper Boje 
Christensen, Greenpeace Denmark) 
v3n2 5 1984 apr 27  Sermitsiak Political resentment makes debate on 
jameson land an election issue 
 34 1984 apr 27  Sermitsiak A reversed north south dialogue 
v3n3 3 1984 jul 11  AG There is no alternative to hurry fiord 
 1 1984 jul 17  AG An agreement with arco Greenland was in 
effect accepted 
 8 1984 sep 28  Sermitsiak Scrutinisation of oilfields off west coast 
v3n4 1 1984 oct 10  AG Outboard motor or possibly kayak 
 2 1984 oct 10 AG Joint committee on resources recommends: 
search for oil can start 
 8 1984 oct 19 Sermitsiak The road to greater independence runs 
through jameson land 
 10 1984 nov 2  Sermitsiak Oil exploration – but the hunters will be 
protected 
 12 1984 nov 9  Sermitsiak 23 said “yes” – 2 said “no” to oil 
exploration 
 14 1984 nov 14  AG 10,000 square kilometres of land to be 
explored 
 15 1984 nov 14  AG Jameson land: liaison committee will ensure 
local population’s insight into the search for 
oil 
 16 1984 nov 16  Sermitsiak Oil agreements can be signed in December 
 17 1984 dec 14  Sermitsiak Jørgen peder Hansen is the chairman of the 
new Danish-greenlandic oil company 
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v4n1 25 1985 jan 3  AG Thank you for good and exciting teamwork”  
 2 1985 feb 27  AG Fight against oil pollution 
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide 
Intervjuguide 
Grunnleggende spørsmål:  
Hvordan gikk det an å komme fra uenighet i 1978 til enighet i 2008? 
 
Personlig 
• Hvordan vil du beskrive din personlige erfaring med spørsmålet om 
petroleumsutnyttelse i Grønland? 
 [How will you describe your personal experience with the issue of petroleum 
extraction in Greenland?]  
 
Historiske sammenhenge: hvor startede det? Hva førte til hva? Hvem spillede hvilke 
roller? Hvem tog initiativ til hva? 
• Hvordan har forholdet mellom en generell naturforståelse og 
petroleumsutnyttelse forandret seg siden innførselen av Hjemmestyret? 
[How has the relationship between a general conception of nature and petroleum 
extraction changed since the introduction of the Home Rule?] 
 
• Hvorfor var det behov for en ny avtale mellom Grønland og Danmark nå, hvorfor 
var det nødvendig med selvstyreavtalen? 
[Why was a new agreement between Greenland and Denmark needed, why was it 
necessary with the Self Rule agreement?] 
 
Betydningsfulle hendelser, diskusjoner, artikler, bøker med mer. Hva har vært de sentrale 
inputs i tankegangen? Hvor kommer ideene fra? 
• Hvilke hendelser har vært viktige for utviklingen av råstoffområdet, særlig 
petroleum, i Grønland? 
•  [Which events have been important to the development of mineral raw 
materials (petroleum) in Greenland between 1979 and today?] 
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• På hvilken måte har spørsmålet om rettigheter hatt betydning for forståelsen 
og diskusjonen av denne utvikling? [How significant has the issue of rights 
been to the appreciation and the discussion concerning these events?]   
• Har noen personer, artikler, bøker el.lign. vært viktige og sentrale for 
utviklingen av råstoffområdet (petroleum) i Grønland? 
• Er det noe som særlig har skapt debatt omkring arbeide relatert til utnyttelse 
av petroleum i Grønland? 
 
Samspillet med  
• Hvilken rolle spiller geologiske analyser av petroleumsressurser  
[How have geological analysis of petroleum resources affected these events?] 
•  
Det daglige arbeide: Hvilke utfordringer og problemer er der? 
 
 
• Hvilke kortsiktige regionale konsekvenser kunne et funn av store 
petroleumsreserver i Grønland ha? 
[What kind of short term regional consequences could the finding of large 
petroleum reserves in Greenland have?]  
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Appendix 6: Interview Contract 
Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet 
Petroleum i Grønland – Viten og ressurser i et arktisk perspektiv 
[Petroleum in Greenland – Knowledge and Resources in an Arctic 
Perspective] 
 
Bergen, 05.02.09 
 
Bakgrunn og hensikt 
Dette er et spørsmål til deg om å delta i en forskningsstudie for å belyse utviklingen i 
spørsmålet om petroleumsutvinning i Grønland fra 1970-tallet til i dag. Studien er et 
mastergradsprosjekt i Region og regionalisering ved Universitetet i Bergen. Jeg ønsker å 
fokusere på møtet mellom danske og grønlandske synspunkter. Som kontekst ønskes 
diskusjonen satt inn i en arktisk, regional sammenheng.  
Hensikten med dette er å se om utviklingen av forholdet til petroleumsutvinning 
på Grønland kan skape innsikt i større regionale, kanskje globale, tendenser og meninger. 
Og da særlig med forholdet mellom viten og naturressurser som innfallsvinkel.  
 
Kriterier for deltakelse  
Det viktigste kriterium er en dyptgående og relativt langvarig erfaring med det feltet jeg 
skriver om, nemlig spørsmålet om viten og naturressurser, nærmere bestemt petroleum, i 
Grønland. Og særlig møtet mellom danske og grønlandske synspunkter om dette. Denne 
erfaringen kan enten være direkte; at du har deltatt i arbeidsprosesser der vedrører 
spørsmål om petroleum i Grønland - teknisk, administrativt, politisk osv. Eller indirekte; 
at du på annen vis har beskjeftiget deg med spørsmål om rettigheter, naturressurser og 
viten i Grønland, Danmark eller Arktis på en måte som jeg vurderer som relevant som 
kilde. 
 
Hva innebærer studien? 
Et strukturert intervju på en halv til en hel times varighet. Intervjuet vil bli tatt opp og 
transkribert etterfølgende. Jeg vil først ha en rekke fastlagte spørsmål og deretter er det 
mulighet for en mer fri samtale. Intervjuet vil inngå som kildemateriale i 
forskningsprosjektet sammen med rapporter, betenkninger, medieutklipp og sekundær 
litteratur. I alt tenkes å gjøre 5-7 intervjuer. 
 
Tidsskjema – hva skjer og når skjer det?  
Høsten 2008 + Våren 2009: Litteratur/dokument studier, bakgrunnsinformasjon og 
kontekst. Vår/sommer 2009: Intervjuer. Høst 2009: Analyse og skriving. Vår 2010: 
Oppgaven ferdiggjøres og levers 
 
Bakgrunnsinformasjon om studien  
Mitt utgangspunkt er en interesse for hvordan teknologi påvirker oss som mennesker i et 
samfunn. I dette prosjektet velger jeg å se på petroleum som eksponent for teknologisk 
utvikling. Etter min mening er Arktis er veldig interessant område i denne sammenheng. 
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Det skrives mye om både klimaforandring og uutnyttete naturressurser, samtidig som 
Arktis som territorium fortsatt mangler å defineres helt klart. 
Nettopp det at kommersiell petroleumsutvinning ikke har skjedd på Grønland etter 
30 års undersøkelser gir en unik mulighet for å lære om hvordan vi som samfunn 
forholder oss til petroleum som fenomen. Dette ville da kunne danne fundament for 
overveielser om de samfunnsmessige konsekvensene av et fremtidig petroleumsfunn. 
 
Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?  
Du velger selv om du vil være anonym. I utgangpunktet ønsker jeg å publisere studien 
uten anonymitet, dvs. med fult navn, men avgjørelse er din. Du vil få mulighet til sjekke 
studien innen den publiseres og vil kunne rette og slette dine sitater.   
Ditt intervju og den informasjonen som registreres om deg skal kun brukes slik som 
beskrevet i hensikten med studien. Ved anonymitet vil opplysningene og prøvene vil bli 
behandlet uten navn og fødselsnummer eller andre direkte gjenkjennende opplysninger..  
 
Ved anonymitet er det kun autorisert personell knyttet til prosjektet som har adgang til 
navnelisten og som kan finne tilbake til deg.  
Da utvalget er lite vil fullstendig anonymitet være vanskelig å garantere. Om anonymitet 
ønskes vil det så langt som mulig bli forsøkt å publisere resultatene så du ikke kan 
identifiseres. For eksempel vil dine sitater bare bli introdusert med en kort generell 
beskrivelse av din stilling.    
 
Frivillig deltakelse 
Det er frivillig å delta i studien. Du kan når som helst og uten å oppgi noen grunn trekke 
ditt samtykke til å delta i studien. Dersom du ønsker å delta, undertegner du 
samtykkeerklæringen på siste side. Om du nå sier ja til å delta, kan du senere trekke 
tilbake ditt samtykke.  
 
Informasjon om utfallet av studien 
Du vil få informasjon om utfallet av studien. Som tidligere skrevet vil du få mulighet til 
sjekke studien innen den publiseres og vil kunne rette og slette dine sitater. Dessuten vil 
jeg naturligvis sende deg den ferdige oppgave. For øvrig vil jeg være takknemmelig for 
alle kommentarer, synspunkter og innspill du måtte komme med.   
 
Samtykke til deltakelse i studien  
Om du bekrefter ditt samtykke på e-post eller telefon, kan vi vente med signering til vi 
treffes. 
 
Jeg er villig til å delta i studien  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato) 
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Appendix 7: Example of Categories used in Analysis 
Categories of interviews:  
Environment, nature, identity (dark green) 
Homeland: when Environment, nature, identity appear as a part of Greenland’s position 
before and in the first years of Home Rule (problem: HCs are a treat, narrative: 
Greenlanders are hunters of nature) 
Eco.mod.: when Environment, nature, identity appear as part of Danish or mid-80s Home 
Rule and the need for More knowledge (problem: lack of knowledge and means to 
control development, narrative: Greenland needs a sound financial base to gain political 
independence) 
 
Hydrocarbons history (blue) or the history of the discussion of hydrocarbons 
Opposition (reverse frontier): the opposition to frontier activities as e.g. APP – related to 
‘homeland’ (problem: outside world is trying to impose its industrial culture, narrative: it 
is possible to protest, we can do something about it) 
 
Practice of the Joint Council and the Raw Material Administration (purple) 
Administration – how JC works (problem: to avoid disagreement, narrative: as ecomod or 
science 
 
Arctic or regional perspectives (light green) 
Contact: when contact is made to other areas, group etc. 
 
Change in orientation or attitude (yellow) 
Conflict: is any conflicting postitions mentioned as a problem? 
 
Knowledge – localisation and use (turquoise) 
Time: is time an issue a: ‘ we have to make the decision now’ ‘it will be ready in 2 years’ 
Place names: how are place names mentioned in the article? 
Estimate: current estimates  
Science: the role of science 
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Summary in Danish 
 
Dette speciale handler om olie og gas − hydrocarboner − i Grønland. Selvom man 
gennem 40 års indsats ikke har fundet hydrocarbon-felter som har kunnet udnyttes 
kommercielt, har hydrocarboner været tæt forbundet med ambitioner om grønlandsk 
selvstændighed. Først i Hjemmestyreordning fra 1978 og senest i Selvstyreordningen fra 
2009.  
            Specialet undersøger hvordan hydrocarbon-spørgsmålet og konstruktionen af det 
autonome Grønland, Hjemmestyret, ændrede karakter fra 1975-1985. Dette analyseres 
via to teoretiske perspektiver: økologisk modernisering (Hajer 1995) og ko-produktion 
(Jasanoff 2004). Der argumenteres for at forståelsen af grønlandske hydrocarboner og 
den grønlandske nation skabte hinanden, blev ko-produceret. Dette ses af at diskussionen 
om rettighederne til den grønlandske undergrund blev erstattet af en diskussion om 
forurening ved hydrocarbon-aktiviteter. Hvor rettighedsdiskussionen indikerede en klar 
konflikt, kan spørgsmålet om forurening aldrig helt afklares. Herved blev naturen 
inddraget i forvaltningen af hydrocarboner. Denne inkludering af økologiske aspekter i et 
moderne forvaltningsregime forstås som etableringen af en ny diskurs, økologisk 
modernisering. Specialet inkluderer en historisk analyse af den dansk-grønlandske 
hjemmestyreproces, inklusiv Hjemmestyreloven og Hjemmestyrebetænkningen og en del 
andre relaterede dokumenter. Det empiriske materiale inkluderer og artikler fra 
tidsskriftet Grønland, artikler fra grønlandske og danske aviser og interviewer med 
nøglepersoner. 
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